So-called 'development courses' in American universities struggle with the question of the Third World's quest for 'modernization' and reform.
Academics ponder the various vested interests (academic-speak for 'making money off the system') that hinder reform efforts: the elected official who is unresponsive to his electorate, the obstacles to grass-roots organization, etc.
Imagine my surprise when these Third-World models, which have been applied for the past few decades in Latin America, Africa and Asia, fit appropriately to the case of present-day Ukraine. Land reform provides a useful illustration of my point.
Economic evidence strongly indicates that land reform would be economically beneficial for the country. Do the Ukrainian powers-that-be not recognize this? Surely then a few economics classes would correct the problem.
Sarcasm aside, no intelligent observer would assert that general ignorance to modern economics is the reason land reform has stalled in this country. So why hasn't land reform made any significant progress for the last four years?
In short: 'Land reform has been hijacked by Ukraine's political left,' as the World Bank's vice president for Europe and Central Asia, Johannes Linnes, said last week during a speech at Kyiv Mohyla Academy. Land reform has been disassociated from its economic ramifications and made a political pawn of those with an ideological bone to pick.
Beyond the ideological dimension, vested interests in opposing land reform reinforce the status quo. The persistent creation of monopolies that control the processes of agricultural inputs and processing reinforce the government's control over the sector. Segregating vested interest from ideology is a tricky business: Which came first, the chicken (the Soviet-inherited need to control every aspect of the economy) or the egg (the vested interest that made control profitable)?
Geography also works to the detriment of progressive land-reform politics; farmers are spread out across rural areas, which makes organizing common interests difficult. Opposition forces, of course, are conveniently concentrated in the capital.
Institutional support for those who have an interest in the rights of landholders is also lacking. Organizations that ostensibly represent the rights of lessors – such as the Association of Land Lessors – are typically created by the government itself, an odd twist on the Western concept of non-governmental organization. Their power to lobby the government, of course, is thus compromised.
What's more, the government's institutional framework does not allow for a clear decision-making process. If a lobby group did get itself together to represent the interests of landowners, who would they go to in order to exert their influence?
To the adviser on economic and agricultural issues in the presidential administration, to the deputy prime minister for the agro-industrial complex in the Cabinet of Ministers, or to the Verhovna Rada's state agricultural sector committee. All three of those bodies have committees, advisers, and deputy prime ministers who are charged with governing the agricultural sector. And they can't even decide who among them has the right to make decisions over land reform issues.
Ukraine has a somewhat curtailed political map with regard to land reform. Its stagnation over the past few years parallels that of many developing countries.
The parallel between Ukraine and the Third World breaks down, of course, when you start comparing Ukrainian society to that in the developing world.
In Ukraine, the forces of reform are not trying to introduce a modern culture to replace or complement a traditional culture – Ukraine has a modern culture. The task here is to introduce a different modern culture (based on free-market ideas) to replace another modern ideology that has been defeated by history (that is, of course, Soviet Communism).
Even though aspects of the development models apply, differences between the former Soviet states and the so-called developing world should not be glossed over. Reform efforts must heed the fact that Ukraine and the other former Soviet states are not the developing world. They are the transitioning world.
Where does that leave the reform process? If you've ever done any exercise in case studies you'll find that the main lesson is that every case is unique. Why does shock therapy move one economy through the pains of economic transition quickly, while it crushes another economy? The success or failure of a certain policy depends on initial conditions. That means you can't just apply a recipe of development – or even another country's successful transition policy – to Ukraine and expect it to work.
But just as Ukraine's uniqueness poses certain obstacles to reform it also introduces certain assets that the developing world lacks. For one, the country's human assets are extensive. The former Soviet states still enjoy a first-class level of education, especially in technological and scientific realms. The country also has extensive infrastructure, though it is quickly deteriorating. A successful reform strategy will effectively use those to bring about change.
The hard part is getting those assets to a market where they can benefit the country.
The political map I outlined above indicates some specifically political solutions to Ukraine's land reform stalemate that are self-evident: Grassroots organization among landowners is essential, as is the institutional support of the grassroots interests; and streamlining the decision-making process also ranks highly, along with breaking up vested interests. Getting to the point where these things are possible, however, is a much more difficult path to navigate.
Ukraine's political geography highlights the necessity of nurturing an atmosphere for reform on every level of society, both on the government and local levels. It stresses the importance of bringing along the bureaucratic, legal, and institutional components of reform at the same pace. Above all, it reiterates that change is possible only if there is a general consensus for reform among the polity and the powers that be, when people see that their interest lies in changing the status quo.
My prognosis for change to Ukraine's stalemate is not much more optimistic – either Ukraine will reform itself or market forces will. It has to be done carefully, or a lot of people will be impoverished in the process. That is why a well-planned market reform is the best solution. The only real question surrounding land reform is when it will take place and with how much suffering.
Andrea Curti, a former Post staff writer, is a graduate student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Massachusetts.
She is currently writing a joint masters thesis on the politics of land reform in Ukraine.
