A meme that did the rounds on social media just after the Feb. 12, 2015 Minsk peace conference between the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany illustrated Kyiv and the West’s position in Minsk perfectly: it shows French President Francois Hollande, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko walking in a group, with Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin behind them.
The figures of the leaders are obscured below the shoulders by a balcony parapet, onto which the meme creator has drawn the forms of Hollande, Merkel and Poroshenko with their arms tied behind their backs, and Lukashenko and Putin carrying pistols trained on the French, German and Ukrainian leaders’ backs.
Ukraine went into the second Minsk peace conference having suffered a surge in attacks following the first Minsk “cease-fire,” which was supposed to start in September 2014.
Attacks on Ukraine by Russia’s proxy forces in the Donbas gradually escalated into the winter of 2014-2015, culminating in the loss of Donetsk airport on Jan. 21, 2015 in some of the most ferocious fighting seen since the start of Russia’s not-so-covert war on Ukraine.
Slow to react as ever, the West, led by Germany and France, only came up with a plan for a peace on Feb. 7, 2015.
By that time, Russia’s army and proxy forces were building up for an attack on Debaltsevo, a vital rail hub in a finger of government-held land that jutted into territories controlled by the Russian-backed armed groups in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.
Minsk II was also supposed to start with a cease-fire on Feb. 15.
It didn’t: within three days Debaltseve had fallen to Russia’s proxy forces, with the main assault carried out by Russian regular troops from the 8th Guards Motor-Rifle brigade, the 18th Guards Motor-Rifle brigade, the 25th Spetsnaz Regiment and the 5th Guards Tank Brigade. Internet sleuths identified these units from their social media posts, though the Kremlin, of course, denies deploying its army units in Ukraine.
But these troops were indeed the “gun” Russian President Vladimir Putin had trained at Ukraine even as he took his seat at the negotiating table in Minsk. As the commander in chief of the Russian armed forces, it is inconceivable that Putin had no knowledge of his troops’ deployment around Debaltsevo.
As Brian Whitmore of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty succinctly pointed out in his Daily Vertical podcast of March 3, 2016, Minsk II “wasn’t a cease-fire. It was blackmail. It was extortion.”
Putin and the Kremlin used Minsk not as a means to achieve peace, but as a way to further conduct their war on Ukraine. In the agreement, they wove together conditions that Russia could, but would not meet (a full cease-fire), and conditions that Ukraine would, but could not meet (constitutional changes and elections in the Donbas). And the West fell for it.
They’re still falling for it, and, absurdly, they’re blaming Ukraine more than Russia for the failure of Minsk II.
Since Minsk II it has been quite clear that the Kremlin is perfectly capable of calling a halt to the war in eastern Ukraine whenever it wants: witness the sudden lull in fighting in September 2015, when the Kremlin entered the Syria conflict.
As international and Ukrainian domestic events develop, so the fighting in eastern Ukraine ebbs and flows, according to the wishes and goals of the Kremlin at the time.
The Minsk II agreement has thirteen points. None have been fulfilled, but that does not mean Ukraine and Russia are equally to blame for its failure. Before work can begin to bring about a political resolution of the crisis, the first-three “military” points have to be fulfilled.
However: Point one – a full ceasefire in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts – has never been honored for more than a few days by Russia, even though the Kremlin could order a halt to the fighting (and it has proved it can) at any time.
Point two – the pullout of heavy weapons – has never been honored by Russia or its proxy forces. Since the beginning of this year hardly a week has gone by without Ukraine reporting the use of “Minsk-banned” heavy weapons on its forces, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the organization charged with overseeing the cease-fire and weapons pullback, has confirmed some of these reports.
Point three – the monitoring of the cease-fire and weapons pullout by the OSCE – has never been allowed by Russia’s proxy forces. The OSCE faces severe restrictions in its movements in the occupied zone, its monitors on the ground have received death threats, and its monitoring drones have been jammed or shot out of the sky.
While some have blamed Ukraine for violating Minsk II by returning some heavy weaponry to the conflict zone, what was Kyiv to do when faced with continued attacks with heavy weapons by Russia’s proxies on its lightly armed frontline troops?
As noted above, it is not Kyiv that can bring an end to the fighting in the Donbas, but the Kremlin. Is Ukraine supposed to sit back and let Russia’s proxy forces take more territory without a response? Remember, Kyiv has lost control of more than 550 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory since the first Minsk agreement.
But for the West’s spineless leaders, it’s always been much easier to blame the victim, Ukraine, than the aggressor, Russia.
In fact, just as the Kremlin started the war in Ukraine, so it can begin the process of ending it. That means fulfilling point one of Minsk II. It is ludicrous to blame Kyiv (as Russia is doing) for failing to carry out points 11 and 12 of the agreement, on constitutional reform and elections in the Donbas, when Russia is entirely to blame for bringing progress on Minsk II to a dead stop at point one.
The implementation of Minsk II will not truly start until Russia and its proxies stop shooting. Until then, blaming Ukraine for the failure of Minsk isn’t just unfair on Kyiv – it’s playing along with the Kremlin’s games.
Euan MacDonald is an editor of the Kyiv Post.
