Nineteen German infantry battalions marched into the Rhineland demilitarized
zone on March 7, 1936, violating Articles 42 and
43 of the Treaty of Versailles and Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Locarno.
Hitler had been agitated and nervy before the
operation, eyewitnesses said. The Fuehrer himself later said that “the 48 hours
after the march into the Rhineland were the most nerve-racking in my life. If
the French had then marched into the Rhineland we would have had to withdraw
with our tails between our legs, for the military resources at our disposal
would have been wholly inadequate for even a moderate resistance.”
Indeed, as U.S. journalist William L. Shirer
later wrote, if the French had sent their troops into the Rhineland to stop the
Fuehrer’s forces “that almost certainly would have been the end of Hitler,
after which history might have taken quite a different and brighter turn than
it did, for the dictator could never have survived such a fiasco…”
Hitler knew there was a chance that his enemies might
take military action against his troops, and plans were in place for them to
make a fighting withdrawal if this were to happen. But he was also betting on
the weakness and indecision of the Western powers. He won his bet, and was
emboldened to set the stakes higher in bets on subsequent military adventures.
In every case, up to Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939, he won his
bets.
A year ago today another authoritarian leader of
a militarily aggressive European state, Russian President Vladimir Putin, similarly
bet on the weakness of Western leaders, and won. After overnight talks in the
Belarussian capital of Minsk, it was announced early on Feb. 12, 2015 that a
package of measures to implement the peace deal achieved the previous
September, also in Minsk, had been agreed. This second agreement, dubbed Minsk
II, was essentially an agreement to try to implement a peace plan that had
already failed.
The agreement included the declaration of a cease-fire, which was to
start at midnight on Feb. 15. The guns indeed went quiet at that time – but
only for about 40 minutes. Over subsequent days, the fighting in the Donbas
again intensified, culminating in the capture of the key strategic town of
Debaltseve from Ukrainian forces on Feb. 18.
Surrounded and outgunned, Ukrainian troops withdrew from the town,
reporting that they had been in combat with Russian soldiers. There is now no
doubt that Russian troops were heavily involved in the fighting for Debaltseve.
An investigation by citizen-journalist outfit Bellingcat has even identified one of the
specific Russian units involved in the seizure of Debaltseve – the 5th Tank
Brigade, based in the Russian Republic of Buryatia, in south-central Siberia.
Obviously, for these troops to have been in combat in the days leading
to the fall of Debaltseve, they and their tanks must have been deployed into
Ukraine at least a few days before. It is also inconceivable that they could
have been so deployed without the knowledge of their commander-in-chief, Putin.
So as Putin sat at the table in Minsk, talking peace, he was fully aware
that his forces were preparing for more war. And, no doubt, he was betting that
the Western response to the Russian military seizure of Debaltseve would be
weak and indecisive.
He was right. In the wake of the Russian attack on Debaltseve, the
United States declared that the issue of providing Ukraine with lethal weapons
to defend its territory was “on the table.” But even after subsequent
violations of Minsk II, such weapons have never arrived.
The European Union condemned the “separatist” assault on Debaltseve as a
“clear violation of the cease-fire,” with EU
Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini stating that the EU was prepared to take
“appropriate action” in the event of further violations of the agreement. There
have been further violations of Minsk II since then, notably the “separatist”
occupation of the village of Kominternove in Donetsk Oblast on Dec. 22, 2015.
No “appropriate action” has ever come in response, and certain EU countries are
now even talking about a relaxation of sanctions on Russia.
Appropriate action in response to Russia’s clear violation of the Minsk
II agreement, just days after it was signed, would have been to impose even
more painful sanctions on Moscow, and perhaps to have drawn a credible “red
line” – a commitment to supply Ukraine with lethal weapons if there were
further violations of the agreement.
But as Putin correctly bet, there was no such action or commitment from
the EU and the United States – just more strong diplomatic language, which
Putin now knows he can safely ignore.
As the exiled Russian dissident and Putin critic Gary Kasparov has
noted on numerous occasions, dictators do not ask “Why?” but “Why not?”
Unless, in the wake of further violations of Minsk II by Russia, Western
leaders can give Putin a credible answer to that second question, there is
little doubt that Russia’s military aggression, in Ukraine and elsewhere, will
not only continue, but will intensify. That is the lesson taught to Western
leaders by history, but one it seems they have still not learned.
