The independent watchdog Committee of Voters of Ukraine, which deployed thousands of monitors nationwide, indicated that the number and scale of election violations were not dissimilar to past elections under the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, all of which were judged free and fair.
While international observers, through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, drew a more critical conclusion, few can deny that despite significant problems with fairness, Ukraine’s election results demonstrate that pluralism and political opposition remain powerful forces in the country’s life and that elections in Ukraine are very different from those in Belarus, Russia or Kazakhstan.
The likely outcome (as indicated by an average of six different exit polls) reveals a highly competitive political environment. Around 31 percent of votes were cast for the Regions Party and 12 percent for its ally, the Communist Party—yielding a total of 43 percent for the ruling team.
The exit poll average also showed around 24 percent for the United Opposition Fatherland Party of imprisoned former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, 14 percent for boxing champion Vitali Klitschko’s moderate Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms, and 12 percent for the xenophobic Freedom (Svoboda) Party led by Oleh Tiahnybok; giving anti-government forces around 50 percent of the vote.
But the party preference vote will not drive the Regions Party from power. This is because only half the Rada’s 450 deputies are elected on the basis of party preference. The other half were selected in single-mandate districts. And here, the Regions Party is accumulating a large advantage, in some measure as a result of the use of administrative resources. Still, it is important to remember the electoral law was passed by common agreement between the opposition and the Party of Regions.
As a result, Yanukovych’s party should end up with approximately190-200 seats in the 450 seat parliament, together with the support of 30 Communists another 30 or so independents, mainly businessmen who need a good relationship with those in power. This eventually should yield a pro-government bloc of a majority of more than 250 lawmakers.
From all accounts, it appears the new pro-presidential majority will be narrower and more fissiparous than in the last legislature. This is not only because the electorate strongly backed opposition parties, but also because major oligarchs have ensured that their loyalists will be well represented in the legislature. Indeed, one informed estimate suggests that as many at 100 legislators will have direct associations with the country’s 10 wealthiest businessmen.
Problems in the local vote count remain. These seem confined to a handful of closely contested districts, where candidates with a reputation for corruption are seeking to nullify the public’s choices.
But several things are already clear:
a) Despite the use of administrative resources and a far from level playing field, political pluralism is alive and well in Ukraine;
b) New political forces (both constructive— Kltischko’s UDAR — and worryingly — the Freedom Party) have emerged;
c) Ukraine enjoys a highly active civil society, an open campaigning environment, a freewheeling internet and relatively open political debate on television.
In the aftermath of the elections, Yanukovych’s next steps are far from clear. But this is par for the course, as during the Yanukovych presidency, Ukraine has been something of a paradox.
The president has been effective in building a stronger infrastructure for his country, helping reduce the country’s budget deficit while cutting taxes, preserving Ukraine’s sovereignty by building new relationships with China and Asia, instituting concrete reforms that are required for closer integration with Europe, and withstanding Russia’s pressure to integrate.
Moreover, despite caricatures of Yanukovych as another Vladimir Putin or Alexander Lukashenko, under his watch rival political parties have been able to conduct vigorous campaigns with the benefit of generally open campaigning, vigorous debates on television, and through a wide-ranging Internet.
Still, his rule has often been tone deaf to the will of the Ukrainian people and to the friendly counsel of Europe and the U.S.
His government has been dominated by the interests of the country’s extant and aspiring billionaires, and evidence of cronyism and corruption abounds,. Moreover, conspicuous consumption by the ruling elite is rampant in a relatively poor country. Most importantly, under Yanukovych, the judiciary’s independence and impartiality has been severely eroded, impeding foreign investment and resulting in tensions with the West over the Tymoshenko case.
In the end, Yanukovych will have to make some fateful choices in the coming weeks and months. These choices will determine whether Ukraine resumes its path toward integration with Europe, becomes increasingly isolated or succumbs to Russian hegemony.
Most importantly, given the election results, Yanukovych will not be able to make these choices without taking into account the views of Ukraine’s voters and Ukraine’s powerful economic elites. And that gives reason for cautious optimism.
Adrian Karatnycky is the managing partner with the Myrmidon Group LLC, a New York-based consultancy with representation in Kyiv that works with investors and corporations seeking entry into the complex but lucrative emerging markets of Ukraine and Eastern Europe. The website is at www.myrmidongrpllc.com.
