On a visit to Brussels in late March, she suggested that there could be fighting between what she regards as a repressive Ukrainian state and the general population, during which members of the opposition could be placed in jail. Her political party, Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko-Batkivshchyna, raised the prospect of the country exploding into another Orange Revolution-style uprising which could even turn violent this time. She also suggested that the Arab Spring pro-democracy movement could learn from what she regards as the failure to reform Ukraine in the wake of the Orange Revolution that overturned a presidential election rigged for Yanukovych.
To be sure, the extension of Russia’s lease of the Black Sea Fleet base at Sevastopol in return for cheaper Russian gas imports heralds a closer relationship between the two countries. Pressure on the broadcast media and a few highly publicized cases of missing journalists has led some to return to the question of media and press freedom.
Equally, there were attempts to influence the outcome of the local elections held last autumn that were regarded by some as not free and fair. Moreover, the criminal investigation of Tymoshenko and several of her former ministers for abuse of office has raised the specter of politically-inspired justice.
However, the comparison between Ukraine and North Africa and the Middle East is a little far-fetched. Ukraine, after all, is a young democracy with relatively well-run elections which are the most competitive in the whole of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Equally, the argument that Ukraine is once again becoming authoritarian regime is something of an overreaction. The reality is somewhat more complicated.
One person’s illegitimate administrative resource is another person’s effective governance. Under the orange regime, there was internecine warfare between the branches of power which rendered the country almost ungovernable. Since Yanukovych was elected president the country has witnessed a dramatic consolidation of the political system. With the new ruling majority coalition in the Verkhovna Rada led by Yanukovych’s Party of Regions the legislature and the executive are aligned under the umbrella of one political party. Moreover, with the constitutional settlement reverting from the one that arose out of the Orange Revolution which simply confused governance to the 1996 constitution in which the presidency is primary, lines of authority and accountability have become much clearer.
Political consolidation coupled with the Party of Regions entrenched popularity has enabled the government under Prime Minister Mykola Azarov to implement unpopular reforms. While Tymoshenko’s government prevaricated, this government has dramatically increased utilities charges and is planning to reform the pension system by raising the retirement age, a very difficult measure given the country’s poor life expectancy. These reforms have been at the expense of the Party of Regions popularity with its poll rating falling to around 25 percent. Only once has the populist card been played and that was when the president vetoed the tax code protecting the simplified taxation regime for small entrepreneurs.
Reform has been beneficial for the economy, which has been stabilized and grew by almost 5 percent in 2010 and is expected to grow by a similar amount this year. Industrial growth accelerated to 10.5 percent in February, compared to the previous year, while currency reserves have reached a record level of $37 billion, ensuring a stable exchange rate.
Moreover while the International Monetary Fund propped up Tymoshenko’s government to assist her presidential campaign, the Azarov government has mostly met the strict conditionality that the IMF has imposed on its continued lending.
This compliance to date has had wider benefits as the government and corporate borrowers have been able to tap into international capital markets for the first time since the financial crisis. There is already evidence that the upturn in the economy is leading to increased domestic consumption and therefore being felt and seen at street level. In the medium term, the government plans to lift the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land, which — with the current high world agricultural commodity prices — will benefit the country’s economy.
Also on the economic front, the government has sought to promote domestic commercial interests. It has been negotiating hard with the EU over the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. In particular the government has tried to resist the EU wish to introduce an asymmetrical deal which would damage the interests of Ukraine’s crucial agricultural and steel producers.
At the same time the government has reserved the right to negotiate some form of integration with Russia’s customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus. It has also been trying to negotiate a reduced gas import price with Russia whilst also exploring domestic shale gas production to reduce its energy dependence. Equally, the admittedly opaque privatisation of Ukrtelecom seems likely to have resulted in the transfer of the ownership this strategic company to one or other or several of the country’s domestic business groups.
The government has even tried to address one of the country’s perennial problems that of corruption. Whilst the attack on high corruption and the abuse of public office has resulted in criminal investigations of Tymoshenko and several of her former ministers and senior officials, members of the Party of Regions have also been investigated. The commencement of proceedings against former president Kuchma over the killing of Georgiy Gongadze suggests no one is immune irrespective of their politics and connections. Moreover the government has passed legislation designed to make its functioning more transparent and to reduce corruption. The government needs to ensure that the electorate perceive a reduction in corruption in time for the parliamentary elections next year.
The West was so desperate for Tymoshenko to win the presidential election last year that it was always likely that Yanukovych’s victory would be greeted by a splurge of anti-Ukrainian articles in the press. While the present authorities are far from perfect, criticism must be seen in this light. The intention is to discredit Yanukovych, his business supporters and his electorate. Yet paradoxically, the West dare not “lose” Ukraine to the Russian orbit and so Yanukovych and Ukraine has more room for maneuver than he or it imagines. Western pressure on Yanukovych may even grow in the coming months as the geopolitical tug of war with Russia unfolds but the west will not disengage for fear of losing what grip it does have over the country.
Adam Swain is a lecturer in geography at the University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom.
