All
agree the decisions at Vilnius will be highly consequential. But we
do not really know what we want the decisions to be. And we probably
have profound disagreements even in this room about what we expect to
achieve with these decisions, either at the Vilnius Summit or in the
future of the Eastern Partnership.
Ironically,
the Vilnius Summit is the first occasion the EU has ever had to make
any decision on the Eastern Partnership itself since its founding on
May 7, 2009 in Prague. Over the past four years experts have focused
on facets of the problem (values vs. interests, Orange or Blue,
Russia or Europe) and neglected the context for the Eastern Question
as a whole. I want to step back and look at how the EU and Eastern
Partners have arrived at this crossroads in Vilnius and how the key
questions have been framed.
The
Archaeology:
The Eastern Partnership was not, as most people suppose, an
altruistic response to the weakness of the smaller, post-Soviet
states. It was Western Europe’s response to the deficiencies of
its institutions and its loss of influence in the East. On April 4,
2008, NATO’s MAP had collapsed at the Bucharest Summit with the
rejection of Georgia and Ukraine and in a bitter dispute between the
US and Germany. In response to the institutional vacuum which then
spread throughout Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, Radek Sikorski and
Carl Bildt pitched the Eastern Partnership to the European Union less
than sixty days after the disaster in Bucharest.
By
the time the Eastern Partnership was finally adopted in Prague on May
7, 2009, the financial markets of the West had also collapsed and the
West had remained on the side lines of the Russian-Georgian war the
previous October. The EU created the Eastern Partnership because it
did not have anything else with which to manage its relationships
with adjacent post-Soviet states and the South Caucasus.
This
is an important point. Ukraine and Georgia did not apply for closer
relations with the EU. The EU proposed engagement to the Eastern
partners, not the other way around. (The EU may be the first suitor
in history to propose engagement and then spend the next four years
excoriating the morals of their chosen fiancé.)
The
proposal of the Eastern Partnership was motivated by a sense that
Europe lacked the instruments to influence the Eastern countries and,
lacking the tools of foreign policy, Europe risked political and
economic disorder and even war on its Eastern borders. As the author
of the Eastern Partnership, Europe therefore bears responsibility for
the sincerity and content of its own policy. In fact, content became
the first crisis of the Eastern Partnership. At first, the policy
was just a vacuous as the institutional deficit which it was designed
to fill.
What
is really on offer in Partnership?
As
in all marriages, most fights are about money, and the Eastern
Partnership was no exception. Supporters of the Mediterranean Union
and members interested in the Balkans and Black Sea immediately went
after funding for the Eastern Partnership, leaving it under-resourced
at birth. It seemed to many at the time that the Eastern Partnership
was too much for most of Western Europe and too little for all of
Eastern Europe.
This
critical view has evolved over time as the Association process has
taken on symbolic weight, as the DCFTA has acquired real content, and
as visa-liberalization has become a credible goal for citizens in
Partner countries. Today, we might say that the Eastern Partnership
is not much but it is more than nothing.
It
is worth spending a minute on how the EP finally gained a grudging
acceptance among half of the Eastern partners.
False
expectations. In the beginning, Georgia saw every Western
institution including EP as a way to gain US security guarantees.
Likewise, Moldova saw every institutional affiliation as offering
the perspective of EU membership. Azerbaijan saw the EP as WTO by
another name and who can say what Lukashenko thought. Gradually,
these illusions were laid to rest.
Many
countries, particularly Ukraine, saw the Eastern Partnership as a
one-way street which required years of strenuous reforms for little
gain at the end (or none at all if the goal posts were moved.) Most
if not all of the near-term deliverables come from the Partners and
many of the rewards, such as DCFTA, involve losses to the Partners
in the initial years.
However,
the travel and trade provisions of the Association Agreement
gradually became more prominent and these pocket-book issues had a
positive impact on voters concerned with jobs and oligarchs
concerned with trade with the EU. At the same time, post-Soviet
political leaders began to understand the interconnectedness of
Western institutions. An association and even a limited trade deal
with the EU helps with the IMF (a little) which helps with FDI,
which helps with credit rating, trade balance, political stability
etc.
At
the moment, AA and DCFTA are nothing remotely like the economic and
labor mobility benefits that were offered to the Visegrad and Vilnius
states a generation ago or the Marshall Plan aid to Western Europe
after WWII. There is no comparison. One might say “Never has so
little been offered so reluctantly to so many poor people by so many
much richer people.” But the Eastern Partnership was never proposed
as a destination but as a mechanism which would allow for closer
relationships to develop. In this sense (and in this limited sense
only) the Eastern Partnership is just barely enough to pass as an
institution.
The
devolution of the Eastern Partnership:
But even as the Eastern Partnership began to take on content, its
partners were heading for the exits. Belarus had no interest and no
possibilities from the start. For Lukashenko, reform is synonymous
with “regime change,” and for once he was right. It is far safer
for Belarus to hide in the Customs Union from Western institutions
than to suffer the intrusive affections of the EU. More recently,
Armenia dropped out of the Association process ostensibly in favour
of membership in the Customs Union. In truth, the Armenians
calculated correctly that Russian military and commercial powers are
a far more persuasive deterrent to Azeri and Turkish irredentist
desires than the mild scolding of faraway Europe. For those
countries who are still pre-occupied with the harsh requirements of
hard security a “partnership” does not offer anything. (Misha
Saakashvili for most of his Presidency felt much the same way.)
Azerbaijan sits at the more luxurious end of the “opt-out”
spectrum. With enough petro-dollars, the comparative advantages of a
little more trade with Europe pale in comparison with the threat
which political reform would pose to the longevity of the Aliyev
clan.
So
without much fuss and solely by natural causes, the class of Partner
countries declined by 50% in roughly four years and now is comprised
of only Ukraine, Moldova and arguably Georgia. If the Eastern
Partnership were a corporation, a decline in market share of 50%
would be a very negative indicator indeed. In political
organizations, however, such a radical change in constituency
produces different kinds of effects.
There
are no longer enough smaller states in the EP to balance the vast
size and weight of Ukraine. For the last couple of years, the
debate on the Eastern partnership has become exclusively a
discussion of Ukraine. Like the only student in school, the spoiled
child gets too much attention and becomes ungovernable.
Moldova
and Georgia, on the other hand, soon discovered that with very
little effort they can come along for the ride. Whatever they do,
their failures will not compare with the faults of the Ukraine, and
whatever good they do will be too small to impress. Basically both
countries are countries whose leadership is only partially on-board
with European values (Georgia far behind Moldova), but they will be
brought along at Vilnius to soften opposition to Ukraine.
In
the brutal language of politics, at Vilnius the EU may “Put
lipstick on the pig.” Moldova and Georgia are the lipstick;
Ukraine is the pig. Said more politely, it is unwise to try to build
institutions with extremely small classes of membership because
fairness, standards and equality are very hard to maintain as the
number of applicants declines to one.
The
problem of Ukraine: Reform and Red Lines:
This brings us to the problems which the dominant role of Ukraine has
brought to the Eastern Partnership. At the most basic level, since
Ukraine does not have to compete with other candidates for a place in
the Association program, it begins to negotiate with the European
Union on what it presumes are equal terms. Obviously, for Ukraine to
believe that Association can be achieved by negotiation as opposed to
by qualification is a very bad thing for those in Europe who expect
to see as much reform from Kyiv as humanly possible. For the purposes
of our discussion today, we can say that the dynamic of reform in
Ukraine is not organized to Europe’s satisfaction nor does it
generate the progress Europe would like to see.
Secondly,
it has been widely known for years that the large post-Communist
states (such as Romania and Bulgaria) take far longer on internal
reforms (notably judiciary and Governmental corruption) than small
states like the Baltics or Slovenia. Poland is the great exception.
Ukraine is by far the largest and most post-Soviet of all the states
with which the EU has interacted since 1989. As a consequence,
Ukraine forces proponents and supporters of the EP to conceptualize
an association process which produces adequate reforms and shared
European values twenty or even fifty years from now. Does anyone
want to tell European voters that they are taking on twice the
problems of Romania for three times as long as Europe has worked with
Romania? Or four and a half Bulgarias for five times longer than
Bulgaria has been a member of the EU? All for an associative
relationship and a bite-sized free trade agreement?
The
Eastern Partnership cannot be too successful because this would
threaten the EU with imminent membership decisions not can the
Partnership move too slowly which would risk losing the EU’s
interest and attention.
The
Politics of Yanukovych and Timoshenko: The
problem of institutions, such as Association, which lack the more
rigid rules of EU membership, is that they tend to stretch to fit the
applicant distorting their standards and the intentions of their
founders. I suspect that the West came up with the “red line” on
Tymoshenko’s release from prison as a desperate measure to prevent
our political values from being “stretched” by the political
weight and extended timelines of Ukraine. Much like Obama’s red
line in Syria, our red line on Yulia has not achieved the immediate
result we hoped for nor has it contributed to de-politicizing the
political transition of Ukraine. No doubt, the Yanukovych-Timoshenko
relationship is the single largest factor which endangers the Vilnius
Summit. Let me try to sum up where the battle stands at the moment.
Roughly
speaking, the Cox-Kwasniewski plan calls for President Yanukovych to
permit Yulia Timoshenko to travel to Germany for medical treatment.
By employing “humanitarian grounds,” President Yanukovych
sidesteps the question of a pardon, which may be unconstitutional at
this juncture anyway, and remains silent on the question of
additional charges. So far, so good.
But
Yulia’s departure for Germany for medical care is really only a
pretence. Obviously, it is a pretence for the EU and for Victor
Yanukovych, but, as it turns out, it is very much a fairytale for
Yulia Timoshenko as well who does not plan to be ill for very long
once in Germany, if at all. She intends to begin campaigning
immediately, tour the capitals of Europe and North America, and start
large-scale fundraising. In short, Yulia sees her departure to
Germany as the beginning of her return to political power with which
she will produce revolutionary change in Ukraine – which may or may
not be a good thing depending on one’s perspective. Suffice to
say, Yulia’s objectives are political.
As
President Yanukovych considers the proposal of Cox and Kwasniewski,
he needs to worry about the Russians and increasingly about the
economy, but he cannot help but worry about the Presidential
Elections in 2015. Yanukovych defeated Timoshenko in the elections
of 2010, and she was barred from politics by her conviction in 2011
and she potentially faces more serious charges. The President quite
reasonably could be concerned that a well-rested and well-funded
revolutionary will bound from her hospital bed and return to Kyiv,
with all the effects of the return of the Ayatollah Khomeini to
Tehran in 1979. Whatever one thinks of the legitimacy of the
President’s fears, his concerns are political.
And
herein lies the rub. Europeans believe that the red line the EU
imposed on politically-influenced prosecutions is both a humanitarian
goal and a legitimate test of shared political values.
Unfortunately, neither Yanukovych nor Timoshenko believes it has
anything to do with values. For Ukrainians, the release of Yulia
Tymoshenko is a political decision on who will take political control
of Ukraine in 2015 or even earlier if things get rough.
This
analysis tells us two things. One, it explains why it has been so
hard to find a resolution of the Yulia Tymoshenko case. And, two, it
explains why the Europeans have to avoid forcing an outcome which
overturns a democratic decision of voters in 2010 and prejudges their
decision in 2015. For all the claims for the benefits of the EP, it
is not an alternative to Ukrainian law, Ukrainian elections or
Ukrainian politics. The EU has gotten itself into a position where it
wants to promote reform without picking political favorites which is
tricky in Ukraine.
The
Russian Factor: Notwithstanding
the paralyzing effect of the political struggle between Timoshenko
and Yanukovych on Ukrainian reforms and EU decisions, the situation
dramatically changed in the course of the summer with the entry of
Russia into the fray. Russia began its campaign with a mid-summer
trade war with Ukraine, followed by an embargo of Moldovan wine,
threats to Georgia, delays at Lithuanian border crossings and finally
in explicit threats by Presidential Advisor Sergei Glazyev at the
Yalta Conference against any former Soviet nation considering signing
an Association Agreement.
Frankly,
Russian antagonism has done more to reinvigorate the Eastern
Partnership and boost the prospects of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova
than any other factor in the last four years. Why Moscow has done
the EU and its neighbors such a great favour is a puzzle. The
argument that Ukraine will re-export EU goods into the Customs Union
is specious. The fear that a DCFTA between EU and Ukraine will
displace Russia-Ukrainian trade is misplaced. The most recent
argument that Ukraine could default on its foreign debt is closer to
the mark, but joining the Customs Union and thereby losing the EU and
IMF makes default more not less likely.
There
are three points which can be made about the Russian factor:
For
Russia, Ukraine is a symbolic good, and Russia’s disruptive
behaviour is part of a symbolic war. The objective of symbolic war
is not the capture of Ukraine, but the enhancement of Russia’s
self-image as the powerful successor of the Soviet Union. In
pursuit of this self-image, the EU is a rival or at least an
obstacle for Russia.
The
competition for Ukraine is limited to very specific Russian
businesses which stand to benefit financially from the isolation of
Ukraine from European markets. It is not clear whether these
businesses are associated with President Putin or Prime Minister
Medvedev or scattered throughout the Russian economy. But the
dispatch of a minor figure such as Sergei Glazyev to deliver
Russia’s ultimatum is to suggest an ambiguity about Russia’s
real objectives.
That
said, the continuous and progressive deterioration of trade
relations in the post-Soviet world and with the European Union is a
harbinger of an approaching trade war. Ukraine may be one of the
battlefields, but Ukraine’s decision about EU association is not
the cause.
The
Disposition of the European Powers at the moment: Broadly
speaking, there are more people in Western Europe who are angry with
Russia than there are who are excited about the reforms and political
credentials of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. Were Cox and
Kwasniewski to succeed in obtaining the release of Timoshenko to
German medical care, it is widely thought that support for advancing
all three candidates at Vilnius would be unanimous. There is
slightly increasing support for signing with Ukraine without Yulia’s
release in Central Europe and the Baltics but not enough to carry the
decision.
Britain
is being difficult because it never saw an EU program it liked.
The
Dutch have reservations because other countries, particularly
Ukraine, are not as perfectible as the Dutch would like them to be.
Neither were the Serbs.
Spain
and others in the South still don’t like these Northern projects
and worry they will lose money somehow.
And,
the Germans have strong views but we won’t know what they are
until Chancellor Merkel builds a coalition Government.
In
short, Europe is split on the Eastern Partnership for reasons having
very little to do with the Eastern Partners. Nevertheless, Europe is
relatively united in its annoyance with Russia. But we cannot know
how this will play out until sometime between October 15 (Cox and
Kwasniewski report to the European Parliament) and October 27 (EU
Foreign Ministers’ meeting) or later if the German coalition talks
extend.
What
is at stake in Vilnius? If
the EU makes an affirmative decision to begin Association with
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, very little will change. The Eastern
Partnership will begin a decade of tedious work in which it will have
to prove to its new Partners and the European Union that there are
real benefits to association, DCFTA and visa liberalization, and that
these programs accelerate the process of reform and really do
inculcate desirable political values. It will be slow, grinding
work. Russia will be equally unhappy (plus or minus.) The Ukrainian
economy will remain at the precipice. Even if Yulia reaches a German
hospital she will be just as far removed from politics as she was in
a Ukrainian cell. And doubts about whether Europe is serious about
the post-Soviet semi-democracies will persist the day after Vilnius.
But Europe will have slightly improved the possibility of a brighter
future for 45 million Ukrainians, 4.5 million Georgians, and 3.5
million Moldovans, but only slightly. Still improving the lives of 53
million people on the border of Europe (or slightly less than the
population of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary combined) is
nothing to sneeze at.
The
stakes are easier to see and far starker in the event of a rejection
or postponement of Association. Then Europe will have constructed an
institution of association whose only purpose is to deny association
to those few countries who would accept it. There are great risks to
this kind of silliness in international politics.
Ukrainian
default: The
rejection of Ukraine at Vilnius will quickly be followed by a
devastating financial crisis in Ukraine. Ukraine’s sovereign debt
was recently downgraded to the level of Cuba’s and Pakistan’s.
Its one-year paper recently traded at almost 16% and its 10-year
paper yields 10.5%. There is only $21.69b left in reserves –
enough for 2 ½ months of imports. Ukraine must pay $10.8b in
foreign debt by the end of 2013. In short on the current course and
trajectory, Ukraine will be bankrupt by February 2014 without a
large infusion of cash from the IMF. Now, if Ukraine has been
rejected by Europe in late November for inadequate reforms, what are
the chances that the IMF will release $3-4b to Ukraine in January on
the basis of successful reforms? Zero. Like it or not, the Eastern
Partnership and the IMF are linked.
Russian
relations – trade war
Like
it or not, there is a trade war coming with Russia, the Customs
Union, Gazprom or some combination of the many protectionisms and
populisms that now dominate the East. In the event of a failed
Summit, there will no longer be an institutional barrier to economic
disorder. Other states will run to the false protection of the
Customs Union, as Armenia has already done. The better response at
a successful Vilnius would be to propose immediate negotiations
between Russia and the European Union on an enhanced trade
relationship between Russia and/or the Customs Union and the EU.
Ideally, this proposal would be part of the Summit communique and
would reinforce the point that DCFTA with Ukraine does not come at
the expense of trade with Russia. Failing to address Russia’s
understandable economic insecurity will contribute to longer-term
trade dislocations throughout the East.
European
credibility: Americans
have recently gained considerable experience in the loss of
political credibility and the decline of the legitimate use of
American power internationally. This experience was quite
unpleasant. The EU faces much the same test of its soft power at
Vilnius as the United States faced of its hard power in Syria. It
would be highly adverse if the EU – the greatest assemblage of
soft power in world history – lost the first “war of soft
powers” – in its own Neighborhood – on a playing field of its
own choosing. And TO
RUSSIA ?– a
nation untouched by persuasion or any other influence which might be
considered “soft.”
What will be left of
the EU then after even the most modest of foreign policy initiatives
fails completely? Not to mention the cries of “Victory” from the
Kremlin and the dancing in the streets of Moscow at the humiliation
of both the United States and the European Union in a three month
period with no real effort whatsoever. There is no doubt that the
failure of the Partnership at Vilnius will damage the foreign policy
of the EU to some significant degree.
Institutional
Framework of the West: At
the most general level, the Euro-Atlantic system on which the United
States and EU depend relies on responsibilities and institutions
shared across the Atlantic. Just as it would be a grave concern to
Europe if the United States failed to support NATO, it will be a
grave concern to the United States if the EU cannot provide
institutions and relationships which reform, engage, stabilize and
direct their Eastern partners. By definition, civilizations are
judged by their ability to export norms, institutions, political
cultures, and, dare I say it, democratic values. If we cannot –
even in as trivial a decision as Vilnius – we need to start
thinking seriously about pulling back.
Conclusion:
I
have tried to describe how a very modest Partnership program – born
from the sense in Poland and Sweden that the West was losing in the
East – became in just four years one of the most difficult and
consequential decisions facing Europe. I am struck by how a program
of the bureaucracy of the dull-as-dishwater European Commission has
become imbued with the high drama of a great Russian novel: a
hostile Kremlin, impoverished peoples on the steppes, tragically
flawed politicians, tragically flawed imprisoned blond politicians,
hundreds of billions about to be lost, and countries about to
disappear from the map of Europe. But what makes for a good movie in
Hollywood makes for very difficult politics in Vilnius.
I
think that it is clear that a positive decision at Vilnius to advance
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova is the better outcome for Europe and the
West. A retreat would likely be far more dangerous for the EU, its
institutions and especially the vulnerable Eastern partners.
Doubtless, it would also be far more expensive. We should all pray
that Cox and Kwasniewski can find some mechanism, which will
certainly be imperfect and likely a bit whorish, which conveys Ms.
Timoshenko at least as far as German medical care. Only because this
would make the right decision at Vilnius far easier for the
Presidents and Prime Ministers who have to make the call. If not, it
will come down to Angela Merkel and the new German Government neither
of whom will be pleased to be confronted (during their first week on
the job) with the Hobson’s choice of abandoning Yulia to jail or
throwing all of Ukraine to the Russian wolves. This is after all a
Chancellor who has made avoiding tough decisions into a form of
political art.
It
is impossible to predict what the leaders will decide at the Summit.
The day after Vilnius we will wake up either to find that the EU has
embarked on a long and tedious repair and reform job in the East or
we will find ourselves in the midst of a disorderly retreat from our
abandoned partners, hotly pursued by financial crisis and trade war.
These
are the stakes at Vilnius.
Bruce Pitcairn Jackson is President of the Project on Transitional Democracies which has been supporting Ukraine’s integration into Euro-Atlantic Institutions since 1999.
