You're reading: Ihor Smeshko, ex-spy chief, enters politics

Col. General Ihor Smeshko headed Ukraine’s State Security Service from 2003-2005, including during the tumultuous events of the 2004 democratic Orange Revolution.

The intelligence service is rooted in the Soviet KGB and best known by its SBU acronym role. As its head, Smeshko inherited the aftermath of the infamous “Melnychenko tapes” scandal. The tapes are named after ex-President Leonid Kuchma’s former bodyguard, Mykola Melnychenko.

The “Melnychenko tapes” are hundreds of hours of recordings made in 1999-2000 that allegedly captured Kuchma and his inner circle plotting numerous crimes – charges that the former administration officials have steadfastly denied. The scandal, despite the lack of a credible investigation, helped turn Kuchma into an international pariah during his last few years in office. Smeshko also held the powerful SBU post after accusations surfaced that Ukraine illegally sold arms to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.

Smeshko left office on bad terms, after Viktor Yushchenko – the Orange Revolution hero and ex-president — implicated Smeshko’s associates in the nearly fatal dioxin poisoning of Yushchenko. Yushchenko contends he was poisoned during dinner on the night of Sept. 5, 2004, at the dacha of Volodymyr Satsyuk, deputy head of the State Security Service of Ukraine at the time. Smeshko and Yushchenko confidant David Zhvania were also at the party.

Today, Smeshko is back with a new political party stacked with top former members of the country’s intelligence services and law enforcement, offering what they say is an alternative to the country’s Orange-Blue divide. In an interview with the Kyiv Post, Smeshko explains why he and other former law enforcement and security officials are attempting to leap into politics. He also provides a glimpse into some of the political crises that have rattled Ukraine before and after the Orange Revolution.

KP: What exactly are the goals and who is the target electorate of your new party Strength and Honor?

IS: The all-Ukrainian civic organization Strength and Honor (SICH) was established in the summer of 2009 to effect the gradual growth of a new, third political force that would be entirely untainted and free of any association with any of the pre-existing political programs or political-oligarchic clans.

Its core current and potential constituency is the 30-40 percent of Ukrainian citizens who are tired of the same old, ineffective, political personalities, bromides and prescriptions, and who want to see new leaders and ideas on the political horizon of our nation.

Our task is to support new political forces – especially those made up of youth and patriotic professionals, who have not played an active political role in the past – in attaining positions of authority and influence.


KP. The new party includes top members of the security services and law enforcement. Why, because new threats are on the horizon? If so, can you name a few?

IS: The founders of our civic organization are well-known former members of every Ukrainian military and law enforcement agency. The current and former officers and employees of these organizations are, objectively speaking, among the most patriotic, world-wise and law-abiding citizens of Ukraine. Statistically, the retired members of these organizations alone number 700,000. More than half of currently employed members are 40-50 years of age. But the base for the SICH political party (officially registered on December 19, 2009, and whose acronym is the name of a 16th-century Dnipro River fortress of Kozak warriors), is far broader.

Regarding threats to Ukraine’s independence and security, they do, in fact, exist and have grown very serious over the last five years. At the present time, Ukraine has no real imminent external threat.

The biggest of my concerns are internal threats to our nation – the threat to Ukraine’s democratic institutions and the lawful rights and civil liberties of its citizens. Another major threat is the explosive growth of corruption within all state institutions. In addition, there has been a catastrophic decline in professionalism and leadership in law-enforcement and military organizations. And, finally, there has been ruination of the legal underpinnings of the state itself by way of systematic violations of its Constitution by those who hold power.

KP: Ukraine has left the Orange era – personified by former President Viktor Yushchenko and former Premier Yulia Tymoshenko – and entered the new era of the Donetsk clan of eastern industrialists. Do you represent something different?

IS: Without a doubt we are different. An overwhelming majority of our membership has never participated in the political life of our nation. For that matter, the full complement of former military and law-enforcement personnel has never even signed up as members of any political party.

KP: Would you nevertheless take a position – say as head of the SBU or National Security Council – in the government of Prime Minister Mykola Azarov?

IS: If there should be a request for any member of our organization to come to Ukraine’s service, then why not? Should we wait until Martians come down to fill the slots for educated, patriotic candidates for these positions? Then who will do the building today of a strong, proud, and democratic Ukrainian state?

KP: Speaking of the SBU, what do you think of the appointment of media magnate Valeriy Khoroshkovsky as its head? Isn’t this a conflict of interest, given his ties to controversial businessman Dmitry Firtash (both have an interest in leading television channel Inter), who is currently suing Ukraine in an international arbitration court?

IS: Why do you only ask me about Valeriy Khoroshkovsky? Are you just interested in the consequences and not the reasons for certain events? Right after the Orange Revolution, starting in 2005, it first became the practice to make politically motivated appointments at the higher levels of military, law-enforcement, and special agencies – civilians rather than uniformed personnel. This was done by President Yushchenko in an amateurish and irresponsible fashion. It was done without any basis in law and without any of the restrictions on political appointees that are generally found in Western countries.

Alarms should have been going off in 2005 when the precedent of appointing [Oleksandr] Turchynov to head the SBU was first established … especially when Turchynov invited senior officials of the SBU and other law-enforcement organizations to meet with him at the SBU dacha without the president’s knowledge. This was not simply a business-related conflict of interest. This was an act that threatened Ukraine’s peace and stability because of personal conflicts between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko.

KP: What do you think of Mr. Khoroshkovsky’s decision to close the SBU archives which revealed crimes by the Soviet leadership against its citizens? Was this justified? What about the need for Ukraine to confront its history?

IS: I consider the practice of using the SBU for political purposes, especially those that cause divisions in society or are intended to gain partisan advantage, to be both wrong and in violation of the law. This principle also applies to the use of the SBU archives. A decision concerning the disclosure of the archives should be made by the head of the SBU and only within the framework provided by law.

I consider the practice of using the SBU for political purposes, especially those that cause divisions in society or are intended to gain partisan advantage, to be both wrong and in violation of the law.

The SBU is not a depository of historical archives for the purpose of scholarly research. If the law provides for disclosure after a certain period of years, then, of course, its archives should be turned over to researchers and historians. After that, it should be up to historians and researchers to decide how to present the information to the public and to draw analytical conclusions.

KP: Speaking of Mr. Firtash, one cannot escape the question of RosUkrEnergo, the Swiss-based natural gas trading company he co-owns with Russia’s Gazprom, and Ukraine’s continuing dependence on Russian energy. Do you see this dependency as a threat to the country’s security?

IS: You are once again narrowing the scope of your inquiry to an analysis of results rather than the reason why these problems have come about in the first place. In the near term, Ukraine will not have any other imported gas than that which it receives through Russian territory. That is an objective reality. In a like manner, Russia also has no alternative to the use of Ukraine’s gas transport pipelines and underground storage facilities. For the present, both are dependent on each other.

This relationship should be professionally exploited, with particular reference to our own national interests. But under current conditions, we can do nothing other than learn how to negotiate and to find compromise and mutually acceptable decisions. The company to which you are referring was precisely the sort of intermediary that could compromise and provide gas at the border at a lower cost than was available in Europe. In fact, at the start of 2005, this arrangement enriched our economy – at the expense of the gas-producing countries – by several billion dollars annually.

Everything changed dramatically at the start of 2005 in the aftermath of the benighted new political leadership of the Orange Revolution. The means by which gas was brought to Ukraine remained the same, but the cost of that gas rose to world prices. Not only that, but the fees for transport of gas through Ukraine’s territory and its storage in underground facilities remained at dumping levels. From that day forward, Ukraine began to subsidize the economy of other countries from its own budget.

Let us not forget Yushchenko’s public, year-long, dishonesty and his foolish conduct at the start of his presidency when, acting through his Foreign Ministry, he asked the whole world to help him find the Ukrainian owners of RosUkrEnergo.

And how can we forget his public instructions to his prime minister to identify the Ukrainian principals while ignoring the SBU, which was under his direct control? All of this tomfoolery resulted in our becoming unilaterally dependent on our neighbor for our gas, rather than interdependent.

The solution is obvious. We must search for new sources and increase production of our own energy, while, at the same time, undertake a concerted and active program of alternative energy development. But, most importantly – as a strategic priority – we must rapidly reduce energy consumption throughout every facet of our life and economy.

KP: You had a troubled relationship with former President Viktor Yushchenko. What was that about?

IS: I never had a “troubled relationship” with Viktor Yushchenko, either on a personal level or with regard to his role as president. However, I think it should be noted that it would have been customary for a newly-elected president to have asked for a briefing from the head of the SBU and his intelligence chief (both positions were then held by me) at the start of his administration.

But that never happened. I did not even have the opportunity to hand him a report I had prepared concerning my removal from office as head of the SBU. I was summarily removed from office in clear violation of the law and Constitution, and even without the benefit of any legal justification or rationale in his presidential directive.

KP: The president implicated your aides in the SBU from 2004, foremost deputy SBU chief Volodymyr Satsyuk, in his 2004 poisoning. How and when, in your opinion, was Yushchenko poisoned?

IS: Neither the president nor any investigative or prosecutorial agency has charged me with any complicity in his poisoning. In fact, Ukraine’s chief prosecutor, Oleksandr Medvedko, only recently confirmed that “there are no concrete conclusions” and that the “crime remains unsolved.” Investigators have failed not only to identify the criminal, but even (as provided by law) to identify any suspects. In the words of the prosecutor: “perhaps we will discover new theories” and “ in order to determine whether the poisoning was deliberate or not, we must first identify the responsible party and only then decide whether there was intent or simply negligence.” So I am also awaiting the answers to all these questions from a prosecutor who appears to be still investigating the matter.

KP: You served in the SBU around the time of the infamous “Melnychenko tapes” scandal, when tapes allegedly recorded in the office of former President Leonid Kuchma were made public, implicating several top officials in heinous crimes. Why did the SBU never follow up on these recordings?

IS: I never served in the SBU prior to September 2003. Between 1992 and 2003 I worked only for military intelligence and the National Security Council. During the period in which the “tape scandal” erupted (2000– 2002), I was on diplomatic assignment in Switzerland.

I consider the surreptitious taping of the presidential office to be the most shameful example of state treason – a criminal act which resulted in long-lasting damage both to Ukraine’s national security and its law enforcement and special services agencies. The responsibility for physical and informational security of the presidential office during 1998-2000 lay squarely with the SBU.

During my tenure as head of SBU (2003-2005), I did all that I could to implement the chief prosecutor’s request that Major Mykola Melnychenko [who claimed to have single-handily made the recordings] be taken into custody.

I am certain that, without a thorough review of the discontinued criminal files, and without answers to the question as to who instigated the taping of the president’s office and subsequent exploitation of the information thus obtained, it will be impossible to identify the person who ordered the murder of [muckraking journalist Heorhiy] Gongadze.

Subsequently, the decision by Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun’s to close the criminal case against Melnychenko in 2005 remains on his conscience.

KP: What do you think of recent accusations by the United Nations that Ukraine is illegally exporting arms to sub-Saharan Africa? Is it happening? If so, what needs to be done?

IS: The arms trade is a separate, serious subject. It should be obvious that in every country the lead role in the arms trade is accorded to its special services. I am proud of the fact that during my two-year tenure at the SBU, Ukraine was never once accused of the illegal supply of arms.

What is more, the SBU, during that same period, and based on its sole initiative, investigated and brought to justice even its own senior officials who engaged in illegal arms trade between 2000 and 2001. The lack of professionalism that began to erode the SBU and other law-enforcement agencies with the arrival of unqualified, “revolutionary” political appointees beginning in 2005 would have had equally adverse results in every operational area. Trading in arms is no exception.


BIOGRAPHY OF IHOR SMESHKO

Col. General Ihor Smeshko was born in 1955 in Cherkasy Oblast. After high school, Smeshko pursued a military-academic career during which he published more than 100 scholarly papers. He earned a doctorate in technical sciences with a specialty in military cybernetics, and a professorship in information and system analysis. In 1992, he joined the newly established Ukrainian Defense Ministry as secretary of its Science Advisory Council, and, later that year, was asked to help set up an intelligence division within the ministry. But before he could begin, he was reassigned to Washington D.C. as defense attache.

Smeshko won many influential friends for Ukraine during his four years in Washington, while earning the admiration of former Soviet and Warsaw Pact diplomatic missions for negotiating the first memorandum on military cooperation between the United States and a former communist state. Ten years later, Smeshko again astounded the diplomatic community by negotiating a similar agreement with the Swiss government – one of only 10 such agreements ever signed by the Swiss.

In 1995, Smeshko was awarded his first general’s star, and was recalled to Kyiv to head up the president’s committee on intelligence, a position he held for three years. Under his leadership, the committee grew from a “paper” organization to a powerful and influential proponent of reform and professionalism.

Between 2000 and 2002, Smeshko completed a master’s degree in military administration as well as a law degree from Kyiv’s Shevchenko University.

In 1997, Smeshko was appointed director of Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate. In 1997. Appointed State Security Service (SBU) chief in April 2003, he was fired by Yushchenko in 2005.

Kyiv Post staff writer John Marone can be reached at [email protected].