You're reading: Giving Peace Another Chance

The biggest question after the new Minsk deal is how long it will last. Reached after a night of talks among four European leaders, the Feb. 12 Minsk II peace agreement might repeat the fate of the September Minsk I deal, which was routinely violated.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that she had “no illusions” that peace would be achieved soon, while French President Francois Hollande said that the Minsk deal itself did not guarantee peace. These comments came before the official start of the cease-fire, set for midnight of Feb. 14.

“If the cease-fire works, even gradually and with delays, it will be very good,” said Volodymyr Fesenko, head of the Penta political think tank. “If it fails, it will still be good for Ukraine because European leaders will lose their last illusions that a diplomatic agreement with (Russian President Vladimir) Putin is feasible.”

The three-page agreement was not signed by any of the leaders, lending credence to the argument that it would be hard to enforce. And yet Fesenko said it was a “victory of both (President Petro) Poroshenko and Ukrainian diplomacy. Our side managed to be firm on principal positions.”

The document does not once mention the self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, referring to separatist-controlled areas as “districts” in eastern regions. Paradoxically, the document features the signatures of leaders of these unrecognized republics alongside representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Although it was signed by the same group of people as the September deal, the new peace agreement is different in many ways. It was brokered by some of the word’s most powerful leaders, including Putin himself.

A Ukrainian soldier rides on top of an armoured vehicle to Debaltseve as a column moves near the eastern Ukrainian town of Artemivsk, Donetsk region on Feb. 10. Military experts predict that heavy fighting will take place around Debaltseve on Feb. 13-14 f

A Ukrainian soldier rides on top of an armoured vehicle to Debaltseve as a column moves near the eastern Ukrainian town of Artemivsk, Donetsk region on Feb. 10. Military experts predict that heavy fighting will take place around Debaltseve on Feb. 13-14 for gaining of the new territories ahead of the ceasefire set by the new Minsk deal.

 

The agreement contains 11 clauses. The main takeouts include:

Cease-fire, withdrawal of weapons

Introducing a cease-fire starting from 12 a.m. on Feb. 15 and withdrawing heavy weaponry by 25 to 70 kilometers, depending on the type of equipment, within 14 days. Ukrainian and Russian equipment will be withdrawn from the de facto front line and the Sept. 19 demarcation line, respectively.

“There are many unsolved issues, including a lack of reliable mechanisms to guarantee the cease-fire and especially to pull back heavy weapons,” Fesenko said. “The OSCE failed in this task. And now there is a risk that the same will happen again and the fights near Debaltseve will go on.”

Vyacheslav Tseluiko, a military expert at the Center for Army Conversion and Disarmament Studies, agreed.

“I’m sure separatists will not comply with this agreement just like in September. Instead they have started attacking,” he said.

Withdrawal of foreign troops

Withdrawing foreign regular troops and mercenaries and disarming all illegal armed groups without specifying a timeline, as well as restoring Ukraine’s control over its border, presumably by the end of 2015. These clauses may be the most difficult to enforce because the Kremlin has denied the presence of its regular troops in Donbas and vehemently opposed monitoring of the whole separatist-controlled stretch of the border by the OSCE.

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Amnesty and prisoner exchanges

Granting amnesty to Kremlin-backed insurgents and mercenaries without a clear timeline, as well as exchanging all Ukrainian prisoners for all separatist and Russian ones within five days after the withdrawal of heavy weaponry. Poroshenko said on Feb. 12 that Russia had also agreed to free Ukrainian pilot Nadiya Savchenko, who risks dying following a two-month hunger strike in a Russian detention facility.

Restarting government payments

Providing humanitarian aid to the occupied territories, resuming social and pension payments to them and restoring the Ukrainian banking system in separatist-controlled areas. For their part, residents of the occupied territories will have to transfer taxes and utility payments to Ukraine.

Ukrainian authorities halted social and pension payments to the occupied territories last year, though some residents of these areas are still able to get them by registering in Ukrainian-controlled cities.

Critics have argued that the resumption of payments would be tantamount to Ukraine financing its own enemies. Poroshenko said on Feb. 12, however, that such payouts would only resume after local elections are held in the occupied territories under OSCE control.

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Constitutional reform

Carrying out a constitutional reform in an effort to promote decentralization and grant more self-government to the occupied territories by the end of 2015. Apart from the constitutional changes, the agreement envisages passing a Ukrainian law on the special status of separatist-held areas.

Specifically, the occupied territories will have minority language rights, implying that they will likely promote the use of Russian. They will also be allowed to appoint their own prosecutors and judges.

Under the document, “people’s militias” will also be created in the insurgent-held areas. They are likely to consist of current insurgents and mercenaries fighting against Ukrainian troops.

The deal stipulates holding local elections in insurgent-controlled areas. Such elections must be monitored by the OSCE. Members of local legislatures and officials who will be elected cannot be fired by the central Ukrainian government before their full terms in office run out.

Despite giving broad self-government to the occupied territories, the Minsk deal falls short of explicitly specifying “autonomy” similar to the status of Crimea or making Ukraine a federal state. Both demands have been frequently made by the Kremlin and Russian-backed insurgents.

Critics, however, argue that the self-government clause is a major concession to the Kremlin that will effectively legitimize the self-proclaimed separatist republics.

Kyiv Post staff writer Oleg Sukhov can be reached at [email protected].

Kyiv Post staff writer Oksana Grytsenko can be reached at [email protected].