Last Saturday the mighty Black Sea Fleet, in existence for 302 years, celebrated Russian Navy Day. Overflown by helicopters and strike aircraft, a massive procession of cruisers and frigates thundered out salutes for assembled Sevastopol guests, then steamed to sea for high-speed maneuvers.
On the same day, Ukraine’s fledgling navy celebrated its second birthday with sailor tug-of-wars and inter-ship soccer matches.
Undoubtedly a naval tradition takes time to develop. But not only time.
‘Without any question, our main problem is shortage of funding,’ Nikolai Savchenko, a spokesman for Ukraine’s Black Sea Naval Forces, told the Post. ‘The government simply does not have the resources to support even a minimum of operations.’
Which was why on Ukraine Navy Day not one of Ukraine’s 44 major combat vessels budged from its berth. With Kyiv counting every kopeck, Ukraine simply does not have the financial wherewithal to pay for much more than a symbolically seagoing navy.
Some 10,000 uniformed personnel and another 10,000 civilians, most of them in shore-side installations, were paid on time in July, but June paychecks remain outstanding.
Aside from NATO-funded maneuvers long on symbolism and short on training value, most Ukrainian vessels have not moved from dock for most of this year.
The authoritative Jane’s Navy International characterized a part of the Ukrainian Navy, consisting of 44 fighting ships, 80 auxiliary vessels and 60 helicopters and airplanes, as battle ready. However, it also said its purpose was more to show the flag than for military purposes.
The Ukrainian naval command deploys maritime aviation, coastal rocket and artillery troops, marines, special assault units, and logistic support troops. Most are at cadre strength with little more than personnel and rusting equipment to contribute to national maritime combat readiness.
Another 500 small vessels survive on the ‘patronage’ of chronically cash-strapped riverside and seaside municipalities.
Only two Ukrainian ships, the Slavutych and the escort ship Hetman Sahaidachny, have regularly sailed the Black Sea this year.
Although listed as combatants, both are configured and crewed not to defend Ukraine’s shores but to show its blue and yellow banner abroad, especially when minimal Ukrainian participation is required in the NATO Partnership for Peace exercises like Sea Breeze, Cooperative Partner, Cooperative Osprey and Fairway of Peace.
Even Rear Admiral Mykhailo Yezhel, Ukraine’s Deputy Defense Minister and Navy Commander listed the single firing of a cruise missile and the graduation of the country’s first batch of naval cadets as Ukraine’s biggest 1998 naval achievements.
‘We are establishing a strong foundation,’ he said. ‘We are making our first steps.’ They are small ones, towards a very limited goal.
‘Our mission is control of our national shores and waters in economic terms,’ Savchenko said. ‘Practically that means stopping smuggling…and illegal immigration…We are neither prepared nor preparing for war.’
Corvettes and smaller vessels are the key. By 2005 the largest vessel in the fleet will be an anti-submarine frigate, and if everything works out by that time Kyiv plans deployment of some form of coastal submarine as well.
But for that to happen, the Russian parliament has to approve a recent Ukraine-Russia treaty finalizing the split-up of the Black Sea fleet. Signed with great fanfare over a year ago, the agreement has moldered.
‘One cannot say that the Russian side has been in a hurry to implement the agreement,’ Savchenko said. ‘It seems that the policy has been to let the status quo dictate events.’
In the case of Sevastopol, that has meant all the most powerful vessels like guided missile cruisers and attack submarines remaining in Russian possession.
Lacking pretensions to becoming a superpower, Kyiv has been fairly relaxed about who gets the major units.
The sticking point has been who gets where they park – the docks at Sevastopol.
In his book Anatomy of an Undeclared War, Savchenko argues that Russian Black Sea Fleet officers worked closely with Crimean nationalists and separatists over the last five years to return the strategic peninsula to Russian control, and at a minimum keep the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol Russian.
In the last year Kyiv has strengthened its position in the Russian-speaking province by replacing separatist local officials with men more supportive of Ukrainian control of the region.
But until the final status of Sevastopol is settled and the rent money from the Russian fleet begins entering Ukrainian state coffers, the Ukrainian navy appears likely to stay as it is: small, simple, and not very formidable.
‘The government is in great part depending on rent money from Sevastopol to resolve financing for the Ukrainian fleet,’ Savchenko said. ‘And as long as the agreement hangs in the air, our navy will have very little money with which to operate.’
