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Most popular Opinion
A rare Russia card
Jun 11, 2008 at 21:55 | Editorialbear serious consequences, and public challenges of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, foremost questioning Ukraine’s rights over Sevastopol, the port city on the Crimean peninsula that is home to the Russian Black Sea Fleet.
Russia has long played the so-called ‘divide and conquer’ and ‘annexation’ cards supporting separatist movements in the former Soviet republics as a method to preserve its influence on neighbors that have sought closer ties with the West. The strategy has been employed in the breakaway Moldovan region of Transdniester, and in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions. Some experts have argued that recent escalation in the standoff between Tbilisi and Moscow over Abkhazia is a test balloon designed by Kremlin geopolitical gurus to gauge how far Russia can get, and whether it can truly pull similar strings in the higher stakes game in Crimea. True or not, Moscow and Kyiv are headed for a standoff over the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, which the Ukrainian side wants removed from Sevastopol when a lease agreement expires in 2017. Not only does the Russian side appear intent on keeping its fleet in Sevastopol, it also seems to be preparing a separatist scenario for Crimea which could end in annexation of Sevastopol (or all of Crimea). In a last-case scenario, an ethnic conflict, or legal clash over this geopolitically strategic peninsula, could open the door for Moscow to keep its so-called ‘peacekeepers’ in this region, much like in Abkhazia and Transdniester. Such instability would also complicate Kyiv’s chances of joining NATO.
What cards could Kyiv, and the West, play to prevent, or minimize the damage? Certainly, the West and Ukraine are in no position to boycott Russian natural gas, oil, or grain. They are too addicted to Russian energy, for now, and hungry markets are unlikely to turn down food with prices soaring. Yet worldwide attention could be drawn to the imperialistic strings Russia is pulling in the region if Brussels, Washington, Ukraine, Georgia and others threaten to boycott the 2014 Sochi Olympic games. Russia’s leaders have high hopes for these games as a way of showcasing their country’s good side. An embarrassing boycott could spoil these plans, and create enough headlines to penetrate Russia’s population, itself locked up from the rest of the world by Moscow’s state propaganda machine. Opening their eyes could help raise pressure within Russia on a leadership that is bullheaded and usually unaffected by worldwide opinion.