The decline of Ukraine's agriculture sector throughout the 1990s was surely one of the most shameful aspects of Ukrainian independence. Blessed with some of the world's best soil but still mired in old ways of administration, almost every year brought new disasters, natural and man-made, that pushed production to even lower levels. Independent experts estimate that Ukraine, with appropriate equipment, inputs and management, could consistently produce over 100 million tons of grain per year. Yet harvests had declined to below 30 million hectares by the end of the decade.

Year 2000 was a turnaround year for Ukrainian agriculture, thanks largely to a late 1999 presidential decree directing that all collective farms be privatized. That action served the essential purpose of putting real power and responsibility on the farms into the hands of managers and private owners. In the past, they had to "handle" an extra bureaucratic layer of meddling from old communist oblast and national officials. The decree not only got rid of that layer, it also made it possible for former collective farmers to rent out their now privately owned plots of land.

This shift in responsibility from the state to the farms' worker-owners and managers has, with some fits and starts, worked remarkably well. Like someone trying to learn to ride a bicycle, there have been a few tumbles but, on balance, this has turned out to be the most productive move in Ukrainian agriculture since independence. Now banks and other lending institutions are more willing to loan the working capital that farms require. The banks do so, not because of any government program or other motivation, but simply because they see reorganized farms with the potential for profit. Most important, they see immensely improved chances of collecting both the principal and interest on the loans provided.

While credit must be given to President Leonid Kuchma for taking the initial step and signing the decree, the decree might have vanished into oblivion like so many progressive decrees before had the Yushchenko government not ensured its implementation.

Overseeing the partial reform of the agricultural land market was surely one of the unheralded major accomplishments of the Yushchenko era. It also offers yet more convincing evidence that Yushchenko was forced out of office for all the wrong reasons. The communists who helped vote Yushchenko out of office will surely want to see those reforms rolled back. It would be a major mistake for Kuchma, or the new prime minister, to let them get away with it.