BY OKSANA BASHUK HEPBURN

Ukraine has the good fortune or the great misfortune of bordering two giants: Russia and the European Union. Historically, it has fused more with Russia than with Europe. Perhaps that is changing.

Somewhat indicative of the shift is the recent refusal by President Viktor Yanukovych to sign the Customs Union–free trade–agreement with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Instead, he proposed a “Ukraine” solution: 3+1. This is news coming from decidedly pro-Russia President: he is catering to Ukraine’s self-interest; putting its wellbeing first.

Only a few months ago the President practically gave a 25-year lease to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in exchange for some energy concessions. Many Ukrainians believe Russia got the better deal; cheap, long-term rent and a military presence, which draws Ukraine closer to Russia’s motherly bosom, a place where Ukraine gets smothered rather than satiated.

Perhaps that experience, which included nationwide protests, taught him a lesson: Russia likes asymmetrical deals, in particular those which enlarge its footprint in foreign territories. Perhaps Ukraine’s president recognized the threat to sovereignty when he said no to Ukraine’s energy company, Naftogaz, merging with Gazprom, and no to selling the national pipelines.

He also said no to Russia’s push to make Russian the second official language, recognizing such moves for what they are: meddling of a foreign power in the domestic affairs. However, he caved to Russia’s pressure recently by signing a law allowing the Soviet hammer and sickle red flag to fly above Ukraine’s national blue and yellow colors on the anniversary marking the end of World War II. To many Ukrainians, even veterans who fought under the Soviet flag, it remains an odious symbol of communist totalitarianism representing some 20 million dead. It is as offensive as flying the red Nazi swastika flag, long banned by many countries.

But Yanukovych gets full marks for his handling of the Custom Union. Here’s why.

By denying Russia’s overtures to become an outright member of the union, Yanukovych underscored, once again, Ukraine’s sovereignty. Yet he did not say no to opportunities such a vast trading block offers. Mindful of the danger of being swallowed up by a powerful neighbor, he proposed the 3+1 approach which allows him to negotiate a trade agreement with the EU as well.

If he can pull it off, and it won’t be easy, enhanced trade relations with both sides would be a serious victory for Ukraine. Undoubtedly, Russia will rev up pressure to keep Ukraine from joining the EU. The typical approach might be to consider this an affront and play hardball by elevating, for example, energy prices.

Ukraine can expect an equally tough battle with the EU; to date membership has been an uphill battle. Its manufactured goods — other than its steel — tend to be less competitive than Europe’s. Yet the constant reminder of not meeting standards may be EU’s concern about Ukraine’s ultimate superior agriculture potential.

That’s the negative assessment. On the positive side, the situation presents a fine occasion for both Russia and the EU to go forward using the trade relations with Ukraine as a building block for the future.

Here, the EU can to do more than offer vague promises of a roadmap to Ukraine. It would do well by offering some incentives to Ukraine as well to benefit from its considerable market. But above all, the EU should prevent that part of the world from falling back into the previous power zones — both economic and political.

In turn, Russia might recognize that interference in Ukraine’s domestic affairs is becoming passe; not welcomed by government or the economic elite, even one disposed favorably to Russia and focus on a more balanced relationship stemming from a good neighbor policy. Here, Canada and the U.S. offer a fine model; a smaller nation coexisting peacefully, on mutually advantageous terms with a giant.

Consistently friendly relations, rather than outbursts like Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s recent nonsense about winning World War II without Ukraine, are needed to mitigate the horrors Russia has perpetrated in Ukraine and the ensuing distrust of the population that followed. Better relations would engender calm in a blood-soaked neighborhood and help shift Russia’s international public opinion from that of a hard-line bully to an attractive business partner. It claims interest in cultivating such an image and might start with negotiating the 3+1 approach offered by Ukraine.

To help things along, peace-loving friends — Canada, the United States and others — might use persuasion to influence Russia and the EU to accept Ukraine’s offers. Ukraine’s trade enlargement in both directions would not only support the larger objectives of assisting it to become a modern Western state and keep a balance with the Western camp but through it link Russia and the other members of the Customs Union to Europe too. This appears to be a clear articulation of Ukraine’s will. The Ukrainian diaspora might assist to ensure, through its various governments, this happens.

Having two suitors at this juncture may yet be a win-win for Ukraine and all the other parties in the equation.

Oksana Bashuk Hepburn is an international columnist and former President of U*CAN Ukraine Canada International Relations, a consulting firm dedicated to brokering interests between Canada and Ukraine.