The undemocratic corruptive behavior of the government at all levels is killing the positive impact of the unprecedented strong political will of President Viktor Yanukovych and his ability to consolidate the political team.
Lack of democratic capacity prohibits Yanukovych from fulfilling his main commitment: to set the country in order. This same lack of democratic institutional capacity, which is understandably perceived as the president’s team natural inclination to evil totalitarian repressions, puts the long-awaited and vitally needed reforms at the brink of losing the momentum.
The proposed reforms will not succeed in the way expected. The government has done everything to persuade Ukrainians that we do not want the reforms that we do not and cannot understand these reforms But is it true that Ukrainians do not want reforms? No, Ukrainians want reforms. We simply do not want to be passive blind victims. Neither does the president want a protesting nation.
The moment is critical. It is crucial that the momentum for reforms is not lost and the president is supported in this endeavor.
The moment is critical. It is crucial that the momentum for reforms is not lost and the president is supported in this endeavor.
The problem is the overwhelmingly corruptive, rude and professionally illiterate behavior of public servants all over the country at all levels of public administration. This public service is responsible for the totally wrong way in which the reforms are unfolding.
The change management is organized in the command-administrative manner, the only one which is known to the unreformed government machinery. The Soviet academic advisers and Western business PR advisers cannot possibly help to organize a proper public policy campaign.
The latest active presence on TV of Prime Minister Mykola Azarov and Deputy Prime Minister Sergiy Tigipko cannot possibly raise their parties’ ratings. Because they do all the work themselves and the people of Ukraine are left as passive observers, uncompromising critics or victims, but never active responsible players.
So what is missing?
· Public policy documents which explain the government reform concept;
· Structured policy consultation process with all the stakeholders, concerning every policy issue;
· Does the government hear that the public and social interest groups have their views and they are voters? The public reaction forces the president to respond by making unintended compulsory revisions. But does it transform the current system of change management? Not yet.
It is difficult to believe that the authors of reforms could not foresee the protests which took place after the tax code was adopted. Why did they have to wait until the explosion?
The answer is only one. The concept, the plan, the information campaign – everything is based on the non-existing command-administrative capacity of the president and the government. It was expected that the highest political will simply had to be obeyed, but surprise, surprise, it did not.
In Ukraine, the government institutions responsible for reforms are not being reexamined to gauge their capacity to carry out these reforms. How can we expect officials to change their behavior if their institutions do not operate any differently? The structure of the ministries, procedures, standards, job description of the public servants have not changed.
Administrative reform must become institutional reform. Sectoral reforms must not be disconnected from institutional reforms.
Reforms cannot be successful if the Ukrainian government does not have the administrative capacity to implement them. There are no signs of any changes that will transform the Soviet executive structures into a democratic/ market public administration. Without such reform, there is no hope of eradicating corruption.
The bottom line is that if the government is unable to conduct public consultations, initiate discussion and produce proper public policy documents about the problems the reform is solving and the solutions the government proposes, it will lose everything.
The bottom line is that if the government is unable to conduct public consultations, initiate discussion and produce proper public policy documents about the problems the reform is solving and the solutions the government proposes, it will lose everything.
After 20 years of technical assistance and of officials going abroad, the government still has no idea of how to conduct a full-fledged cycle of public policy. Ukrainian public servants in charge of reforms do not design implementing guidelines for the reform managers.
There is something utterly wrong with the way Ukrainian public service is managed – Hr 500 million for modernization of public service in 2006-2008; Hr 1.3 billion for 2008-20010 for research on public administration; hundreds of millions of euros and dollars that Canadian and American governments spent on improvement and strengthening of human resources in the main public service department.
Why did we have all these projects? Why are they called assistance for Ukraine? Which Ukraine did they assist?
Today’s experience will be in every textbook of development. The president and his team will be remembered in history as the fastest learners of transformation management. But who is this great teacher of reforms for effective economy and democratic behavior? Big business interests and elections.
Vira Nanivska is director of International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv.
