Bombs are no longer falling on Georgia, but the world is still watching. Ukraine is watching even more closely than most — and rightly so — for Russia’ s overwhelming military response in Georgia was intended especially for Ukraine’s eyes and ears. The message was crystal clear and shrill: move toward NATO and a similar fate may await you. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made the point more diplomatically last week when he suggested that it was his duty as president to safeguard the “security and dignity” of all Russian citizens, wherever they may live—and a lot live in Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Moldova and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.

If this rationale is valid beyond Georgia — and Medvedev’s comments suggest that it is — then we are living in a new world, where Russian warplanes and tanks will be sent into sovereign nations to protect Russians in the “near abroad.” That is a dangerous world. Ukraine should play its cards carefully, to be certain, but should not be terrorized into altering its westward course.

That would play into Russia’s hands. Together with other western leaning post­Soviet states, and partners in the West, Ukraine should continue to support Georgia’s democratically elected government and its territorial integrity, thus sending a signal back to Moscow that sovereign states will determine their own future and foreign policy.

There are about 25 million Russians living in the former Soviet republics. For example, in Estonia, Russians comprise roughly 30 percent of the total population. In Ukraine, an aspiring NATO and European Union member, Russians constitute about 11 million, about one quarter of the total population, and about 75 percent of the population in Crimea.

The sequence of events this year has made Russia’s actions seem inevitable, at least in retrospect. In February, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, against Russia’s strong objections, and with the West’s support. Only two months later, in April, Georgia and Ukraine received positive signals about their future membership in NATO at the Bucharest summit, although Russia ensured that a precise timetable was not determined.

Then­President Vladimir Putin began to escalate by treating South Ossetia and Abkhazia as Russian territories, politically and economically, by enlarging the size of the Russian “peacekeeping” force and by encouraging small firefights against Georgian forces. The aim was to provoke a response. Saakashvili eventually obliged.

Around the same time, problems in Crimea escalated. Ukraine responded by banning several high Russian officials from entering its territory. Prominent among the persona non grata was Moscow’s Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov, famous for propagating separatism in Crimea and in the eastern Ukrainian regions.

Like in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia has given almost all inhabitants of both territories Russian passports in recent years, enabling Moscow to create a humanitarian pretext while bolstering its nationalist credentials at home. Medvedev’s argument about protecting Russians in the “near abroad” is legalistic and disingenuous. Few in the West believed it and most saw it for what it was—a land grab. Russia’s behavior in Chechnya indicates how far it is willing to go “to protect its minorities,” not to mention “co­citizens.”

Ukraine is unique. Unlike Georgia, where the parliament voted to leave the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the course of war, the Verkhovna Rada is divided about NATO membership, leaving the CIS and the war in Georgia. Whereas over 80 percent in Georgia support NATO membership, less than a half of the total population in Ukraine supports joining NATO, according to polls conducted before Aug. 8.

It is clear that Russia will do whatever it can — including what it did in Georgia — to undermine [Ukraine’s] efforts to move toward NATO. For that reason, both countries need concrete guarantees of their security during the accession process. No one wants to get into a military standoff with Russia, least of all Ukraine, but diplomatic signals, when coordinated among many nations, can make the Kremlin understand that Ukraine’s decisions are its own and Moscow’s meddling will not be tolerated.

As the U.S. pushes forward with membership action plans for Ukraine and Georgia, it can expect some NATO members to object, especially Germany, for fear of Russian retaliation using its energy leverage.

Germany and others must realize, however, that NATO expansion will reduce Moscow’s leverage by providing an alternative source of Caspian crude to Western Europe and beyond — and that is one of the main reasons for Russia’s heavy­handed reaction.

The Russian response in Georgia sends a strong deterrent message to the leadership in Ukraine. It is about time to send a message back — let us be friends, not lovers.

Mariya Chelova is research fellow at the Social Science Research Center of Berlin, and Ph.D candidate at the Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences. David Siroky is United States Institute of Peace Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar and a Ph.D candidate at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, USA. He recently returned from Georgia, where he was researching the secessionist conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.