The diaspora does not deal with Russia (except in theory) or with its proxies inside the country. Ukraine does. The diaspora can entertain synthetic notions from images cultivated in history and from rare visits to Ukraine (and then mostly only for a short time and with limited contacts).
The diaspora’s clusters of self-contained ethnic communities stand alongside its indifference to American public issues that can teach reality lessons in the socioeconomic sphere. The diaspora’s right-wing sympathies, somehow rationalized by its anti-communist traditions and despise for any form of socialism, seem to be impervious to the logic of the American social contract that created Social Security and Medicare, which its members obviously would not give up.
The diaspora’s dismay at the dominance of the oligarchs in Ukraine does not extend to the outrageous behavior of American’s financial magnates who brought the U.S. economy to the brink of collapse and precipitated a worldwide Great Recession.
And then the diaspora has no clue relative to the permutations and failures in the American foreign policy – other than sporadic reactions when it seems to affect Ukraine’s balance relative to Russia.
The fissure between Ukraine and its U.S. diaspora is very obvious in the politics of the ongoing presidential elections in Ukraine. If the diaspora could have its choice, it would have gone four-to-one for Victor Yushchenko. Ukraine’s choice this year, as has been obvious for some time, was not Yushchenko.
Victor Yushchenko is seen in the diaspora as a patriotic leader, oriented toward the West and keeping distance from Russia. He is the diaspora’s favorite despite his demonstrated inability to provide effective leadership after the 2004 democratic Orange Revolution, his penchant for antagonizing friends and foes alike, his endless vacillations and a lamentable absence of political savvy.
The diaspora’s emotional commitment to Yushchenko made no room for an intelligent calculation of the alternatives, even though his defeat was palpably apparent in coming.
The editorial views in the two newspapers published by the Ukrainian National Association in New Jersey highlighted the negatives and saw no significant differences between the two leading candidates, Victor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko (The Ukrainian Weekly, June 14, and Svoboda, July 24, 2009). Tymoshenko was roundly denounced as being “soft on Moscow,” despite her Orange credentials. The accusation was misplaced. Diaspora strategists may have been unaware of softness under way in the Bush White House after the fiasco at the NATO meeting in Bucharest in April 2008, as the U.S. government was secretly bargaining with the Kremlin to open an American military supply route to Afghanistan through Russia. (The deal was concluded in January 2009).
Actually, Tymoshenko’s stated agenda is the same as Yushchenko’s in the 2004 elections. On the other hand, Yanukovych’s plans include not just “improved relations” with the Russian Federation, but also a close cooperation with Russia and joining a Moscow-led customs union. There are major differences as to the role of big business. And more.
Boris Danik
North Caldwell, New Jersey
United States
