How, 35 Years Ago Today, Ukraine Reasserted Its Sovereignty and Some Curious Facts

July 16, 1990, marked a major milestone in Ukraine’s efforts to free itself from Soviet Russian rule. But what actually happened?

Modern Ukraine was finally able to proclaim the renewal of its independence on Aug. 24, 1991, as the Soviet Union was undergoing imperial disintegration. Ukraine had proclaimed its independence in Kyiv back in 1918, on Jan. 22, but had not managed to hold out against Russia’s overwhelming imperialist White and Bolshevik Red forces.

A turning point in Ukraine’s struggle to reappear on the map of Europe’s free nations occurred in July 1990 when the still communist-dominated parliament of the Ukrainian Soviet “Republic” defied the Russian-dominated imperial Soviet set-up and reasserted Ukraine’s sovereign rights. 

Not only is the significance of this event important to recognize and not forget, but also the extraordinary circumstances in which it occurred.

Take a deep breathe here:

Did you know that miners protesting in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, and Russian pro-democratic forces challenging the authoritarian rule of the Communist Party in Moscow played crucial roles in precipitating Ukraine’s declaration of sovereignty?

By the second half of 1989, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s relaxation of controls under the names of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) had caused the Soviet Union to founder. Democratization and the preservation of an anachronistic empire ruled from Moscow through an authoritarian system of one-party rule by the Communist party were incompatible. Gorbachev was desperately trying to preserve the USSR on the basis of a New Union Treaty of its constituent republics.

The cracks were evident in Russia itself, where a communist official, Boris Yeltsin, had challenged Gorbachev and, on June 12, 1990, had effected an extraordinary groundbreaking declaration of the Russian Federation’s sovereignty within the USSR, thereby providing a model for other Soviet republics.

In Ukraine, Moscow’s loyal hardliner communist party boss Volodymyr Shcherbytsky had been replaced in September 1989, and a broad movement for democratization and national self-determination – Rukh – had crystallized around the same time and was gathering momentum. It had active representatives in the democratic minority in the Soviet Ukrainian parliament, or Verkhovna Rada.

The All-Union Communist Party (CPSU) was itself experiencing a split into hardliners and a more liberal wing backing Gorbachev. This was evident at the congress that took place in Moscow in July 1990, just as the debate about following the example set by Yeltsin and his supporter in Russia proper and asserting some form of Ukraine’s sovereignty was under way in the Verkhovna Rada.

Meanwhile, in Ukraine’s Donbas, the restive miners were threatening strike action to improve their condition and were calling on the Soviet Ukrainian authorities, rather than Moscow, to address their complaints.

Yet at this tense moment, the congress in Moscow had drawn numerous communist deputies away from Kyiv and seemingly hamstrung the Verkhovna Rada.

The patriotic democratic opposition in the Ukrainian parliament was able to capitalize on this and to press home the argument that only after proclaiming the republic’s sovereignty would the Ukrainian authorities be in a position to deal with the miners’ problems.

This was the first challenge of its kind to Moscow in the military-security sphere from any of the non-Russian republics.

In the meantime, their task had been facilitated by the fact that the parliamentary commission on state sovereignty was headed by Mykola Shulha, the Ukrainian Communist Party’s (CPU) liberal secretary for inter-ethnic relations. He had overseen the preparation of a revised working draft of the declaration of state sovereignty, incorporating changes proposed by Ivan Tymchenko and Serhii Holovaty from the democratic opposition.

The new version embodied significant compromises, such as a change in the name of the document, so that it now read: “On the state independence [sic] (sovereignty) of Ukraine.” The draft also excluded a section on a New Union Treaty and included a section on national armed forces.

The Communist hardliners saw this draft as tantamount to a declaration of independence and resisted. But even with the Communist camp, some of its more progressive types were frustrated by the continuing delay. Bowing to the pressure, the acting speaker put the proposal to recall the Communist deputies to a vote: 291 deputies supported it, and 20 opposed it.

But then there was another major shock that seriously weakened the communist majority. The speaker, Volodymyr Ivashko, who had initially taken over from Shcherbytsky, announced that he was not returning to Kyiv and had accepted the offer of becoming Gorbachev’s deputy in Moscow.

The opposition seized on this arguing that the Communists were putting their party and Moscow’s interests before those of Ukraine and its parliament. This enabled the opposition to gain more concessions from the stunned Communist majority.

The revised draft unveiled on July 11 did not refer directly either to the USSR or a New Union Treaty. While asserting the right of the Ukrainian nation to national self-determination, and the desire of the people of Ukraine to build a democratic society based on the rule of law in which the rights of all citizens and peoples would be guaranteed, it also stated, among other things, that the Ukrainian SSR must have “its own citizenship,” control over immigration into the republic, an independent banking system, and “its own armed forces and state security bodies.”

Later that dramatic day, the demoralized Communist majority was given even more to think about: A resolution adopted by miners at their protest meeting in Donetsk was read out in the parliament, in which they reiterated their call for the nationalization of the CPSU’s property, an end to the Communist Party’s control of the ministries and agencies responsible for defense, internal security and overseeing the economy, and for the Soviet Government to resign.

Moreover, the evening’s television news showed an abundance of blue and yellow flags at the miners’ protests in the Donbas. 

The main sticking points during the remainder of the debate in the Verkhovna Rada were whether citizens of Ukraine should have a single citizenship of the Ukrainian SSR or also remain citizens of the USSR, how the republic should safeguard its defense and security, and the New Union Treaty.

On the first issue, a compromise was eventually reached whereby citizens of Ukraine were also guaranteed the right to retain Soviet citizenship.

The second question, about defense, proved more difficult to resolve. But here too an agreement was successfully worked out, and it turned out to be more radical and far-reaching in its implications than could have been anticipated.

After considerable debate, the principle promoted by the national democrats that a sovereign Ukraine should have the right to its own military and security forces was endorsed by a vote of 230 to 113. This was the first challenge of its kind to Moscow in the military-security sphere from any of the non-Russian republics.

The deputies also agreed that Ukrainian conscripts should not serve outside the republic without the permission of the Ukrainian parliament.

On Sunday, July 15, the democratic forces held a huge demonstration in Kyiv at which calls were made for protests and civil disobedience if the Verkhovna Rada delayed declaring Ukraine’s state sovereignty.

The following morning, the moment of truth arrived and the overwhelming support which

the declaration of sovereignty received astounded even the optimists: 355 deputies voted for the declaration, four against, and one abstained.

After decades of being submerged, Ukraine had finally regained its voice and reasserted its desire to be recognized as a state in its own right.

The adoption of the Declaration was greeted with jubilation and the parliament further underscored the significance of its decision by voting that henceforth July 16 would be observed as a state holiday.

For the patriotic forces, the Declaration represented the first major step towards independence, while for the CPU leadership the document was a means for holding on to power while broadening Ukraine’s autonomy within a revamped Soviet system.

Nevertheless, the symbolic and psychological value of the document seemed to more than compensate for the flaws and compromises which it contained.

The Declaration boosted national dignity and pride, strengthened the sense of a broader Ukrainian republican identity and citizenship and, while signaling a decisive break with the imperial and authoritarian past, also opened the way forward to a more promising future, however interpreted.

In the Ukrainian capital, for example, the Kyiv City Council voted on July 20 to raise the blue and yellow flag outside the city hall, and four days later tens of thousands of people gathered to witness and celebrate the event.

The author has written extensively about Ukraine’s road to and after independence in his book The Ukrainian Resurgence (University of Toronto Press, and Christopher Hurst, London, 1999). This article draws from that account.