Türkiye faces both geopolitical risks and opportunities.
I have spent a few days jamming over various geopolitical risks and opportunities currently facing Türkiye with contacts in Türkiye, Ukraine and beyond.
To use an oft-used metaphor which cannot be understated perhaps at this point in history – Türkiye faces shifting geopolitical tectonic plates.
To name but a few: The war in Ukraine threatens to totally transform the defense and security architecture in Europe. The US backstop, and even NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause is in serious doubt. That much has surely been muddied further this week by a decidedly weak NATO response to Russian drone incursions into Poland and Romania and then Russian MIG31 flights into Estonian airspace.
Similarly the, seemingly unfettered, ascent of Israel to regional hegemon in the Gulf and Middle East at least, even encroaching in Türkiye’s own backyard and with competing spheres of influence is threatening conflict between the two. In Türkiye this risk seems center stage at present.
The US vs China rivalry raises the question if Türkiye, like others, will ultimately have to chose a side, or can it find a niche to leverage advantage for itself in a seemingly multipolar world?
And then there are the opportunities, with prospects for peace in Syria, and Lebanon, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and then the Kurdish peace process domestically in Türkiye which could help ease long standing friction points with its neighbors and provide potentially huge economic wins - as would a peace in Ukraine via big reconstruction contracts likely to find their way to Türkiye.
These are just a few, I could talk about the Cyprus issue and a broader tensions with Greece, still festering across the Eastern Mediterranean, and risks from potential instability in Iran following recent Israeli and US strikes.
But starting with the war in Ukraine, Türkiye has managed to navigate a delicate course between the two main combatants and their backers. As a NATO member it has avoided going all in with most of its NATO allies (barring Hungary and Slovakia, and perhaps now the Trump administration) by not supporting the long list (19) now of Western sanctions packages. It continues to import huge quantities of Russian oil and gas – but has thus far avoided the same treatment (50% tariffs) meted out by the US to India. It remains welcoming to millions of Russian tourists, and their payment cards. It has pleaded proximity herein, a lack of alternatives (unlike India on oil and gas), and economic vulnerability – on the latter if the West wants Türkiye to join energy diversification away from Russia, or stop Russian travel and tourists, it needs to provide financial support to cushion the blow.
As with the Trump administration now, it has also argued that Europe, should first get its act together by cutting its own multiple (and sometimes flourishing) trade ties with Russia, and facilitators such as the Greek shipping industry. Türkiye argues that close proximity means that it would disproportionately shoulder the burden of sanctions, and if the West wants compliance it should help Türkiye out financially. Türkiye has continued to trade with Russia, and in fact much of this trade has stepped up apace.
At the same time though, and perhaps because Türkiye still facilitates trade with Russia, Türkiye has been able to provide critical support still for Ukraine – Baykar drones, munitions supply, but also it has been a useful – deemed fair – broker for peace talks, with the Antalya and then Istanbul meetings. It has helped with prisoner exchanges. Erdogan can talk freely with both Presidents Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. That is useful.
Let’s be clear here though, despite its attempts at balancing its Russia and Ukraine relationships, Ankara has zero interest in a Russian victory in Ukraine. It understands that this would risk an emboldened, and militarily strengthened Russia back in the Black Sea, southern Caucasus, Central Asia, Syria, and Africa, et al. pushing back against Turkish interests across the board. Hence it has provided critical military support to Ukraine. It has supported eventual NATO membership to Ukraine, rejected Russian annexation of Crimea, and supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity – in many respects its support to Ukraine has gone beyond that of other NATO allies.
Russia’s miscalculation with its war on Ukraine, has though provided geopolitical opportunities for Türkiye. For example, with Moscow bogged down in Ukraine, this limited Russia’s ability to intervene to support Armenia against Azerbaijan’s final push in the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, and then to support the Assad regime in its final days in Syria. This created space now for a final Armenia-Azerbaijan peace, and a parallel Armenia-Türkiye rapprochement, with the prospect of opening up of borders, and transit throughout the region, but hopes of security and stability in Syria with knock-on effects to the Kurdish peace process in Türkiye itself.
Hopes of an early peace in Ukraine, though, are now fading fast. Trump’s 24H and then 100-day peace promises appeared built on flimsy ground. Both sides appear to see little to gain from cutting an early deal, and are now preparing for a long war. That also seems to be the conclusion of Europe if recent messaging is to be believed. And while giving lip service to the Trump administration as to the soundness still of the Transatlantic alliance, speeches and actions from the Trump administration suggest that they don’t see the war in Ukraine as existential to their own security interests as do the Europeans. The US is disengaging, and that is risking a security and defense vacuum in Europe. Russia is on the offensive in Europe, against Ukraine and Europe, the U.S. in retreat, and doubts remain as to whether Europe can defend itself in the short term against the Russia threat. Europe knows it needs to re-arm and rebuild its own autonomous defense capability, but that will take time – likely 5-10 years, to fill the gaps left by a US.withdrawal.
The hope here is that Ukraine’s valiant defense buys Europe time to rebuild its military industrial complex. And that Europe and Ukraine’s defenses can be buoyed in the short term by the US continuing to be willing to sell military kit to Europe. European countries have committed to spend on their own military rebuild – the 5% of GDP NATO spending commitment – and it seems to have finally figured that to alleviate European taxpayer complaints about the $100 billion annual bill for keeping Ukraine in the war, that it can raid the €200 billion plus of CBR assets immobilized in European jurisdictions ($330 billion across Western jurisdictions) to now fund Ukraine.
The long war in Ukraine, US disengagement from Europe, Europe’s lack of military preparedness and it’s time problem in rebuilding its own military industrial complex, presents an opportunity for Türkiye. Türkiye has both one of the largest militaries in Europe – now behind only Russia and Ukraine – battle tested and hardened from conflicts within and across its borders – and one of the largest military industrial and manufacturing bases in Europe.
Türkiye can step up and provide the moon shot for Europe to get its own military industrial base in gear. It can provide troops and kit to any Coalition of the Willing in any peace deal in Ukraine (albeit that seems distant at this stage) but also can build the ships, tanks and drones (if not planes), and make the munitions, to quickly bolster Europe’s defense. Türkiye can provide the scale, and quickly, that both Ukraine and Europe lacks when it comes to shells, drones, et al. What it needs is the financing and for Europe put its old prejudices aside about Türkiye’s place in Europe. Sure many European politicians question whether European values (human rights, rule of law, democracy) align currently with those of Türkiye, even though interests in countering Russia clearly align. Many Turks would likely counter that what they see is not European values but European double standards when we look at EU foreign policy towards Ukraine, Türkiye and Israel-Gaza. And whatever European values really are they are unlikely to survive long if Putin wins in Ukraine and then advances in Europe. Needs must for Europe, and the need suggests closer and deeper military defense alignment and cooperation with Türkiye.
Türkiye can help assure European defense, Europe needs to wake up to that fact and provide finance to Türkiye to allow it to scale up European defense capability to now match that of Russia.
And just to be specific to what is happening on the battlefield in Ukraine, it is moving from a war of attrition to a war of iteration, and what is evident now is the winner will not just be who can provide most 155mm shells, but who can exponentially increase drone production. And on that front Russia is, while Ukraine is lagging. Soon 700 Shaheds a day will go to 10,000 a day, and how can Ukraine’s air defenses and critical infrastructure required to sustain its own defense survive that? And what is happening in Europe seems to lack coordination and scale. Türkiye can help Europe provide that scale and quickly.
But in helping Europe meet its immediate defense needs, and assure its security, Türkiye’s own relationship and integration with Europe will be cemented. Let’s face it, Turks, from Ataturk, and before, have looked West. They send their kids to US, UK and European universities for education, not to Moscow or Dubai. Two thirds of trade, investment and financing with/for come from the West. The quid pro quo for Türkiye should be deeper trading relations with Europe – a new Customs++ Union with the EU, and UK, and technology exchange, two-way.
Surely events in recent weeks suggest that Europe, including Türkiye, needs greater defense autonomy from the US, and therein Europe and Türkiye are natural partners because of interests, proximity, and history, while values are subjective.
But those same events have suggested that if Europe lacks the long term strategic vision, and cannot put past prejudices behind them, that Türkiye has to look to other options.
The Israel issue and nuclear option
And on this latter note, the rapid ascent of Israel as a near hegemonic regional power will force greater strategic defense cooperation between Türkiye, the Gulf and the wider Middle East – a rival perhaps to Europe for Türkiye’s defense manufacturing prowess.
After Israel’s recent successful wars against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran, ongoing military intervention in Syria, and relentless and unforgiving actions against Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, the penny seems to have dropped that: a) Israel is unconstrained – its actions will not be limited by the West, rather it will even still be armed and financed by the West. And on that note, the recent Israeli strike on Qatar, demonstrated that even close friendship with the US is no defense, only your own hard, autonomous defense capability is. b) Israel sees advantage now to expand its borders; c) Israel seems to want to keep its neighbors weak and unstable, through its constant military intervention, as now can be seen in Syria.
All these points will push Türkiye, the Gulf, and wider Middle East towards deeper cooperation. And that has already been seen with Saudi Arabia’s newly signed mutual security pact with Pakistan. It is crystal clear that Saudi has sought aussrance under Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella, as it no longer feels that same reassurance from the US. But therein what about Türkiye? Will it seek similar reassurance from others or seek its own autonomous nuclear capability? And perhaps all this is revealing a conclusion from the US/Israeli strikes against Iran, or Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, that the only defense is now the nuclear defense – whether that is Türkiye, Ukraine or Saudi Arabia. Could Türkiye secure the same nuclear assurance from Pakistan, or the UK, or France? Or will it decide to go it alone, at some point in the future?
The above does suggest that Türkiye has options – Europe, the Middle East, even China, in term of future defense cooperation. But maybe what it will decide is a pragmatic multi-vector strategy in terms of defense cooperation, with Europe, the Gulf/Middle East, whatever works best to deliver Türkiye’s fast track to full defense industrial autonomy. And all this might well still mean cooperation with the US – buying F-16 upgrades, F-35s even, while it can. It will be about keeping options – a little too early for Türkiye to pivot to China, as surely that would just irk the US too much.
And what about the relationship with the US?
Well, it’s complicated and transactional. But encouragingly, Trump and Erdogan seem to have a good personal relationship. Both are transactional, non-ideological by nature. Both have faced down what they would view as their own deep states, perhaps now even capturing them. Both value their militaries, and want to project power. Both are pro-business, and want to get deals done. Both like building, appreciating construction and understanding the value of real estate. There seems to be an alignment of interests on Syria. Both appear to want to get on with Russia, and Putin. Personal popularity is important for both.
Actually for Erdogan it has long been about jobs, jobs, jobs, and low interest rates, low taxes, construction, real estate, have been at the heart of his electoral success. For Erdogan, that eventually ended up in a ramp-up in inflation, and a weaker currency which might be the end result of Trump’s current policies on tariffs, and the Fed. Here, though, are two men that want to cut deals, think outside the box, do the unthinkable and often come out smelling of roses. And it feels like in US Ambassador Tom Barrack, and close Trump confidente, the US has a diplomat who can solve problems like Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria or S-400s. Sometimes thinking outside the box can go terribly wrong, and this all could, but I don’t sense it will be. Trump wants deals, solutions, wins and I think Erdogan had the wherewithal to provide those.
All the above said, the huge threat to Türkiye-US relations is Israel, with the two now sparring over the end game in Syria. For Türkiye Syria is existential, given its impact on the Kurdish peace process. Israel seems to think that Syria is a free hit, against Türkiye, and Erdogan in particular.
It’s not difficult to imagine miscalculations leading to conflict between the two. This would be a disaster for Trump – two allies, still, potentially coming to blows. The hope is that calm heads in the Trump administration will encourage restraint now by Israel. But will a headstrong Netanyahu, with an almost missionary zeal, listen? Might Netanyahu risk a strike again Hamas leaders still in Türkiye? Possible I guess after the attack in Qatar. But such an eventuality would inevitably see swift Turkish retaliation, and a lose-lose-lose scenario for Israel, Türkiye and the US.
We are in uncharted territory. Turks tell me they have a much larger and capable army, better equipped navy and missile/drone capability to hurt Israel. Israel’s air power could cause similarly catastrophic damage in Türkiye. Türkiye also has the Article 5 backstop, not that anyone would want to really ask the question if that actually means anything anymore.
From a Turkish perspective at least the challenge now presented by Israel, and the wider ones in Ukraine, with Russia, doubts over the US security backstop, must affirm the prudence of the decision two decades back to invest heavily in an autonomous Turkish military industrial capability. That and tensions with Israel might well act to buoy Erdogan’s current lagging opinion poll rating hurt by inflation and the travails in the courts with the opposition CHP. Tensions with Israel will surely continue to spur on the Kurdish peace process within Türkiye – which does appear to have been a motivation for the remarkable about-face by Erdogan nationalist ally Bahceli in moving to support this process earlier this year. I guess all this just affirms the reality of the many moving parts, or plates in the current tectonic geopolitical mix, which presents both threats and opportunities for Türkiye. It’s complicated, but that’s the neighborhood in which Türkiye operates.
Reprinted from the author’s @tashecon blog! See the original article here.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.