When Moscow’s long-time Syrian ally, Bashar al-Assad, was overthrown by Islamist opposition forces last December, speculation immediately arose that Russia would soon lose its naval and air bases in Syria. The large-scale movement of Russian military equipment out of its Hmeimim air base and redeployment to eastern Libya in December 2024 indicated that Moscow itself anticipated the loss of these Syrian bases. But after the new Syrian leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, stated during his October 2025 meeting with Putin in Moscow that he would respect Syria’s existing agreements with Russia, Moscow now seems more likely to keep Hmeimim and its Tartus naval base as per the previous Syrian regime’s agreements with Russia about them.
This development is truly amazing. Normally, when a government backed by one great power is overthrown and replaced by forces hostile to it, the great power that supported the overthrown regime loses whatever bases it had in that country. Thus, Washington lost access to bases in South Vietnam and intelligence facilities in Iran (among others) as did Moscow after the downfall of the Marxist regime in Afghanistan at the end of the Cold War, the US in Afghanistan after the downfall of the Kabul government, and Paris after the overthrow of pro-Western civilian governments in various francophone African countries.
Why Russia would want to keep its Syrian bases is fairly obvious: It wants to use them for maintaining its military presence in the Middle East and facilitate its military operations in Libya, the Sahel, and elsewhere. Losing the bases would also diminish the Putin’s cherished image of Russia as a great power.
Why Sharaa would be willing to allow the Russians to keep these bases is less clear – especially since they do not pay any rent for them. It is possible that Sharaa might find a continued Russian military presence useful in curbing the influence of Türkiye, which he mainly relied on while still in opposition. Another possibility is that since Sharaa has not received as much assistance as he had hoped for from the West, he is turning to those states that are willing to provide it – including Russia. The most convincing explanation, though, is that Sharaa has turned to Russia in response to Israeli hostility.
Despite Sharaa’s efforts to reassure Israel that his new government does not have hostile intentions toward Israel or that he will support Israel’s adversaries, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu launched attacks on military facilities in Syria not because the new Syrian authorities were using them against Israel, but to forestall them from potentially doing so.
Israel has also supported the Syrian Druze community opposing Sharaa. Just as Israel had to be careful not to harm Russian interests when attacking Iranian, Hezbollah, and Assad regime positions before Assad fell, Sharaa may hope that Israel will continue to avoid targeting Russian forces – especially if he can persuade Moscow to deploy Russian military patrols in southern Syria where Israel has been actively supporting the Druze.
Whatever the reasons for Sharaa allowing the Russians to retain their bases, Putin clearly benefits, while those in the West who hoped Russia would lose them have been disappointed. But it is not yet entirely clear either what Sharaa will be willing to allow Russia to do with these bases or what Russia itself will be able to do with them.
Jihadist complications
Many observers note that Russia has used its Syrian air base in particular to support military regimes in the Sahel which have ousted French and American forces from their territories. Even with Russian support, though, these governments have not been able to suppress their Sunni jihadist opponents, which could not be defeated with Western support earlier. Some of these jihadists are aligned with Islamic State, which Sharaa and his allies have long been at odds with in Syria. But given Sharaa’s own jihadist roots, how much does he now want Syria to be associated with Russian-led fights against jihadists – especially when these efforts have so far been unsuccessful? And if Russian forces are going to be involved in military efforts against Islamic State, Sharaa might well prefer that they work against his immediate Islamic State opponents inside Syria and not ones far away in the Sahel.
Under Assad, Israel did not target Russian forces inside Syria but did target Iranian, Hezbollah, and Assad regime forces. The Assad regime and its allies were unhappy about this, but their dependence on the Russian support they did receive meant that they could not make a fuss about the additional Russian support they wanted but were not receiving. By contrast, if Russia does not protect the new Syrian government against Israel – such as by deploying Russian troops alongside Syrian government ones to deter Israel attacks – then Sharaa and his associates may come to question how useful Russia’s retention of its bases is for them.
Given the typical pattern of how external powers lose their bases in countries where regimes allied to them have been overthrown, Russia’s retention of its Syrian bases after the downfall of Assad has been a coup for Moscow. Sharaa, though, has only allowed the Russians to retain their Syrian bases because he expects something of great value from Moscow in return. If Putin disappoints him, Sharaa may yet disappoint Putin.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.