Fields, villages, connecting roads – from Russia’s perspective, the war in 2025 has been a fiasco so far, with “successes” measured in acres. But now, in the final stages of this year, just before winter sets in, there are reports of Russian advances into the city of Pokrovsk, and similar reports from the city of Kupyansk.
Is this a Russian breakthrough? Has the tide turned? Or is what is currently happening more likely to be the “culmination of Russian efforts to conquer at least something this year,” as Ukrainian analyst Mykola Bielieskov of the National Institute for Strategic Studies puts it?
One thing is certain: Russia has massively intensified its attacks in central Donbas in recent months. According to President Volodymyr Zelensky, the Russian army currently has around 170,000 troops on the front line around Pokrovsk alone. Bielieskov speaks of a 1:10 balance of power in some sections of the front. But one thing is clear to him: what is currently happening is not “a turning point in Russia’s favor.”
After all, there is the price Russia is paying for what are ultimately relatively small territorial gains: in the past three months, Russian losses have been just under 30,000 men per month. This includes soldiers killed or wounded beyond combat capability. And 30,000 men is also the limit of human reinforcements that Russia is currently able to muster, according to current figures.
The life expectancy of Russian contract soldiers – and Russia is currently only deploying such soldiers, as there is no mobilization – remains at around one month.
In any case, the current situation in Pokrovsk and Kupyansk has developed over months. In Kupyansk, it was a slow, steady Russian advance with heavy losses. In Pokrovsk, on the other hand, one could get the impression that Ukrainian units were taken by surprise.
Mykola Bielieskov does not share this impression. Yet he does identify mistakes on the Ukrainian side, particularly in the chain of command and reporting. Developments were downplayed, he says, and the region only received full attention once Russia had already massively gathered and deployed troops.
Pokrovsk – a small city that once had a population of 60,000 – has been on Russia’s priority list for more than a year. The town is strategically important. Important transport routes pass through Pokrovsk. The city was also an important logistics hub. Pokrovsk also flanks the two larger cities further north in the region: Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. If Pokrovsk were to fall, capabilities would be freed up for an offensive on these two cities. At least, that is the theory on paper.
According to Daniel Mealie of the Institute for the Study of War, there is one main reason why Russia is currently relying primarily on infantry and using armored vehicles only sparingly or selectively: the challenge of procuring such vehicles and the mass deployment of drones. Tanks are a target. And when mechanized attacks do occur, they involve dozens of tanks at once, especially in bad weather, because that interferes with reconnaissance.
According to Bielieskov, Russia’s offensive actions are currently based primarily on lightly armed “barefoot infantry.” This slows down every troop movement. But it also sets the pace when it comes to supplies and the entire logistics. “They cannot change direction so quickly, and it is still dozens of kilometers to Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.” He therefore classifies what is currently happening as follows: they are creating the “starting point for the coming year of war.”
Drone watershed
The year 2025, which is coming to an end, certainly has what it takes to go down in history as “historic.” Drones, sensor surveillance, remote-controlled and autonomous systems now dominate the battlefield. “This is no longer the battlefield of 2022,” says Bielieskov. Back then, it was all about artillery. Artillery has a precisely defined range and, at the same time, a delay in target planning.
The widespread use of FPV drones means that attacks can be carried out with precision in real time. This has fundamentally changed the nature of warfare.
“Whereas the no man’s land between the front lines in the First World War was perhaps a few hundred meters wide, today it is 15 to 20 kilometers on both sides,” says Mykola Bielieskov.
Meanwhile, the Russians hardly use tanks or heavy equipment anymore – they are too easy a target. Large offensives by the Russian infantry have recently been carried out under the protection of aluminum blankets to avoid thermal sensors. Given the technological means employed and the resulting conditions for troops in a no man’s land dozens of kilometers wide, a collapse of the front line is not in sight.
But has this developed into something of a high-tech stalemate? Bielieskov says: “Ask a front-line soldier about this – he will definitely say no.”
Multidimensional warfare
But that’s not all. Kinetic warfare is only one dimension of this war, which is being fought on many levels; and not only in Ukraine, but also in Western Europe. The war is being fought on a political, informational and psychological level, but also through sabotage, diversion and propaganda in all its forms. And these are ultimately decisive in a war of attrition like this one.
“Even the First World War did not end with a breakthrough on the front,” says Bielieskov, “but with the collapse of systems and states.”
And while Bielieskov views the events on the war front rather calmly as a “last-minute Russian panic before winter,” he is much more concerned about the political front. Recently, financial contributions from NATO countries to Ukraine have fallen sharply, even though NATO had only just agreed on a procurement and financing mechanism (PURL) in July. Ukraine needs $16-18 billion per year, but since July (i.e., after about a third of the year), only $3 billion have been paid into the pot.
However, according to Bielieskov, what is lacking is “political leadership” and the ability of politicians to explain the urgency of the situation. What threatens is fatigue, the deceptive impression that Ukraine will somehow sort things out and that Western Europe is not directly affected anyway. Wishful thinking – until it is too late to react.