Russia is conducting full-scale hybrid operations against Poland – from sabotage to disinformation. Tomasz Siemoniak, Polish Sejm minister, member of the Council of Ministers, and Coordinator of Special Services spoke at length with Kyiv Post. Siemoniak insists that the Kremlin’s goal is destabilization and dividing allies.
Michał Kujawski: On Oct. 9, the European Parliament adopted a resolution stating that Russian hybrid attacks, acts of sabotage and violations of EU airspace constitute a form of state terrorism. How intense are these activities, and how much of them reaches the public?
Tomasz Siemoniak: The war has been going on for nearly four years now, and we are moving through different phases of reaction – from shock and solidarity to habituation. Today, only the most spectacular incidents break through to public opinion, such as the intrusion of more than 20 Russian drones into Polish airspace in September 2025. It was a painful reminder that the war is still ongoing, and that in Ukraine far larger attacks are a daily reality.
The drones that entered Poland were not armed and did not cause serious damage. Poland’s role – and that of the entire Central and Eastern Europe – is to constantly remind other Western states that the war continues and brings enormous losses. The optimism from a few months ago, that a ceasefire might be possible, has faded.
MK: Russia’s goal in Ukraine is to turn it into a vassal state. What is the aim of Russian hybrid actions in Poland, the Baltic states, and the region?
TS: The goal is destabilization. Russia uses a full arsenal of hybrid tools: migratory pressure at the Belarus-Poland border, sabotage and reconnaissance operations, cyberattacks, and information operations. We regularly observe attempts to pit Poland against Ukraine, against Germany, or against the EU. Russia wants to weaken public support for Ukraine and exhaust our resources.
The infrastructure along the Polish-Belarusian border alone cost 3 billion złoty ($818 million); a Polish soldier was killed there and others were injured. Detaining a single saboteur often means the need to increase protection – which means additional measures. This is a game of resource exhaustion, a cold calculation by the adversary.
MK: Many of those detained [by Poland] for acts of sabotage are Ukrainian citizens. Who are they?
TS: Most are charged under Article 130 of the Criminal Code – for knowingly cooperating with foreign intelligence services. I’m not judging their views, but the evidence shows they knew who they were working for.
It is true that Ukrainian citizens dominate that group, but more than a million Ukrainians live in Poland – statistically, among them may be individuals willing to carry out such actions for little money. These are one-off “agents” recruited on Telegram, whom no one later defends and who will not become subjects of any agent or prisoner exchange. Setting aside patriotism and choosing sides, I have repeatedly appealed: it is not worth ruining your life for a few thousand euros. Being a saboteur working for Russian services stigmatizes you for life.
Poland consistently maintained that a free Ukraine is a key national interest.
MK: Such cases also fuel the Polish public’s dislike of Ukrainians.
TS: Yes. Russia achieves a double effect here. Often more important than the sabotage itself is the fact that the perpetrator turns out to be a Ukrainian citizen. Take the example of the fire at the Marywilska shopping center in Warsaw: the damage was minor, but the media message – that a Ukrainian was responsible – works in Russia’s favor.
MK: Let’s return to the intrusion of Russian drones into Polish airspace. Accusations were made against NATO that it failed the test, and even disinformation theories appeared claiming it was a Ukrainian provocation.
TS: The reaction was adequate – both kinetic and political. We used Polish and allied assets, including aviation. Some of the drones were shot down. The prime minister and the president were at the operational command, there was a government meeting, we triggered NATO consultations under Article 4. All responses were correct and appropriate to the situation – the intrusion of 21 decoy drones.
MK: If the narratives I mentioned spread globally, maybe the information strategy could have been conducted more effectively?
TS: The Air Force opened fire based on legislation amended in recent years. In the past, the minister made decisions about shooting down a target; today, military commanders decide – and that is what happened this time. The operational commander publicly stated that he made the decisions independently. The president and the prime minister present at the operational command did not influence the decisions in any way; on the contrary – they demonstrated that in such moments decisions are made by the military, not politicians.
The incident was a major shock and had a strong impact on public opinion. I believe this was one of the goals of the attack – a Russian demonstration of the ability to conduct such operations and a test of our reaction. On social media there will always be “experts” contesting the actions, but I don’t attach undue importance to that. Post-incident polls showed that most Poles positively assessed the state’s response.
MK: With respect to Polish-Ukrainian relations. Poland is the second-largest supplier of goods to Ukraine after China, and yet anti-Ukrainian sentiments in society are growing, and the political climate is at times chilly. How do you assess current relations?
TS: We are in a period of searching for a more durable formula for cooperation. For years, indifference prevailed, and cooperation only became active during major political moments and major events – the Orange Revolution, Euromaidan.
Poland consistently maintained that a free Ukraine is a key national interest. There were many positive moments – the recognition of independence in 1991, joint historical initiatives such as the cemetery in Bykivnia near Kyiv, where Polish officers murdered by the Soviets [in the Katyn massacre] are buried. Despite such positive accents, for a long time there has been a shared sense that the potential of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation is not being fully utilized.
After 2022 came the incredible mobilization of Polish society, and the then PiS [Law and Justice party] government, in the spirit of cross-party consensus, took decisive actions to support Ukraine. These were major steps, but after nearly four years the emotions subsided and disputes emerged. Unfortunately, at some point support for Ukraine stopped being something that united Polish politicians.
MK: So what happened?
TS: At some point the problem of Ukrainian grain appeared, and there was disappointment that President Zelensky, during his visit to Warsaw, did not address the historical issue of Volhynia, which is important for Poles. We were aware that the war was ongoing and that historical expectations are a complicated matter, but the moment came when historical issues became a political category, and some politicians – mainly from Confederation alliance – decided to exploit this. It is difficult to use rational arguments in emotional debates.
MK: Didn’t part of the political elite start speaking the language of Confederation? This was visible during the last presidential campaign in Poland.
TS: Prime Minister Tusk’s position is unequivocally positive toward Ukraine. Of course, we also defend our own interests. But we must remember that Ukrainians in Poland work, pay taxes, and their participation in the labor market is the highest in the EU.
For decades Polish society was homogeneous… Even so, the integration of Ukrainians is progressing well. We do not know how many will stay, but we should build value out of this – cultural and economic as well. Migration will always be a political issue, just as it is throughout the EU.
Germany has learned its lesson regarding the perception of Russia.
MK: Was it the right decision that Poland did not extradite to Germany the Ukrainian citizen, Volodymyr Zh., accused of complicity in the Nord Stream sabotage?
TS: The Polish court decided so. The government’s stance was clear – opposition to extradition – but the decision was made by a fully independent court, based on the German request and what the prosecutor’s office presented. German media were too quick to pass judgment in this case.
MK: Was there pressure from Germany?
TS: Germany acted within procedures and legal provisions. Statements from AfD politicians expressed dissatisfaction, but I did not see political pressure. We must remember that our assessment of the Nord Stream project – as an idea of German-Russian cooperation – has always been very critical.
MK: Are there concerns that Germany will want to return to cooperation with Russia?
TS: I do not see such a possibility. Germany has learned its lesson regarding the perception of Russia. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has ended the era in which the German economy believed it could gain an advantage over competitors thanks to cheap Russian resources. Times of shocking episodes – such as former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder working for Gazprom – are over. The CDU/CSU always criticized that policy. Germany needed time to understand the risks, but it did so, and the change is lasting. They also recognize that Russia is an aggressor and an unreliable partner.
MK: It is hard to disagree with your assessment of Chancellor Merz’s policy, but the same cannot be said about the growing strength of AfD.
TS: AfD remains an obvious problem. It is a party building support on criticism of Germany’s migration policy – a policy the current chancellor himself acknowledges as unsuccessful. But we must note that movements similar to AfD operate in many Western European countries. What is worrying about AfD is its leniency toward Russia.
Some situations indicate that Moscow supports such groups. One example is Marine Le Pen’s National Front [today rebranded as National Rally], which Russia openly lent money to. It is clear that the Kremlin bets on nationalist movements as the best tool to weaken the European Union.
MK: Where does this come from?
TS: You cannot ignore the decades of German-Russian cooperation after German reunification – which Russia consented to. For Germans it was the most important event since 1945. The generation that shaped German politics for decades grew up in the shadow of the Cold War and the division of the country. This can be seen, for example, in the case of Chancellor Angela Merkel from the former GDR.
Embedded in that mindset was the memory of Russia as both a threat and a victor of World War II. I remember how in 2014 – right after the annexation of Crimea – I hosted in Warsaw the then-new German defense minister, Ursula von der Leyen. Today, as an excellent president of the European Commission, she is one of the key figures supporting Ukraine. I can see how far she has come and how deeply she is engaged in strengthening Europe’s security.
Kyiv Post conducted this interview before the act of sabotage on Poland’s railway on November 17.