It has always been problematic the way the Donald Trump administration has carried out its negotiations aimed at ending the Russo-Ukrainian war. The decision to have Special Envoy Keith Kellogg engaging Kyiv and Special Envoy Steve Witkoff separately reaching out to the Kremlin opened up a seam that could easily be exploited. The recently revealed 28-point proposal and news about Witkoff’s conciliatory approach towards his Russian counterparts reveals just how problematic it turned out to be.
Right now, the United States and Ukrainian governments are deliberating a framework for peace negotiations going forward. Representatives from the two sides convened earlier this week in Geneva, with US government officials presenting their Ukrainian counterparts the 28-point framework for ending the war. After the deliberations, the two sides noted progress in a joint statement, but the pleasantries in the information space belie the negative impact of the Kremlin’s exploitation of the US approach to the negotiations.
In any negotiation, there should be one lead negotiator who engages the different parties. That person should have a clear understanding of all the interests, constraints, and restraints at play, and he or she should orchestrate the negotiating team in maximizing outcomes. This is a fundamental principle for any negotiation, so it was immediately odd when the Trump administration opted not to follow it in the pursuit of a mediated peace to end Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.
For undisclosed reasons, the US government decided to split these responsibilities between retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg and businessman Steve Witkoff. Kellogg became the Special Envoy to Ukraine focused on engaging the Zelensky administration, while Witkoff became the Special Envoy for Peace Missions who divided his time between Moscow and separate dealings in the Israel-Hamas War.
On multiple occasions, Kellogg stated that this arrangement was not a problem; however, the evidence has proven otherwise. There were reports of Witkoff attending meetings with Vladimir Putin alone and speaking through a Kremlin translator, which is a misstep in US diplomatic protocol and led to potential misreporting of the Russia side’s positions and intentions. Further, when the Kremlin began protesting Kellogg’s involvement in the negotiating process, he started to recede into the background, to the point where Kellogg is now unlikely to remain in his post for a second year.
At the same time, Witkoff stepped up his engagement. This included his multi-day meeting with Russian interlocutor Kirill Dmitriev in Miami in October. There, they reportedly drafted the core elements of what would later become the US government’s proposal for ending the war.
What resulted from this US approach has been a failure to impose costs on the Russians and a problematic framework for peace negotiations. Every time the US was ready to apply pressure, be it through imposition of sanctions or additional military aid to Ukraine, the Kremlin would extend an olive branch through Witkoff or via other engagement just long enough to delay any punitive actions. Now, the Russia side has succeeded in shaping the US government’s 28-point peace proposal.
The 28-point proposal was not all bad. It does reflect the US government’s continued interest and investment in the peace process. Also, the fact that it includes a US security guarantee for Ukraine is positive.
The 28-point proposal was aspirational in nature and clearly prioritized a near-term peace declaration over a durable and implementable peace process.
Nevertheless, the bad outweighed the good. It called for non-specific provisions that would make it easy for the Kremlin to claim Ukrainian non-compliance or for the Russians to find workarounds to implementation. It called for a “Board of Peace” model for implementation, which may make sense for transitional administrations but is not appropriate for a peace process between sovereign states with functional governments. It incorporated US-Russia interests such as arms control, economic relationships, and a return to a G8 format that have no place in a peace agreement to end military hostilities between Russia and Ukraine. Further, it did not call for a DMZ across the entire proposed line-of-control or for on-the-ground third party implementation mechanisms.
A flawed anchor
Those were just a few of the many problems, but ultimately, the 28-point proposal demanded way too many concessions from Ukraine with far too few from Russia. It was aspirational in nature and clearly prioritized a near-term peace declaration over a durable and implementable peace process. And, to the detriment of the negotiating process, it became the US government’s anchor – that is, the reference point for the deliberations currently taking place.
While there is little doubt that US and Ukrainian working level officials are doing their best to work with what they have, they are currently operating from this flawed anchor in the negotiations. What that means is that any deal they produce will be unnecessarily oriented towards Kremlin objectives, will leave major structural gaps for implementation and oversight, and will undermine the foundation for a lasting peace.
Unfortunately for Ukraine, the Voldymyr Zelensky administration does not have much choice in the matter. As President Zelensky noted: “Right now, Ukraine may find itself facing a very tough choice. Either the loss of our dignity or the risk of losing a key partner.” So, the two sides have worked from the US proposal, reportedly paring down the 28-point deal to 19 and eliminating any issues that violated Ukraine’s indispensable negotiating interests.
The Kremlin approach
Despite this conciliatory approach, the Kremlin will likely deliver an initial rejection to whatever compromise language the US and Ukraine produced. This will allow the Russia side to see what additional concessions they can garner, which is consistent with their approach thus far. Up to now, clinging to maximalist demands has worked in their favor.
Ultimately, the Kremlin’s negotiating strategy has been simple and predicated on two things: first, that Ukraine’s partners will lose interest in the war and turn off support; and second, that Ukraine’s partners will not dial up the costs against Russia any further. Accordingly, the Kremlin will continue its efforts to exploit the Trump administration’s desire to achieve another near-term peace deal, and they will leverage any tools and seams available.
The reality is that if the US wants a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, the formula is the same as it has always been: pressure on the Kremlin; aid to Ukraine; negotiate an armistice; and reserve political level issues until after a complete cessation of hostilities is in place. This will take more time, negotiating effort, and commitment, but the work and hardship today will save lives and prevent renewed conflict down the road.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.