Behind on unmanned warfare and lacking societal resilience, Europe risks being unprepared for the next war.
Could Europe defeat Russia in a real conflict? On paper, yes. In reality, the answer is uncertain. Military power without readiness is a strategic vulnerability.
If a major conflict erupted tomorrow, Europe would struggle badly
We have the potential to be far more prepared, but that requires urgent changes and sustained effort. Delay will make catching up vastly more expensive.
The problem is not only weapons, although Europe lacks critical systems and sufficient quantities of the ones it does have. The deeper issue is how we prepare as societies and what that means for our readiness. Europe is behind in unmanned warfare and in coordination between public institutions, industry and citizens. Infrastructure and resilience matter as much as tanks and missiles.
On paper, Europe looks formidable: a large population, strong economies, advanced industry, world-class innovation, and powerful allies. We outperform Russia on all these metrics. Yet if war started tomorrow, Europe would struggle for a long time before turning the tide, and Russia knows it.
Why? Because we are still preparing for the Russia of February 2022. That Russia is gone. Today’s Russia is a war economy with far more combat experience and a decisive edge in unmanned warfare. Moscow has gone all-in on drones while Europe continues to treat them as a niche capability. That is a mistake. Russia’s society is ready for war and accustomed to it. Most European societies are not.
“Quantity matters, and Europe lacks it.”
Russia’s defense industry has adapted quickly under sanctions, shifting to mass production of drones and electronic warfare systems. Recent estimates suggest Russia produces thousands of attack drones monthly while Europe debates procurement rules. This speed gap is our Achilles’ heel.
Russia iterates fast. Europe skips generations of drones because of cost and slow procurement. By the time our systems pass testing and bidding, they risk being obsolete and often are when delivered. That gap will cost us dearly unless we act now.
Recent drone incursions across Europe prove the point. We lacked equipment to detect and neutralize drones, lacked clear procedures to take them down without risking civilian harm, and lacked a coherent response. Russia was not deterred and continues hybrid actions against us. That is a warning sign.
Technology is only part of the picture. Most of our societies are not ready. Few European countries have the institutional collaboration needed for total defense. Finland is a rare exception. Our infrastructure is fragile: railways, tunnels, bridges and shelters remain largely unprepared.
Civil defense is another blind spot. Finland and Switzerland maintain bomb shelters for their populations. Most EU countries do not. Few run regular drills involving the military, public institutions, civilians and private companies. Readiness requires this. Hybrid threats exploit gaps between jurisdictions and institutions. If we do not close those gaps, we will remain vulnerable.
Europe has high-quality weapons, but not enough
Quantity matters, and Europe lacks it. We have high-quality weapons, but not enough of them. We need more drones, shells, missiles and air defense systems. And we need more and better-trained people to operate them. Technology is essential, but wars are ultimately fought and won by people.
Europe must adopt a whole-of-society approach: more collaboration, more coordination, more innovation, more equipment. New procurement models, new partnerships and co-creation with private actors. Learn from Ukraine. Learn from Finland. Peacetime armies cannot keep up alone. Society must be involved.
We also need new ways to counter hybrid threats: constant innovation in unmanned warfare, modular defense systems, and flexible collaboration between public institutions, civilians, NGOs and private companies.
“The best way to avoid fighting Russia ourselves is simple: Make sure Ukraine wins.”
The Niinistö report points in the right direction, but more is needed. Europe should consider mandatory civil defense drills, stockpiling critical components and fast-tracking drone production through joint ventures. The European Defense Fund and NATO’s innovation programs are steps forward, but they remain slow and fragmented. Procurement cycles that take years must be replaced with agile models that deliver capabilities in months. Ukraine’s experience shows rapid adaptation is possible when governments, tech firms and civil society work together.
Finally, Europe must address the financial dimension. Frozen Russian assets represent a significant resource that could fund Ukraine’s defense and accelerate Europe’s own readiness. Legal caution cannot outweigh Ukraine’s and Europe’s strategic survival. If Europe hesitates, the cost will not be measured in court cases but in lives and sovereignty. Belgium’s obstruction in releasing frozen assets must be resolved.
All of this is urgent. The best way to avoid fighting Russia ourselves is simple: Make sure Ukraine wins. Supporting Ukraine fully is Europe’s first line of defense. Acting now is not optional. It is existential.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.