A tip from a Kyiv Post reader with additional details has drawn my attention to a recent YouTube podcast by Yuri Shvets, a former KGB major who served undercover in Washington DC during the 1980s.
The defector, who immigrated to the United States in 1993 and now provides sharp geopolitical commentary, has highlighted a critical piece of US legislation that has been largely overlooked in current discussions about Trump’s approach to Russia and the ongoing war in Ukraine.
That legislation is the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act – CAATSA – and there’s a bitter irony in its relevance today. This is what I’ve discovered.
In August 2017, Donald Trump reluctantly signed CAATSA into law, but not before issuing a signing statement that complained bitterly about how it “encroaches on the executive branch’s authority to negotiate.”
The bill had passed Congress with veto-proof majorities – 98-2 in the Senate and 419-3 in the House – a direct response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and Syria, as well as its interference in the 2016 presidential election.
Trump called the legislation “seriously flawed” and argued it would harm America’s relationships with European allies. Yet faced with near-unanimous congressional support, he signed it anyway.
Seven years later, that same law may be a crucial obstacle standing between Trump’s apparent desire to grant Russia sweeping sanctions relief and a bipartisan Congress determined to maintain pressure on Moscow.
In essence, CAATSA transformed Russia sanctions from a matter of executive discretion into a collaborative process requiring legislative buy-in.
CAATSA did something unprecedented: It took sanctions authority that had traditionally resided with the executive branch and codified it into law, transforming Obama-era executive orders into statutory requirements that no president could simply sweep away.
The legal framework Trump reluctantly set in motion during his first term now threatens to complicate his second.
So, what exactly does CAATSA do? At its core, the law prevents any president from unilaterally lifting sanctions on Russia without congressional oversight.
Specifically, it requires the executive branch to notify Congress at least 30 days before removing or substantially altering any sanctions covered under the law. During that period, Congress retains the power to block the president’s action through a joint resolution of disapproval.
In essence, CAATSA transformed Russia sanctions from a matter of executive discretion into a collaborative process requiring legislative buy-in.
The law covers sanctions imposed under several key executive orders, including Executive Order 13662, which targets specific sectors of the Russian economy and individuals connected to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Biden understood this. In the final weeks of his presidency, Biden made strategic last-minute designations under Executive Order 13662, effectively expanding the universe of sanctions that fall under CAATSA’s protective umbrella. These designations weren’t just symbolic – they were a deliberate effort to ensure that any attempt to grant Russia sanctions relief would trigger CAATSA’s congressional review requirements.
Trump’s proposed 28-point Ukraine peace plan reportedly included provisions for sanctions relief and recognition of Crimea as Russian territory. Whether Trump personally crafted this plan or merely endorsed it, the proposal runs headlong into CAATSA’s constraints. Any meaningful sanctions relief would require congressional notification and would almost certainly face fierce bipartisan opposition on Capitol Hill.
That opposition has already been taking shape. Senator Lindsey Graham, typically a Trump ally, has joined forces with Senator Richard Blumenthal to introduce legislation that would further strengthen sanctions on Russia. Their bill has attracted more than 80 Senate co-sponsors – a remarkable show of bipartisan unity in an otherwise fractured chamber.
Congressional guardrails matter when dealing with adversaries who have repeatedly demonstrated bad faith.
CAATSA serves as a crucial check on executive power when it matters. Without it, a president could potentially negotiate away years of carefully constructed sanctions pressure in exchange for a peace deal that might not serve American interests or protect Ukrainian sovereignty. With CAATSA in place, Congress retains meaningful oversight authority and the ability to prevent any agreement that amounts to capitulation.
Congressional guardrails matter when dealing with adversaries who have repeatedly demonstrated bad faith. Russia violated the Budapest Memorandum when it seized Crimea in 2014. It has systematically targeted civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. It has interfered in democratic elections across the West. Any peace agreement that doesn’t account for this pattern of behavior – and that removes the economic pressure that sanctions provide – risks emboldening further aggression.
The law passed with support from both parties because lawmakers recognized that Russia’s actions threatened core American interests and that maintaining pressure on Moscow required institutional commitment beyond any single administration. That consensus remains relevant today, perhaps more so than in 2017.
Trump could discover that the “seriously flawed” law he reluctantly signed still has teeth. But first, Congress must demonstrate the will to use the authority CAATSA provides. Lawmakers should make clear that any peace deal must protect Ukrainian sovereignty, hold Russia accountable for its aggression, and serve American strategic interests – not simply offer Moscow an off-ramp from the consequences of its actions.
CAATSA stands as a reminder that in matters of war, peace, and national security, the Constitution’s system of checks and balances matters. That is, if the Constitution is taken seriously by those at the top.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.