Dec. 6 is the Day of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, currently one of the most important Ukrainian holidays. It is the Armed Forces, according to general consensus, that are the backbone of national statehood, its shield, the main and only guarantor of its security.
The Armed Forces are very diverse. There are professional soldiers, those who have served in the military for decades, volunteers who joined the ranks of the Armed Forces during the full-scale war, and those who were drafted, or forcibly mobilized more recently.
Who are they, what do they think about, and how do they see their future and the future of the Ukrainian military? We spoke with four different servicemen with different fates, ranks, branches, and ages about their service experience, about how they see the past, present, and future of the Ukrainian military. These stories are different, but they are about one thing — a shared mission for the sake of Ukraine.
Story One. Volodymyr Nazarov, Captain, 23 years old. “Ukraine has created a unique air defense system in the world.”
Volodymyr Nazarov is a young officer, only 23, yet he has already risen to the rank of captain. We meet him in a forest where his air defense unit is preparing to carry out tasks to repel another Russian strike.
“In 2019, I finished school and hesitated about what to apply for,” Nazarov says. “I wanted to join the security forces. And entered the Kharkiv Air Force University. It has the highest level of military education. I met the big war there as a cadet.”
He continues, saying after Russia’s full-scale invasion:
“We had just returned from vacation on February 24, 2022, during our third year. We quickly adapted our studies to the new war — we watched videos of Russian helicopters landing troops in Hostomel, analyzed situations from the perspective of air defense actions.
“The university promptly updated its curriculum, and instructors helped with the material. It is one of the most relevant specialties — because whoever controls the sky controls the ground. I wanted to ensure the enemy would not take over the Ukrainian sky. And we are succeeding.”
He seems more mature than his age. He says he always wanted to serve because his father is also a professional soldier and officer. He has never regretted dedicating his youth to the military; on the contrary — this is where he sees the meaning of his life.
“Civilian life seems to have more advantages at first glance. But I like that as a serviceman I have rights, a social package, and although not much, a stable income — but the most important thing is moral satisfaction. I do what I love. It’s like the ‘natural calling’ described by Hryhorii Skovoroda. After a whole day of work, I never say ‘oh, I’m burnt out,’ I don’t feel that. On the contrary, I’m inspired,” Nazarov says.
He is the deputy commander of the battery for armament and is responsible for the combat-ready condition of the weapons. This means servicing and preparing both missiles and machine guns. His unit, the 1129th anti-aircraft missile regiment, is armed with both missiles and machine guns, so his “clients” are both cruise missiles and Shaheds.
“The unit had been fighting without an officer for a year. There was a shortage of officers at the beginning of the war. There weren’t enough even before the full-scale invasion. All the soldiers were older than me. I was 21, and the soldiers were 23, 24, three of them 35, and all the others over 40. Some were the same age as my father. But we never had conflicts about who was older or who had served longer, and the relationships developed well. We all came to the military consciously,” Nazarov says.
He believes the war in Ukraine may become the first war of a new type — that’s how he sees it. In fact, he says, in the last two years it has changed beyond recognition:
“The war has changed technologically. The use of weapons has drastically changed, the same Shahed — from a primitive ‘moped’ worth a few thousand dollars turned into high-tech weaponry worth more than a hundred thousand dollars, becoming a formidable weapon. Our countermeasures have also grown.
“There is still a lot of work to do. I want to serve until the end, at least until victory, then go through post-war demobilization measures, then the armed forces will change — it will become stronger, more agile, more technological. I would like to serve until the end of my life.”
The officer is not just following orders. He continues to study, improve himself, learn from other units, and take pride in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He says that nowhere else in the world exists an air defense system like Ukraine’s:
“No country in the world has faced such challenges in air defense. And no country in the world could organize such protection of its airspace across its entire territory — not even the US, if instead of Canada they had some aggressive neighbor trying to fire across their territory to its full depth.
The officer explains:
“We hit enemy assets throughout the full depth of our territory; there is no such thing as an enemy aerial target passing the front line and flying deep into the rear. At the same time, we fly deep into the Russian rear and strike them.
“We have reached something very important — our air defense is almost fully divided into object-based air defense, protecting stationary objects, and mobile military air defense, protecting units and moving with them. This is critical. In Europe and the USA, air defense is still built mainly as object-based.”
Story Two. Oleksandr Kravchenko, Master Sergeant, 42 years old. Veteran, retired after injury. “The Armed Forces must change their attitude toward soldiers.”
Oleksandr Kravchenko is one of the volunteers who formed the backbone of the Territorial Defense Forces at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. He defended Chernihiv and later fought in Luhansk region.
In 2023 he sustained a serious injury, was demobilized, and now works as a security guard in a supermarket in Chernihiv region. He is sociable and recalls his time in service fondly.
“We received full uniforms, body armor, plates, tactical vests, helmets, thermal underwear, goggles, gloves, boots — everything needed for service. And the training was better,” Kravchenko says.
He has something to compare with — he served his conscription in the internal troops 20 years ago and remembers well what the level was then.
Later he served on contract in the Armed Forces — he says even in small details the difference is noticeable:
“The equipment was good both then and now, but the provisions are completely different now. Before the war we fired three rounds at the shooting range with a Kalashnikov — imagine that! Three! And later, as a company instructor, we fired a whole magazine during just one exercise. That’s a completely different level.
“Now it seems unimportant, but in 2022 it was a breakthrough! Of course, at the beginning we had all sorts of things — even Maxim machine guns, and we, for example, had two Degtyarev machine guns from the late 1930s and 1951. It was a bit funny but surprisingly they were in good condition and performed well in combat. In 2022 the war was nothing like it is now. We hadn’t even heard of drones then; we saw them used for the first time at the end of 2022.”
During service he experienced both gratitude and injustice. Many of his veteran friends are now fighting for their pensions with bureaucrats, and he notes that as a security guard he earns about the same as he did in the armed forces.
“Early in the war, society’s respect was strongly felt, now of course less so — the war feels much further away to people than it did in the spring of 2022,” the veteran says.
He also says that despite huge improvements in the armed forces during the full-scale war, the military has shown that many changes are still needed — and some of them haven’t even begun yet.
The veteran reflects:
“First, the Armed Forces lack professionalism — mobilized soldiers need to be turned into professionals. Second, officers need to treat soldiers better. Some of them have grown their wings too much I think…
“When I yell over the radio that 300 meters away the enemy is unloading ammunition, and the answer is ‘wait, we’re busy’ — what the hell is that?! This attitude needs to be changed, because combined with the low pay of 20,000 hryvnias (500 dollars), it strongly demotivates new mobilized soldiers.”
Story Three. Anatoliy Kurynivskyi, 55 years old, mobilized soldier. “Do not be afraid — those who fear die first.”
Anatoliy, a soldier of one of the ground forces units, is 55. He was mobilized recently. He has been in an active unit for barely a week but is already driving a Humvee. He is an experienced worker from central Ukraine, and he already has everything in life — a job, experience, and a large family. He proudly tells his comrades he has five grandchildren.
However, when the Mobilization Office (TCC) found him, he did not resist. Kurynivskyi says:
“In 2023 I wanted to join one of the assault units, but they didn’t take me because of my age and health — my knees are bad. So I decided to keep working. I’m a loader at a cheese factory, and I planned to continue working until mobilized.
“I received the draft notice — I went — and here I am. This is my fate. My family supported me, and I think it’s right. I’m a man, no one commands me, I collected myself and came.”
As someone from the older generation, he remembers well what the late Soviet Army and post-Soviet Ukrainian Ground Forces of the 1990s were like, and he feared he would face the same now. But he was pleasantly surprised. The soldier says:
“People didn’t say much good about the military then, so I grew up with the idea that it would be difficult. Especially with all the talk now — people saying everything is bad, you’ll end up here or there...
“But it turned out not to be true. Of course, switching from civilian life is hard at first — lots of training, paperwork, all that… but everything turned out much better than I expected. We were fully supplied with gear, fully outfitted, the uniform is quite comfortable and warm. Everything was explained to us.
“The unit I joined is full of very friendly people. No one looked at me sideways, no one said anything like, ‘You joined only now while others have been fighting since 2022.’ Nothing like that. Here everyone is equal. And that is good.”
He says he is ready to fight until the end, because once he has come — “It is until the final result.” He also encourages those who are afraid to join the military — to do it. He insists it is not as scary as it seems. Kurynivskyi says:
“Don’t be afraid — if your time has come, go. Since ancient times it is known — those who fear die first. I didn’t invent this, it’s a law of nature.”
Story Four. Colonel Kostiantyn Horbachov, 45 years old. “In 2014 the entire Armed Forces had only two drone teams. I commanded one of them.”
Kostiantyn Horbachov is a career officer who has served his entire life, holding a PhD, the rank of colonel, and serving as a professor at the National Defence University. He managed to escape the Ilovaisk encirclement in August 2014, and in those same days he stood at the origins of creating the first Ukrainian drones — the same ones Ukraine now uses to destroy thousands of enemy soldiers every day and strike Russian oil refineries and defense industry sites. Eleven years ago, he says, everything was much simpler — and, it seems, more naive.
Horbachov recounts his involvement in the history of Ukraine’s Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as use by the AFU:
“In 2014 we started in the Palace of Pioneers, with makeshift production, and at that time we had two UAV reconnaissance teams — I led one. Now we have not battalions, but regiments of unmanned systems.
“We had two UAVs in amateur production, only two, and both were non-codified. In our group we had specialists in aircraft modeling, and we built UAVs on the basis of a glider, adding an electric motor, surveillance cameras, data transmission systems — all this was done in two months before my eyes. it looks so naive and sweet from a distance of 11 years.”
Despite bureaucracy and slow state response, he says, much was achieved in the eight years between 2014 and 2022. Horbachov explains:
“Development began in 2014. Between 2014 and 2022 no more than 10 types of UAVs were approved for use — mainly for artillery reconnaissance. Artillery made a real qualitative leap, and we saw that in spring 2022, when artillery guided by drones destroyed Russian columns.
“But copters did not develop much at first — there was no production capacity, and we used Chinese Phantoms. Everything changed with the spread of 3D printing. And of course, in 2022 the real drone revolution began. Dozens of manufacturers emerged, hundreds of models, volunteers joined in.”
But the surprises on the battlefield didn’t end there. First-person-view (FPV) drones turned the war into a real confrontation of robots — something unimaginable 10–11 years ago. Horbachov continues:
“FPV kamikaze drones completely changed the battlefield. Their effectiveness at first didn’t match artillery, then it equaled it, and later in some areas even surpassed artillery and aviation combined. Of course, there are natural factors — fog, rain, snow, wind.
“But look at how the war has changed — one artillery shell costs about 1,200–1,500 dollars. One FPV drone — 300–400 dollars. To destroy a tank, according to norms, artillery needs 14 shells. A drone needs three. Calculate — 3×300 dollars versus 14×1,200. Savings of tens of times. And now another revolution is happening — air defense has begun actively using drone interceptors. In three to four times less time we have made a qualitative leap into an entirely different war!”
He notes that this momentum may now move to a new level — when drone units will carry out not just tactical military tasks, but also tasks of a much higher strategic level. The colonel says:
“It’s no longer simply a matter of training UAV specialists; we now face the need to train senior specialists at the tactical and operational level, because we already have not only UAV battalions but also regiments that perform tasks at the operational level. And we are already ready for this transition.”