Hi All! Many thanks for the questions. To recap, over the past three weeks, I have been out and about in the field and so have had the opportunity to visit:
- An Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) factory
- A factory making batteries for UGVs
- A maintenance repair site for UGVs operating on the front line
- An operations center running UGVs on the front line
The most useful part of it was the chance to speak at length with a director/chief engineer of the UGV factory, and the commander of a UGV battalion performing operations for a frontline brigade.
On the technical side, my big discoveries probably were first how well-adapted the factory was to producing UGVs that the front wants – not only do they take special orders, but that’s just the nature of the work. So, like, almost zero problems retooling for a new version, that’s how they work, each new batch is upgraded. Also, management is fully aware of the market possibilities and market value, and is getting a little irritated with Western carpetbagger “businessmen” showing up and wanting to get rights and sell the company’s hard-won knowledge abroad and pocket the profits.
On the operations side, the big discovery probably was the scale of organization and staffing necessary to operate dozens of UGVs in a battle or two; it’s a whole lot more than a couple of computer geek guys in a Scooby Doo van. The West, I think, has almost no concept of the command relationships and skills needed to make the drones work in combat; it’s a whole lot more than teaching a couple of privates to operate the drone and putting a sergeant who doesn’t in charge.
Images are somewhat obscure robots from popular media from long ago, no relevance really except that it’s robots, it pretty much predates the Star Wars franchise, and it breaks up the text.
Roland Stern
Q: What I’m saying might sound silly, but the more information you give about the progress of Ukraine on these fronts, the more the Russians will know. You and I, we support Ukraine, but don’t you think that saying too much, even though it’s very interesting to read, might harm Ukraine’s interests? Keep on the great reporting, but be careful. All the best.
A: Pretty much everything that I report comes from controlled meetings between the Ukrainians and me, with the Ukrainians deciding what I get to see. Generally, I’m allowed to talk to whomever, but everyone is briefed on what to say and not say to a reporter. There are times when I’ll suppress information that isn’t relevant and might threaten security, and on rare occasions, the interviewees will request that something not be made public because of security. On extremely rare occasions, like in the past four years, about as many times, because of security, we cut something out once it’s published. Aside from security, our stuff doesn’t get censored, full stop. So if you’re reading it, it’s already been vetted.
Elisa Bird
Q: Hello Stefan. I don’t use Facebook because I despise advertising, and life’s too short to look at other people’s cats all day, but I do care about Ukraine. I’ve spent my life squabbling about issues relating to justice and abuses of power, and russia’s invasion of Ukraine is so important for that and much more. I hope you have as good a holiday as you can and that 2026 will see you rid of the russians for good. I, and Europe, care about you. Slava Ukraini.
A: Thanks for the kind words.
Robert Honeyman
Q: Battery plant: where are the electrodes made?
A: Ukraine, but I am told they are considered a commodity and can be imported without issues.
Sidney Israel
Q: Cool idea! Those look like some kind of de-mining rigs on the Rovertech drones?
A: That is because they are.
Katie @All Things Chris Whitley
(NOTE: This was not a question but a comment by Katie, I think, that is worth commenting on:
Q: “Surely, Ukraine is the global leader in drone technology. Too bad Western militaries – and Ukraine’s allies, especially the US – don’t understand that helping Ukraine win this war means helping Ukraine’s allies LEARN from the operating teams and ADOPT these innovative technologies. Curb your hubris, US and others!”
A: Part of my job is trying to have an understanding of how far ahead Ukraine is over NATO militaries on drones. In my view, it’s at least eight years, and in some categories it’s more than a decade. But it’s not so much the technologies as the mindset. To someone involved in the war in Ukraine, the idea that NATO would train in Romania in September and assume battles can be fought by supplying troops with trucks, is lunacy. A truck bringing supplies to the front in the Russo-Ukraine War is about as obsolete as cavalry – yet NATO keeps on practicing as if it won’t face drones in quantity.
GeneralKaos
Q: What are the maximum payload capacities (weapons, medical supplies, logistics loads) that current Ukrainian ground robots can handle?
A: Varies from type to type, and range and battery power are factors, but generally from a couple of hundred kilos to a bit less than half a ton.
Q: How do these robots perform in terms of speed, maneuverability, and endurance compared to traditional vehicles in similar roles?
A: Great question, but hard to answer without writing a lot because there are so many kinds of ground drones. The fastest seems to be about 10 kph (6.2 mph); these drones don’t race to an objective, they pick their way. Maneuverability is turn-on-a-dime, plus, because of size and ability to handle bad ground, weight distribution, and physical size etc., ground drones can go where vehicles cannot. Everyone told me that’s probably the biggest advantage. This is even discounting the fact that a human driver can be afraid while a ground robot cannot. Endurance, I got told that in an ideal unloaded situation 80 km (50 miles). So what you don’t have is drones zooming from sector to sector; they live in a particular area, their activities are tied to a particular unit, usually a battalion or a brigade, and they tend to drive the same routes repeatedly.
Q: What are the main limitations of their sensors (e.g., night vision, thermal imaging, obstacle detection) in battlefield conditions?
A: In general, ground drones can carry any sensor that an airborne drone can, but unless the drone is physically trying to drive underground to find something, reconnaissance is better performed from the air. Moreover, as a ground drone moves about, it’s standard operating procedure (SOP) for drones to be in the air doing route reconnaissance etc. In rare/high-value cases, first-person-view (FPV) drones can fly overhead cover in case there is contact.
Q: How resilient are the robots to electronic warfare (jamming, spoofing, cyberattacks)?
A: I was told, extremely resilient, as the main control is by Starlink, and it’s not practical to try and jam a drone carrying Starlink (If it’s a drone homing in on a target using Starlink as terminal guidance, different situation. But that’s mostly not a ground drone mission).
Q: What battery technologies are being used, and how do they balance energy density, recharge time, and battlefield durability?
A: I am told that cutting edge is the Li-Iion battery which is widely used. Cutting edge is figuring out ways to link sequences of smaller batteries into a bigger storage system. I’m not qualified to talk about energy density, but if you’re really curious, give details, and I’ll fly it by the manufacturer. We didn’t talk in detail about recharge time, but generally it’s overnight. Durability is a big factor, with weather considered the primary thing that will impact, so much effort on insulation, weather-sealing, etc.
Q: Are there design features that make Ukrainian ground robots distinct from Western or Russian equivalents?
A: I’m really not qualified to respond in detail, except in price. I was told by several people that a Ukrainian ground drone typically costs 5 to 10 times less than the NATO analogue. Russia is only beginning to use ground drones and only sparingly.
Q: How modular are these robots — can they be quickly reconfigured for different missions (attack, medevac, logistics)?
A: Pretty modular, but like any transport system in a field situation, once a sub-system gets installed, usually soldiers will try and avoid the hassle of switching things out. But in general, both the wheeled and tracked sections with transmission, electronic brain, batteries etc. are the same from drone to drone, what gets changed is the thing parked on top, and as needed mechanisms to run what’s on top.
Q: Are there innovations in autonomy or AI decision‑making that reduce operator workload or improve survivability?
A: Generally, no. Everything is remote-controlled with an operator watching the world around the drone via on-board and overhead sensors, a control team helping the operator make sense of all the display screens, and a battle coordinator who’s giving the ground drone team instructions at the same time as he’s giving the air drone team instructions, plus the assault vehicles, plus the dismounts, plus the artillery, and so on. One thing you don’t get from the videos that becomes really obvious when you see the operation is how complex and how much teamwork it takes to operate these things; they’re not robot couriers but part of a whole bunch of moving parts. So if the idea was to reduce workload on the operator, either the ops section would come up with a replacement, or maybe the battle captain would let the drone operators do nothing for a while.
Q: What role does local manufacturing ingenuity (e.g., rapid prototyping, battlefield repairs) play in their evolution?
A: This is pretty much what’s driving the innovation. Not all manufacturers do it, but some go to the front with their drones and are talking face-to-face with the operators. I actually witnessed this. The discussion is very practical: the field guys say we have this need or problem, the manufacturer comes up with a technical solution, the solution is returned to the field, and once used is refined. Communication is by phone or text message, and there’s no one between the operator, or the operator’s direct boss, and the head of the company, or the company’s development engineer. So identifying a glitch and fixing it – something that can take the Pentagon years – gets spotted and reported immediately, and the upgraded version gets to the field in a week or two. Development over time is driven by battlefield need, so the trigger is the soldiers saying, “You know, we’re thinking of a drone that could do THIS.”
Roland Stern
Q: What I’m saying might sound silly, but the more information you give about the progress of Ukraine on these fronts, the more the Russians will know. You and I, we support Ukraine but don’t you think that saying too much, even though it’s very interesting to read, might harm Ukraine’s interests? Keep on the great reporting, but be careful. All the best.
A: See above, everyone is aware security needs to be protected, and it is.
Donald Hill
Q: I’m not sure what they want to publicly share, but: Production rate, loss rate, how many are damaged, recovered, and repaired. Cost per different types of drones. How much money is budgeted for ground drones.
A: Loss rates are a secret, but I can tell you with confidence that the loss of a single ground drone is a big deal that doesn’t happen every week. They are careful about where they send them and how. I was told a base model before you start building it to carry a weapon or wounded or whatever costs about $25,000. The more complicated the stuff on top, the higher the final price. In the brigade, I was told that about half of the money for drones comes from the government and half from donations/civil society. It’s clear I was being shown a well-supported unit, and without question, some brigades can only afford the drones the government pays for.
Q: Terrain is an issue for aerial drones and ground drones live in terrain. How are communications maintained? Ground relays with small emission ranges? If fiber optic is used, what is the danger of tracing to point of origin if used on the same route over and over again, especially a road?
A: Communications is by Starlink, and Starlink works well. Fiber optic is considered a no-go for ground drones because the wire gets hung up on too much stuff. That control system was considered but rejected.
Q: How many ground drones currently in a brigade? How many people to maintain/drive that amount? What is their work rotation like (days off, etc.)? How many brigades have any ground drones?
A: Great questions that really get to the point. The answer is dozens, but not hundreds in the brigade I was in, and so the average across the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ZSU) is certainly less. A full “battalion” is involved in keeping those drones maintained, operated, secured, communicated with, powered, and so on, and all the humans involved need to eat, sleep, be clothed, trained, get mail from Mama, and so on. Since this is the ZSU, a full-strength “battalion” is usually less than 500 men and women, and in field operations, what with casualties and leave and detached training and so on, my guess is the actual strength of the unit I was at is probably around 200–250 people. They operate 24/7, but I doubt they can operate at full capacity with all the drones out and about, 24/7. The bottleneck in getting more drones out into the field is people, not equipment, I was told. I don’t know how many units have ground drones, but I expect most do. However, I would say less than 10% of the ZSU has shifted seriously from conventional vehicles to ground drones. So, in that sense, what I saw wasn’t the present ZSU, but the future.
Q: We’ve seen small operations with an MG on a single drone, a limited number of kamikaze ground drones, and one big operation from the 13th Brigade. How are ground operations evolving, and when might there be another big drone-dominated operation?
A: Another great question. I drilled down on this. After some questioning and work pinning down the commanders and operators, my impression is that the state-of-the-art right now is a platoon-sized operation with crew-served weapons aboard drones in support; that is happening now. It took a little work, but the answer on something bigger is that company-sized might be possible, but it’s not been attempted, as much due to the Russian FPV drone threat as because they’ve never attempted that scale before. All agreed bigger scale is coming. It took them about six months to go from “ground drones not doing much but being tested” to “ground drones doing all tactical logistics, about half of tactical evac, and supporting attacks and defenses in actions platoon- or squad-sized, with crew-served weapons like machine guns or grenade launchers.
Q: Aerial drones lying in ambush are fairly routine now. With the shortage of infantry, will ground drones ever play a part in covering the front line with observation and fire?
A: They are doing it right now, but it is neither systemic nor across the board. One operator showed me a drone that is famous in the brigade for holding a fighting position for nearly a week, by itself.
Q: What kind of advances are being made in medical evacuations?
A: Huge subject. Short answer would be that if the wounded isn’t ambulatory, a ground drone is by far the preferred method because the drone doesn’t get tired carrying the wounded soldiers, and it can pick a route difficult to observe from the air. The debate is ongoing whether a wounded soldier should just ride on the drone without protection, or should he be protected by some kind of metal box resistant to splinters and small arms. The problem with the box is that if the drone gets stopped by an FPV or something else, the box becomes a ready-made casket. But an open-bed drone exposes a wounded soldier to more splinters and shrapnel.
William Tracy
Q: Drones in general – airborne in particular – have tended to create a rather wide “dead zone” along both sides of the line of contact. What are the countermeasures to free up one’s infantry to get “boots on the ground” to move the line, and in particular, how would ground drones enable this?
A: I tried hard to understand what the ZSU is or could do with ground drones to make attacks more effective. As a system, their best use is as a reliable means of delivering supply to the front, followed by carrying support weapons that fire, covering deliberate assaults. The limiting factor is the planning; no one I talked to seemed to think a “drone breakthrough” was realistic because of all the route reconnaissance and coordination that would have to be done before a deeper attack involving ground drones could take place. Theoretically, if history is going to repeat itself, the first army to concentrate drones like panzers might re-establish maneuver warfare. But the actual operators told me that was pie-in-the-sky thinking, the present level of command, control, and intelligence prevents ground drones from being used that way.
Iain Healy
Q: How autonomous are these things, can the be pre-programmed with parameters or do they still need a human operator?
A: Need a human operator full stop.
Roy Cauldery
Q: I would be interested to hear of any whisper of AI. Or AI dronewalls. An honest appraisal or feedback from end users is always key. What do they see as good/bad or soon needed?
A: Not a word about AI from anyone that I talked to. The front-end users told me that communications could be more reliable, it would help to have better sensor fusion (right now the command center does that and attempts to instruct the operator how best to proceed), and it would be good to have more people and more time to practice an operation. The cutting edge seems to be thinking about ways to go after the Russians where they’re found, in holes. From the ground drone side, they are experimenting with a “Mother Ship” drone that carries two mini-drones, each about 80 cm. square, that carry an explosive charge the size of an anti-tank (AT) mine, or just an AT mine, and are small enough to roll into a Russian dugout. This is not across the force; it’s an indicator of what they’re investigating now.
Jean-Pierre Elrif
Q: hi Stefan do you have a favourite drone-making team in case someone wants to make a donation ?
A: I absolutely do, I recommend 414th Brigade Unmanned Systems Forces “Ptakhi Madyara,” this is the tactical drone unit in the ZSU, they kill or wound more enemy than any other unit in the ZSU, and have done so for years. If you can’t find them on the internet, contact me personally.
Lars Hoffmann
A: Should whatever knowledge you get on drones not be kept Need to Know??
Q: Well, most of it the manufacturers/operators are cool with putting out in the public. But there are a few things I don’t make public; this is a war after all.
Nick Van Der Horst
Q: Is anyone over there paying attention to what drone manufacturers are doing in the rest of the world? I’m sure they pay attention to Russia, but what about China/S. Korea/US/Europe?
A: Oh yes, they are very well aware, down to the nth degree. Some of the engineers I talked to seemed to be so knowledgeable it seemed like they had been reading classified US tech reports. They seem to know and have a strong opinion on where the Chinese have an edge in certain components; they know what’s needed to overcome the edge, and it seemed like they were well-informed about future plans to fill gaps. All the Ukrainians seemed perfectly aware that now that they have this experience, it will attract foreign carpetbaggers, and they seemed very aware of the need not to sell out tech for cheap.
Michaelangelo Yauder
Q: FOR the armed UGVs, they operate in teams of possibly how many? 2 UGVs as a team plus overwatch by UAS for support seems probable. The UGVs are still affected by terrain considerations, in urban or built-up areas, most videos show their use as kamikaze/OWADs and supply/casevac missions. Any hints on the control security of the UGVs by the users, or use of AI/ML for mission planning and usage.
A: The way it was described, and sort of shown to me, it’s kind of like a fighter jet being launched. There’s an operator, but there’s also an intelligence guy, an “other battle intelligence guy,” a maintenance guy, a logistics guy hauling the drone closer to the battlefield on a trailer, a security team protecting the drone on its trailer, the battle commander, and the drone battalion commander juggling the needs of the various operations he needs to support. Then add in specialists, for instance everyone in the Medevac chain that would have a need to know where the evac drone was or is going. The big eye-opener for me is that operating drones at scale isn’t just a tech issue, it’s probably even more an organization+staffwork+command and coordination issue.
James Nigel Shakespear
Q: From the Kyiv Independent today: ‘Zelensky said the government and Defense Ministry must fully fund drone purchases, a priority as Ukraine leans heavily on unmanned systems to offset Russia’s advantages in manpower and firepower’. How do the men on the ground look forward to better funding? Do they expect any reorganization and upgrading of manning levels?
A: Manning levels is the more important part of your question. A point brought out to me by the commander was that personnel shortages aren’t just on the front lines; he has more robots than he has people to operate them. A better way to put it would be, he probably has enough people to run most of his robots for a surge, but not nearly enough to keep them all in operation constantly. Neither he nor anyone else I talked to saw a quick solution; the only possibility was machines that require fewer people to operate and maintain them.
As to funding, I was told that about half of the robots operated by the brigade come from government funding and the other half from grassroots/social funding. Everyone admits this is not the most efficient way to go about things, but the critical shortage, as reported to me, was operators/maintainers not machines.
Alexandre Plennevaux
Q: Access to power must be critical on the front line, to recharge batteries. How difficult is it? What solutions work, and what have they tried that failed?
A: It didn’t seem that much of a problem. Everyone and their brother has generators, and these drones are moved to and from the front line by trailer, so it’s easy enough to haul them to somewhere where the power grid is intact and then juice them up there. The main power issues are battery-related, i.e., in order to get the drone to travel a certain distance or operate for a certain length of time, with a certain payload, to what extent can your batteries support it.
There is obviously a point of diminishing returns in that, yes, you can add more batteries, but at some point, the battery weight makes the mission impossible.
Oscar Hjertqvist
Q: Wheel vs tracks for ground drones – what are the manufacturers and end-users’ experiences?
Is wireless control dead due to both jamming and tracking? So far, we have seen small GUV, but nothing in mini-tank size (10 tons+). Is that due to difficulty to manufacture and use, or a strategic choice from the manufacturers and military? Will we see unmanned versions of 20-ton IFVs like CV90 or 60-ton MBTs, designed to not have a human crew?
How is the cost for a UGV divided for sensors/engine/chassi/other stuff? Is the camera and battery the expensive part, or is the expensive part actually the human welding the chassi together?
How does an electric propellered UGV look at the typical UAV sensors? Is the engine/transmission hot and detectable? Are they working with camouflage or just keeping the UGV as simple and cheap as possible?
A: Thanks, all really good, practical questions. If you aren’t employed by your country’s defense ministry, I would say you should be.
OK, on tracks vs. Wheels, both are seen to have advantages and disadvantages; neither is a panacea. Wheels are cheaper, less likely to break, lighter, less of a power drag, are faster where there’s good trail, raise less dust and attract less attention, and without question handle Ukrainian mud better, especially wet black mud.
Tracks can go more places, are a bit more resistant to drone hits, MGs, and artillery, and in a tough situation are more likely to find traction than wheels.
We have not seen bigger versions of the UGV because, primarily, that is easier to see from the sky and that attracts drones. Everyone I talked to said that the UGV is harder to spot from the air and, due to its size, easier to conceal. I was not told, but I can see the logical next step in that when UGVs are used in bigger assaults, the solution will be more small UGVs rather than a few big ones.
Certainly, remote-controlled APCs and tanks are technically possible, but both of those vehicles, due to cost and cargo needs the very best, most flexible operation, and from what I can see, that’s still a human at the individual vehicle level. Sensors are great, humans operating sensors with an awareness that failure to observe could get them killed, usually will give human-operated sensors aboard a vehicle more tactically capable than the same thing remotely. But again, technically possible.
I can’t really answer the cost/ratio question because so much depends on what’s put onto the base chassis, is it a stretcher or a turret with thermal sights and an anti-tank missile launcher, etc. But, bottom line, I was told that a UGV base w/o bells or whistles costs a bit over $20,000 (i.e. Hr. 90,000). So the answer to your question is, how much do you want to add on top of that?
In terms of manufacturing in Ukraine, the parts are the expensive part, and the more sophisticated the part, the costlier it will be. The Ukrainians seem to be very skilled, however, at finding cheap components and figuring out how to install them or assemble them into something useful. So, the most expensive add-ons would be things not made in Ukraine but unavoidable, like a Starlink receiver.
Kevin Bennett
Q: How close are we to unmanned sentry guns like they had in aliens?
A: We are there. I was “introduced” to a drone armed with a machine gun that held a position on its own for three weeks, and I inspected drones rigged to carry .30 machine guns, .50 machine guns, and M-40 grenade launchers. All are used in the field right now. The “cutting edge” right now is using more than a few of them simultaneously in a single operation, that is rare but becoming more common.
Jay Cha Cha
Q: Two questions: (1) How does the cycle of innovation and adaptation between field units and manufacturers for UGVs compare to the one that developed for UAVs? (2) How does attrition for UGVs compare to UAVs, and does that change what is being favored (survivability vs cost vs flexibility)?
A: The cycle seems to be exactly as fast, and as described to me by the engineers and the soldiers, the process doesn’t differ from air drones.
UGVs survive better, not least because when they fail, they don’t fall hundreds of feet from the sky and crash. Attrition is less due to jamming and enemy action, but UGVs are more expensive, and they don’t go behind enemy lines, so you wouldn’t expect it. In general, the UAV vs. UAV effectiveness looks fairly close to the relative effectiveness of a legacy APC/Tank vs. a legacy helicopter/airplane. Different operating environments, different tools.
Joannes Berque
Q: How critical is the dependency of these drones/robots [on] Chinese rare earth? I suppose there are no alternatives for magnets, but do they assemble engines in Ukraine or get them off the shelf from China? Same for batteries.
A: I can’t answer that specifically. I don’t know. But generally, the Ukrainians seemed to be pretty confident they could get what they need because the components they need are manufactured in such quantities that they are world commodities, so a market cut off just means a shift to another source. The Chinese, I think in 2023, announced they were no longer selling drones and drone parts to Ukraine, this made Russia happy for a short time until they figured out traders in the Emirates/Hong Kong/You Get the Idea were happy to buy Chinese drone components and sell them on to the Ukrainians.
Starlink systems are more of a worry; everyone is waiting/hoping for the Europeans to get their constellation going so that Elon Musk can’t screw with Ukrainian military communications anymore. Although even there the world market is an insulation: as I understand it, most of the Starlinks in Ukraine were bought by Poland, so, were Musk to cut off Ukrainian Starlinks, he would be stiffing one of his biggest customers, the government of Poland.
Jim Bell
Q: Yalie ’94 here…when a soldier/unit is designated ‘paratroop-er’ does that mean they have gone through a jump school somewhere? Any female paras? Where do Rotax-style engines come from — buy and/or build — for those prop-driven drones? Are some made in-country? Same question for micro/mini gas turbines that so many advanced drones use. And like to say that your weekend missives are the best!
A: Go Bulldogs! In the ZSU, no unit is fully jump qualified excepting, perhaps, a few sections of the special operations. The “air assault” title mostly means “higher recruiting standards + heavy equipment, but it all should be fairly easily air transportable.” So APVs, not IFVs, Soviet MBTs, not NATO MBTs, towed artillery, not self-propelled artillery. There are plenty of female air assault soldiers; the general ZSU figure is about 12% of the force. In the forward troops, women seem to gravitate to medical, supply, admin, and operations. Pretty much the entire ZSU acknowledges that the bravest soldiers of all, after the frontline infantry – and platoon HQ doesn’t count – are the female combat medics.
I assume the Rotax-type engines are imported, the logic being that it’s easier in a war than spending the time and resources to develop a domestic version. Ditto gas turbine engines, there’s no question the Ukrainians could engineer it, but given limited resources, it’s probably not sensible to try to do that right now.
Natalia Shevchuk
Q: Dear Stefan, apologies for asking a question not directly related to the subject… you’re welcome to ignore it, but I thought it would be a good time to ask because it’s still “fresh.” NYT (I quote a third-party source here) reports that Dan Driscoll told his European counterparts about consistently growing stock of long-range weapons manufactured by russia, particularly ballistic and cruise missiles. He insisted that Ukraine must sign the deal because “it will only get worse” due to lack of the interceptor missiles supplied by the West to Ukraine. Fabian Hoffmann from Oslo University points out that only limited russian launch capabilities impede their ability to carry out more devastating strikes on Ukraine. Goggle search tells us that russia has significantly increased its missile production since 2021, with a multi-fold rise in some types. So, here is the sad truth – instead of limiting russian ability to wage a war, the “civilized world” only stimulated their war machine. Does it look like ultimate evidence of general mental decline, spreading over the Western governments? Is it hopeless?
A: Hello Natalia it’s always nice to hear from you. Hopeless, it’s not. I think you can see how even the passage of a few days has made Driscoll’s threat seem, well, outdated. It seemed like he was just talking when he said it, now, about a week later, it seems more that way.
The Ukrainian read based on intel reports reaching the public domain is that yes Russia is attempting to amass missiles but the less missiles they shoot the better the chances the ones they do shoot will get shot down, and also, in order to threaten NATO they need a missile reserve that won’t go to Ukraine, otherwise NATO will take the Russian conventional threat less seriously.
Driscoll said “it will only get worse”. I don’t’ know what intelligence he’s seeing or not seeing, but I do know he’s a young guy with little experience in this kind of decision-making and analysis, I know he got his job because of political connections and ideological commitment, and I know his entire chain of command sees every reason to manipulate the public narrative by lying to the media, and little or no obligation to be honest with the American people. So I trust little of what he says, and my starting question will always be “Would he gain something if this weren’t true, but he said it anyway?”
Another factor is, the Ukrainians are not sitting on their hands, and one of the things the Ukrainians have been targeting are Russian missile/rocket fuel factories.
A final point is, were Russia to attempt a major missile bombardment, that would require the concentration of a lot of launch systems and a lot of missiles, and the bigger the concentration, the better the chances the Ukrainians would spot it, and again, the bigger the concentration, the more time the Ukrainians would have to take action.
So, although I don’t exclude the possibility of big Russian missile strikes against Ukraine, it seems to me that if they had the capacity, they would have used it.
Save democracy in Ukraine
Q: Every month russia sends a thousand Ukrainian soldier bodies back. Why is Ukraine leaving so many out there when they are fighting mainly a defensive war?
A: As I understand it, the actual figure is about 850 dead soldiers, but I get your point.
Since the Ukrainians generally are defensive and being forced back, obviously, over time, advancing Russian forces will uncover Ukrainian remains. There have been a few instances of Russian soldiers being turned over to the Ukrainians in a possibly sneaky move to avoid paying the Russian soldier’s family disability, but generally, the attacking side capturing ground captures most of the corpses.
Stephen Yuzwak
Q: I have one. Are there any indications of linkage between the current ‘US peace proposal’ and the seemingly sudden accusations of corruption within Ukraine? I am being paranoid and conspiracy-oriented, but it seems very coincidental that key Ukrainian officials are now sidelined while ‘negotiations’ are taking place.
A: Is this a setup? Of course there is, it’s obvious. The West has been pressuring Ukraine to “do something” about corruption, and at the same time, it’s become fashionable in Washington etc. to blame Yermak for the “stalled peace process.” This clearly is, Yermak was the point guy, not backing down to US demands, so naturally the Americans concluded the problem was Yermak rather than the loony tune craziness of the American demands. I have no doubt it was easier for the present US White House to tell itself Yermak was the “problem,” rather than admit the White House has little or no leverage over Ukraine.
I think it is possible that Zelensky, as part of the negotiation process plan, which seems to me to be calculated to drag things out, calculated that now was a useful time to “sacrifice” Yermak, in order to take away from the Europeans the accusation that his administration isn’t serious about taking on corruption.
A basic problem for the Ukrainians is that they are taking the Westerners at their word, and since the Ukrainians can see epic corruption in more than a few Western states – I mean, Trump’s son-in-law is now negotiating directly with Putin, the Europeans still can’t wean themselves from Russian oil, etc. etc. – they are continually surprised when the Western states call Ukraine on the same thing.
As to “sidelining,” it’s abundantly clear that from the Ukrainian perspective, both the Russians and Americans are ignorant, because they seem to think switching out members of the Ukrainian negotiating team or even the Zelensky administration will somehow make the Ukrainians more agreeable to concessions.
Zelensky keeps saying he can’t cede territory because the constitution forbids it, but what he isn’t saying, but what is obvious in Ukraine, is that any politician attempting a move like that would get strung up, armed units would come hunting for him as a traitor, and the police wouldn’t stop them. It doesn’t matter who’s in the Ukrainian delegation; they’re always going to take the same position. Russo-American faith that the problem is just Zelensky’s personality is just staggering ignorance, and an excellent lesson about how little the big countries have learned about Ukraine, even after four years of war.
Remember when Vance yelled at Zelensky in Trump’s office and when Trump yelled, “You don’t have any cards!”? Four months later, Ukraine trashed about 1/3 of Russia’s strategic bomber force with the most effective drone-based special operation in history; as Vance and Trump were yelling at Zelensky, planning for that operation was already in its final stages. Yet even after that, and now the Ukrainians shutting down about 20% of Russian oil production with long-range drone strikes, Vance and Trump are still talking like TASS: Ukraine is doomed, Ukraine has no resources, Ukraine can’t hurt Russia, bla bla bla bla.
They’re just talking, they’re ignoring the war.
Reprinted from Kyiv Post’s Special Military Correspondent Stefan Korshak’s blog. You can read his blog here.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.