I don’t think the current US-managed peace process in Ukraine is serious. The key players are working on very different agendas, and many of their publicly communicated positions are quite different from what they are actually working to achieve
It is perhaps useful, then, to examine the different actors (the Trump administration, Russia, Ukraine, and Europe) and dissect their agendas.
Let’s start with the Trump administration
As he has shown with the Gaza peace process, President Trump wants a ceasefire, or something in Ukraine, which he can sell as a peace to bolster his obsession now with securing the Nobel Peace Prize. That drive to secure the Nobel Peace Prize seems driven by an obsession with outdoing former President Obama, who did secure the coveted prize, albeit seemingly more for breaking the glass ceiling and being the first black POTUS.
In Trump’s dash to secure his “peace” in Ukraine, he is less bothered about the details - Trump is not the details guy. Trump sees his job as setting the terms of the deal, and it is for others to fill in the gaps and actually deliver lasting peace. If the peace fails to endure - actually because of the lack of detail - that would not be Trump’s fault, but he can blame others for either not delivering the detail or, in his mind/spin, for not being serious about peace.
Trump wants a quick win, in effect. He is not really bothered to understand the core drivers of the conflict - actually, he seems to be easily swayed at this stage by the Russian narrative. This, perhaps, reflects the views of those around him in MAGA and the successful information campaign waged by Russia over many years amongst the US, populist far right.
This willingness always to go along with the Russian view, some have argued, is a reflection that Trump is a long-term Russian asset - the pee tapes line. It might well not be, though. It might just reflect Trump’s tendency to view the world through a prism of power, menace, and wealth. He sees Putin as a powerful man, almost with a desire to emulate him. Putin operates, in Trump’s views, with almost no holes barred - he is willing to do almost anything to deliver on his agenda, to stay in power, and to project his imperial ambition of Russia.
Likely, like Putin, Trump views the world from the perspective that there are only a few great powers, and these great powers sit down and set the rules between themselves, they divide up the world into spheres of influence, and that others, including smaller countries, have to just go along with the directions and whims of the great powers.
Trump wants a quick win, in effect. He is not really bothered to understand the core drivers of the conflict - actually, he seems to be easily swayed at this stage by the Russian narrative.
And likely Trump only sees three global great powers, the US, China, and still Russia, because they are still the preeminent global nuclear powers. Trump does not view Europe as a global power, but rather as an irritant, as its interests and values (rule of law, human rights, common European and rival market) are often at odds with Trump’s own interests and values.
But Ukraine fits into the smaller, weaker country club, which has simply to accept the writ of the large, the U.S. and Russia. Brave Ukrainians outdid expectations by resisting the full-scale invasion and fighting on for close to four years, but this will ultimately be futile, in the Trump view of the world, as it will inevitably be traded off on the greater power battle for spheres of influence. Trump views Ukraine as a pawn to be traded to Russia so as to allow Trump to get what he wants eventually.
Trump likely also views all this through a business prism - there are advantageous deals to be made from this war. The war has indeed given the US leverage over the other key players - through Ukraine and Europe’s dependency on US weapons supplies, its ability to dial up or down sanctions, and, for Putin, Trump’s ability to weaken and undermine Ukraine, and force it and Europe to potentially accept an unpalatable and potentially catastrophic deal for them both.
So, we have seen Trump force Ukraine to accept a hugely unfair and exploitative minerals deal - almost colonial in its terms. A similar deal was included in the Dim-Wit 28-point plan for the use of the immobilized CBR assets, which saw the US rape Ukraine of reparations for the war.
Trump also thinks that Russia will pay handsomely for a favorable deal, including for big deals to be signed with the U.S., and the family likely. Trump will charge Russia for bringing it back into the international business world, back into G8 et al, and will have scant care about the concerns and indeed security interests of others, including both Ukraine and Europe.
Even on Europe, Trump has already extracted his forty pieces of silver. By raising real doubts in Europe’s minds about the strength of the US security backstop for Europe – forget about NATO’s Article 5 defense, but even its willingness to continue providing arms to help Ukraine defend itself and Europe - Trump was able to secure a highly advantageous tariff deal earlier this year. JD Witkoff was dispatched to the Munich Security Conference to frighten the living daylights out of Europe about the U.S. security backstop to Europe, and Europe soon realized that it was best just to accept whatever tariff deal the US offered, in the hope that the U.S. would continue to supply arms.
Europe just accepted the 15% tariff levied by the US without reciprocity. This was the price Europe appeared willing to pay to buy off the U.S. and hope it would maintain a security backstop.
There is a crew within the Trump administration - JD Vance, Elbridge Colby et al - that I do think buys into the Reverse Nixonian here, so it is about giving Russia what it wants in Ukraine, and likely Europe, in exchange for a new longer-term alliance with the US in its new hegemonic battle with China. I am not sure Trump buys this line - he is happy to cut big trade deals with China, and views Xi in a similar power rush agenda as Putin.
But there is an agenda within some in the administration to deliver on this game plan - and if that means weakening Europe to gift Ukraine to Russia, and by so weakening Europe, it just reinforces its dependency on the US. Then all well and good.
But in summary, the Trump administration’s game plan is just to deliver a quick peace in Ukraine, whatever the cost to Ukraine and Europe. And if that means forcing Ukraine to surrender yet more territory in Donbas and beyond to Russia, in exchange for weak security guarantees, then so be it.
And the harsh reality is that the Trump administration is unwilling to provide Ukraine with the security guarantees it needs to sell any deal domestically. The US is absolutely not willing to fight for Ukraine if Russia attacks again, post any peace deal. The US approach, I think, is that in offering Putin a deal which is beyond even his expectations, and the offer of a bigger, longer-term alliance against China, plus lucrative business deals, that Russia would in fact take what it is being given in Ukraine, and hold back from further invasion. That is a total misunderstanding of Putin and Russia, naive beyond belief.
But in summary, the Trump administration’s game plan is just to deliver a quick peace in Ukraine, whatever the cost to Ukraine and Europe.
So, what about Russia?
Let’s start at the start. First, Putin wants the whole of Ukraine, and nothing less. This is an obsession with Putin. Read the 5,000-odd-word essay that Putin scripted in mid-2021 in the run-up to the full-scale invasion, and it was a call to arms for Russian troops who eventually took part in the invasion. He spells it out: Ukraine is Russian, Ukrainians are Russian, modern-day Ukraine was a mistake of history, and it has no right to a sovereign, independent existence.
Second, Putin cannot believe his luck with the Trump presidency. Trump seems to be willing to deliver exactly what Putin wants in Ukraine, a bad deal imposed on Ukraine, which could leave the way open to the political, social, and economic collapse of Ukraine, even its military collapse, providing then an opportunity for a final and successful military conquest of Ukraine by Russia.
Putin knows that the 28-point Dim-Wit plan was absolutely unacceptable to Ukrainians, and if Zelensky had accepted that and tried to implement that in Ukraine that he would have faced another revolution at home. And remember that Ukraine had already had two revolutions in protest of its relationship with Russia: The Orange Revolution and Euromaidan.
Any such Revolution would be seized upon by Russia for further attack - no doubt. Indeed, under the terms of the 28-day plan, elections in Ukraine would need to be held within 100 days. They would require lifting martial law, likely leading to the collapse of the front lines and the inability to mobilize police. Ukraine would be left defenseless. But Putin knows that, which is why he is calling for elections after 100 days.
Putin knows, though, that he faces off against Europe and Ukraine, which both see this as an existential fight - and are waging a desperate diplomatic battle behind the scenes to avoid a scenario where Trump forces Ukraine to accept a peace plan close to the 28-point plan.
Putin is trying to play Trump to shift the blame for any failure in peace negotiations to Ukraine and Europe, in the hope that, in anger, Trump then pulls his military and intelligence support for Ukraine and Europe, leaving the latter vulnerable to further and perhaps final attack from Moscow. So, the Kremlin is also waging a PR and intelligence campaign to win the heart, mind, and ego/vanity of Trump.
Putin is trying to play Trump to shift the blame for any failure in peace negotiations to Ukraine and Europe, in the hope that, in anger, Trump then pulls his military and intelligence support for Ukraine and Europe, leaving the latter vulnerable to further and perhaps final attack from Moscow.
What about Ukraine?
The reality is, and whatever its leaders might say publicly, Ukraine knows it cannot trust the US under Trump. It clearly understands Trump’s motivations and desire to throw it under the Russian bus, or more accurately, tank. Zelensky knows the 28-point Dim-Wit plan is a disaster for Ukraine and would render Ukraine unsustainable.
Unsustainable in that accepting any such plan would leave Ukraine at risk of another revolution and further Russian attack, perhaps a much more successful second time around. Ukraine is willing to trade de facto territorial losses - as per current front lines - for security guarantees. But any deal over land would need cast-iron security guarantees, and it just does not trust the US to provide these, as it ultimately knows that the Trump administration would sell it down the river for bigger Russian business deals.
But Ukraine knows it is still dependent on US weapons supplies, if not on US financial support, to sustain its defense. It is working with Europe to wean itself off US military supplies, but realistically, full military autonomy from the US is still years away. But it is stalling, trying to appear still engaged in negotiations, telling Trump whatever he wants to hear, blah blah, while at the same time hoping that time brings new options.
Perhaps these options could be a worsening in the Russian economy driven by lower oil and commodity prices, or through its own efforts via deep strike drone attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, to force Russia back.
Note here: when we talk about security guarantees, Ukraine understands that Trump will never allow Ukraine to join NATO or provide any real Article 5-like assurance. But I think what Ukraine wants is a State of Israel-style guarantee that the West agrees to provide Ukraine with the full array of conventional military kit (F-35s, whatever) to allow it to defend itself.
But even here, I think Ukraine does not trust the US enough to trade territory for the offer of continued and sustained military supply in the event of a future attack by Russia. There is simply no Ukrainian trust in the Trump administration.
So why does de facto lose territory? Ukraine is playing for time in negotiations with Trump, perhaps hoping he will grow bored with these and then open a window for Europe to take the lead and perhaps try to force a peace framework more amenable to Ukraine.
What about Europe?
After almost three years of giving lip service in terms of support for Ukraine, the seminal moment for Europe in this war was JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Council in February 2025. From that speech, Europe realized that the US security backstop for Europe was no more. NATO was dead, and Europe could no longer rely on the US to honor its Article 5 commitment to European defense.
But they also realized that the threat posed by Russia’s attack on Ukraine was existential to Europe and its defense, but they were increasingly at risk now of facing that threat without US backing. Europe recognized it needed defense autonomy from the US; it would need to be responsible for its own defense.
But after years of neglect and free riding, even if it stepped up military spending and investment in rebuilding its own military industrial capability, it could be five years or more before it is ready to defend itself.
Europe understood that it needed to buy time in the interim, and the strategy is now two-fold: First, provide warm words to President Trump, say whatever he wants to hear, to encourage him to still sell weapons to Europe, both for it and for Ukraine.
Second, to help Ukraine hold the line against Russia for as long as possible, Ukraine has become Europe’s front line against Russia. It is now imperative for Europe that Ukraine holds out as long as possible. And Europe here is absolutely understanding of the Ukrainian position on the evolving peace talks brokered by Trump.
Europe is also likely to be as distrustful of Trump in this peace process. And this distrust by Europe of Trump is likely to move into overdrive with the publication over the past few days of the new National Security Strategy for the US by the Trump administration.
This latter document makes for a truly extraordinary read for the European mainstream as the Trump administration all but calls for their defeat at the hands of the far-right movements in Europe - the AfD, Reform in the UK, and FN in France, et al. No wonder that the Kremlin has reacted with joy over the new U.S. NSS, as it appears that both see Europe as the enemy. Europe, as defined by the EU, is about respect for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law.
All appear to be anathema to both Putin and Trump. But Ukraine is fighting for these same European values, and the European mainstay now realizes that if they are going to survive being squeezed in the vice of the Trump and Putin administrations, which seem to want the same things, then Ukraine is their best chance, and a crucial ally.
The very survival of the European project - the EU - could well now depend on the outcome in Ukraine. Not only is the threat from Russia to Europe existential, but the survival of Ukraine is. And this is why we are now seeing Europe make extraordinary decisions, unfortunately at the eleventh hour, as steps are being taken to retool the €200 billion-plus in immobilized CBR assets in Europe for the defense of Ukraine.
It is remarkable here that we can see the EC resort to emergency rules, overriding unanimous decision-making in the EU, to use qualified majority voting to override opposition to the CBR Reparation Loan idea from the likes of Belgium, Hungary, and Slovakia. This is survival stuff now for the EC/EU, but needs must.
The very survival of the European project - the EU - could well now depend on the outcome in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Europe continues to give lip service to Trump’s peace efforts on Ukraine while all the time doing everything in its power to derail them. And this is the combined efforts of the European big powers, the U.K., France, Germany, Poland, etc., doing all they can now to support Ukraine.
I guess the question for Ukraine, and Europe, is whether it’s all just too late. Has Europe failed to properly read the threat from Putin for a decade or more, failing to act when it could during the Biden presidency, appearing complacent initially towards the second Trump term, and only now realizing it may be all too late?
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.