Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to New Delhi – marked by an unusually grand welcome from Prime Minister Narendra Modi – was crafted to send a message to the “big boys,” i.e., China and the United States, that both Russia and India still have options. Each country faces mounting international pressure for different reasons. For India, the strain is coming chiefly from Washington, where US President Donald Trump’s tariff-heavy strategy aims to pressure New Delhi into reducing its dependence on Russian energy. For Russia, the economic burden of sustaining a wartime economy is taking a visible toll, deepening Moscow’s reliance on China as the main buyer of its energy and a critical supplier of technology for its military-industrial complex.
Despite the fanfare and the long list of Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) announced after the 23rd India-Russia Summit, the substance behind the 16 agreements was noticeably thin. Optics outweighed outcomes. Many of the MoUs were routine – the sort of technical arrangements that hardly require a personal visit from a leader under an active International Criminal Court warrant, let alone a decoy plane sent to confuse onlookers. Putin even reportedly travelled with his own team of chefs, unwilling to eat anything beyond a pre-approved menu, including India’s local version of “Russian borscht.”
In one of the visit’s most striking moments, Putin paid homage at Mahatma Gandhi’s memorial, leaving a handwritten note in Russian praising Gandhi’s commitment to nonviolence – a message difficult to reconcile with the realities of Putin’s military pursuits in Ukraine. Modi, eager to showcase personal warmth, greeted him with a “dobryi den,” though the pronunciation leaned more Ukrainian than Russian, adding an unintended layer of irony to the choreography.
While addressing Russia’s ongoing illegal war against Ukraine, both leaders conspicuously avoided using the word “war,” opting instead for softer formulations such as “crisis” or “issue.” The linguistic caution stands in contrast to Modi’s own public remarks in September 2022, when he stated unambiguously to Putin that “this is not an era of war.”
It is highly unlikely that the Prime Minister Modi will “call a spade a spade” when he meets Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, reportedly as early as January 2026. Indian media outlets suggest preparations for such a meeting were already underway before the dramatic November 2025 dismissal of Zelensky’s powerful chief of staff, Andriy Yermak, an event that added new complexity to Kyiv’s diplomatic landscape.
RT India as a source of “truthful information”
Before assessing the material outcomes of the bilateral talks in New Delhi, it is worth highlighting a development that largely escaped international attention: the formal launch of Russia Today (RT) in India. Kremlin media chief Margarita Simonyan attended the inauguration alongside President Putin and senior Russian officials, including Kirill Dmitriyev – underscoring the political weight Moscow assigns to this expansion.
The intertwining of state interests and media strategy is further reflected in the channel’s high-profile Indian lineup. RT India’s flagship geopolitical talk show will be hosted by former Indian Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid, while Rungjun Sharma, the channel’s head of news, will front a weekly program focused on Russia-India relations. Indian politician, diplomat and author Dr. Shashi Tharoor, who chairs the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, has already launched his own RT program titled “Imperial Receipts with Dr. Shashi Tharoor.”
India-Russia Summit: key takeaways
Trade dominated the agenda under the India-Russia Cooperation Programme, which seeks to raise bilateral trade from the current level of roughly $65 billion to $100 billion by 2030.
Energy remained the fulcrum of the discussion. New Delhi received renewed assurances that Moscow would continue to serve as a dependable supplier. “Russia is a reliable supplier of oil, gas, coal and everything that is required for the development of India’s energy. We are ready to continue uninterrupted shipments of fuel for the fast-growing Indian economy,” Putin stated.
Recent data compiled by CREA for October 2025 underscore the depth of the relationship: India remained the second-largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, importing €3.1 billion ($3.6 billion) worth of energy products. Crude oil accounted for 81% of the total (€2.5 billion [$2.9 billion]), followed by coal at 11% (€351 million [$412 million]) and oil products at 7% (€222 million).
Putin’s highly choreographed visit to New Delhi was rich in ceremony but thin in concrete deliverables.
Notably, India’s crude imports from Russia rose 11% month-on-month. While private refiners continued to make up more than two-thirds of these purchases, state-owned refiners nearly doubled their intake in October. The Vadinar refinery – owned by Rosneft and now sanctioned by the EU and the UK – also ramped up production to 90% capacity. Since the EU sanctions in July, the facility has relied exclusively on Russian crude. Imports climbed 32% in October, reaching their highest level since the start of the full-scale invasion and illustrating the limited impact of Trump’s tariff measures on India’s energy calculus.
The perception of Russia as a reliable partner was reinforced by Moscow’s commitment to increase imports of Indian marine and agricultural products – sectors that have faced sharp declines in exports to the United States. While Russia cannot match the scale or purchasing power of the US market, the move nonetheless positions Moscow as a stabilizing economic partner for New Delhi at a moment of shifting geopolitical pressure.
Defense was another anticipated focal point of the negotiations, given Russia’s longstanding role as India’s largest military supplier – even as New Delhi increasingly diversifies toward partners such as the United States, France and Israel. This year’s India-Russia Summit did not produce any major new contracts: no fresh deals for fighter jets, missile systems or other headline acquisitions were finalized.
Instead, the two sides outlined a cooperation roadmap that prioritizes long-term defense collaboration, including co-development and co-production. The shift aligns with India’s broader push for strategic autonomy and its efforts to strengthen domestic defense manufacturing under its self-reliance agenda.
Another significant area of cooperation concerns labor mobility. With India now the world’s most populous country and Russia facing a rapidly ageing workforce, both governments have agreed to facilitate the legal employment of roughly 70,000 skilled and semi-skilled Indian workers in Russia by the end of 2025. These workers will be channelled into sectors such as construction, engineering, electronics, textiles and IT – areas where Russia faces acute labor shortages. In return, Prime Minister Modi announced a visa concession for Russian travelers: a no-fee, 30-day tourist visa aimed at boosting people-to-people ties and supporting Russia’s outbound tourism amid broader geopolitical constraints.
Putin’s highly choreographed visit to New Delhi ultimately underscored a relationship in transition – one still anchored in energy, defense legacy, and political symbolism, yet increasingly shaped by global pressures neither leader can fully control. India’s desire for strategic autonomy and Russia’s search for economic lifelines have produced a partnership that is pragmatic rather than transformative, rich in ceremony but thin in concrete deliverables.
As New Delhi prepares for a likely meeting with President Zelensky in early 2026 and as Moscow deepens its media and economic footprint in India, both sides appear intent on signalling flexibility to the wider world. The summit’s true message, then, may lie not in the MoUs or warm embraces, but in the careful calibration of two powers navigating a turbulent geopolitical moment.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.