Not NATO, Not Minsk: West Backs Stronger Ukraine Defense

A historic European-led security deal gives Kyiv more protection than past pledges, draws in the US, and pressures Moscow – without collective defense, says veteran US diplomat Daniel Fried.

PARIS, France – For months, European plans to guarantee Ukraine’s security after a ceasefire have sounded ambitious on paper and uncertain in practice. On Tuesday, at the Élysée Palace, those ideas hardened into something more concrete – quietly, and with Washington now visibly in tow.

For the first time, the Trump administration formally aligned itself with a European-led framework for post-war security guarantees for Ukraine, including participation in US-led ceasefire monitoring.

The move emerged from a Paris summit of more than two dozen allied nations and was codified in the newly announced Declaration of Paris.

The framework falls well short of NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause. But it goes significantly further than anything Ukraine has previously secured – a distinction that matters, says Daniel Fried, a former US assistant secretary of state and longtime Russia hand.

“These are security arrangements that are not Article 5,” Fried told Kyiv Post in an interview Tuesday night. “But they are much more than Ukraine has ever had.”

Europe steps out front – and Washington follows

French President Emmanuel Macron used the summit to unveil the Declaration of Paris, a political framework laying out security guarantees that would take effect in the event of a ceasefire with Russia.

Britain and France went further, formally declaring their readiness to deploy troops to Ukraine after a peace deal – a step discussed for months, but never previously put in writing.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer said that following a ceasefire, the UK and France would establish military hubs across Ukraine, with protected facilities for equipment, training and logistics.

Late Tuesday, Starmer, Macron and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky signed a trilateral declaration of intent after hours of talks.

Zelensky called the outcome a turning point. “These are not just words,” he said. “There is concrete content.”

Behind the scenes, the presence of US envoy Steve Witkoff and President Donald Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner gave the gathering unusual political weight.

Kushner said Trump “strongly stands” behind the initiative, calling the summit “a very, very big milestone,” while cautioning that it did not mean peace was imminent.

There is still no ceasefire – and no indication Russia is prepared to agree to one.

Not Article 5 – but not Minsk either

Fried is careful not to oversell what Paris delivered. The guarantees do not amount to NATO membership. They do not include automatic collective defense.

But they also bear little resemblance to the hollow assurances that followed the Minsk agreements a decade ago.

“Ukraine has had essentially nothing except offers,” Fried said. “It has never had anything like boots on the ground, or monitoring of a ceasefire line. That is new.”

While Western troops have previously trained Ukrainian forces, the new coalition language goes further.

It opens the door to air and ground monitoring of a ceasefire line and to forces that could serve both deterrent and training roles. The details remain unresolved, Fried stressed, but the range of possibilities is deliberate.

“There’s now a bracket of possibilities, from stronger to not so strong,” he said. “The Russians, I think, will be discomforted by the prospect – because it’s elastic and open-ended, and they hate it.”

The ceasefire dilemma

The framework’s most obvious weakness is also what made it politically possible: it only takes effect after a ceasefire.

That gives Vladimir Putin a clear incentive to delay or refuse a truce that would bring Western forces onto Ukrainian soil. Fried agrees this is a real problem – but not necessarily a fatal one.

By tying the guarantees to a ceasefire, he said, governments were able to begin serious planning. And the condition itself can later be turned into leverage.

“If the Russians are repulsive, you could always remove or threaten to remove that precondition,” Fried said, recounting how a senior European military officer explained the logic privately. “It’s rather clever.”

That flexibility, he added, could give both Europe – and Trump – options if Moscow stalls.

A quiet US shift

Macron hinted at it on stage, saying that “recent weeks have illustrated a change” in the US position, without elaborating. Fried is more explicit.

“The Europeans have succeeded in convincing Trump that if they’re taking the lead, the US has to come in close behind,” he said.

The clearest sign is language referring to a US-led monitoring and ceasefire operation – something Fried says did not exist under Minsk.

“That suggests US drones and monitors on the ground,” he said. “The Russians will not like that, because it means they will not be able to conduct raids with impunity.”

It is not a deterrent force, Fried emphasized. But it is real enforcement – and that makes it consequential.

Moscow uneasy, not accommodating

Russia has shown no sign of compromise. Officials continue to insist there can be no ceasefire without a comprehensive settlement and have ruled out any deployment of NATO-country troops in Ukraine.

But Fried argues recent Russian behavior reflects anxiety rather than confidence.

“That ridiculous and easily disproved charge of a Ukrainian attack on a Putin residence – that smells of panic,” he said. “Of haste.”

In his assessment, Russia is no closer to peace. But its position is weaker – and the West’s is stronger.

Progress without illusions

None of the leaders in Paris claimed a breakthrough was imminent.

Starmer warned that “the hardest yards are still ahead.”

Zelensky noted that many commitments will require parliamentary approval. The size, funding and command structure of any multinational force remain unresolved.

And looming over everything is the question Fried says matters most.

“What will Russia do – and when they refuse to deal seriously, what will we do?” he asked. “And particularly, what will Trump do?”

For now, the answer is incomplete. But after Paris, it is no longer empty.

Europe has put skin in the game – and the US, cautiously but unmistakably, has stepped back onto the field.