For Vladimir Putin, a stretch has begun in which “black swans” arrive one after another and start to form an unpleasant pattern.
It began with dashed expectations around Donald Trump and the collapse of hopes for a rapid “reset” with Washington. Then came the Venezuelan shock: reports that the United States carried out an operation to seize Nicolás Maduro – humiliating one of the symbols of the anti-Western camp and exposing the vulnerability of Moscow’s partners.
In parallel, Europe is increasingly discussing interdictions and legal pressure targeting the tankers of Russia’s “shadow fleet” transporting sanctioned oil.
All this is unfolding at a moment when foreign-policy setbacks and the absence of a clear turning point on the battlefield are hitting Putin’s reputation harder than at any time since Prigozhin’s mutiny. The Kremlin again looks less like the setter of the tempo and more like the chaser – reacting to decisions made elsewhere.
And precisely at this moment, the “loyal vassal” becomes the weak link: Reports multiply about the critical state of Ramzan Kadyrov’s health.
But then shifts began that, over time, turn him into a toxic asset.
Why does Putin need Kadyrov? Viewed pragmatically, the “Kadyrov project” has long exhausted its usefulness as a state instrument and increasingly turns into a headache: provocative behavior, ostentatious luxury, a sense of living “outside the rules,” his own religious norms, and an ever more “Arabized” public style that distances the republic from all-Russian narratives.
The project was conceived as part of Moscow’s strategy of supporting “traditional Islam” in the North Caucasus – a barrier against Middle Eastern influence via religious channels. In that logic, Kadyrov was allowed much: He regulated daily life, set dress codes, dictated rules on beards, and even the details of rituals, demonstrating readiness to suppress radical currents with harsh force.
But then shifts began that, over time, turn him into a toxic asset.
After the 2016 Grozny Islamic Conference and the “fatwa” adopted there – provoking a sharp reaction in Russia and abroad – Kadyrov faced a dilemma: remain the “guardian” of Moscow’s line or seek recognition among the elites of the Gulf. He chose a double game: formally staying within the Russian framework while drawing closer to Gulf monarchies and adopting the very symbols of practices he had previously denounced as markers of “Wahhabism” – down to the demonstrative style of a beard without a mustache.
And Putin – a retrograde man living in yesterday – has a habit of postponing unpleasant decisions as long as possible.
When a “strategic guardian” starts to look like a conduit for external influence, the state inevitably begins to see him not as an asset but as a risk. The concentration of wealth around Kadyrov’s circle in Gulf countries only deepens his dependence on external patrons.
Even his participation in the war against Ukraine, in this logic, did not strengthen his image but weakened it: Instead of demonstrable effectiveness, he increasingly relied on staged videos, sustaining by threat what he could not confirm by action.
So why does Putin still cling to Kadyrov?
The first reason is symbolic. For Putin, Kadyrov is like a stag’s head on a hunter’s wall: a trophy of “victory” in the Caucasus and proof of a glorious past. It no longer matters how the trophy was obtained or how much blood, money, and compromise the bargain cost; the details are pushed aside because the trophy props up the myth of the victor. And Putin – a retrograde man living in yesterday – has a habit of postponing unpleasant decisions as long as possible.
The second reason is coercive – and far more dangerous.
Kadyrov, together with Viktor Zolotov, serves as an important counterweight within Putin’s “balance of fear.” Kadyrov’s death or removal changes the alignment around the president, breaking a configuration Putin has built for decades.
A third layer follows: Putin sees the “Kadyrovtsy” as personal insurance in case of domestic unrest. He believes these men, for his sake, would spill blood against anyone – against a peaceful demonstration, or even against parts of the security elite. He cannot be equally confident in the loyalty of “ordinary” Russian “siloviki”: In a critical moment, they may refuse to play the executioner.
Kadyrov’s death triggers two processes at once – federal and republican – and that is why the Kremlin is so nervous about succession.
The security services almost never invest in “temporary” figures.
At the federal level, Kadyrov’s disappearance automatically weakens Zolotov’s camp, which has relied on the Chechen resource as a coercive insurance, while simultaneously strengthening the Federal Security Service (FSB): Lubyanka gains a chance to take control of the last truly autonomous paramilitary enclave inside Russia.
At the regional level, it opens a window for a brutal struggle for power, because Chechnya has no “neutral” continuity – only a redistribution of influence and security guarantees.
In this logic, the leading candidate is Prime Minister Magomed Daudov, a Lubyanka protégé.
If the FSB has managed to break Kadyrov’s resistance and lock Daudov into the premiership, the probability of a power transfer to him rises sharply: The security services almost never invest in “temporary” figures. By installing Daudov, the FSB does not merely gain a manageable republic – it shifts the balance in Moscow, prying from Zolotov’s hands one of his important instruments.
If Daudov becomes head of the republic, a redistribution will begin – and old humiliations, debts, and accumulated grievances against the Kadyrov clan will be recalled.
For the Kadyrov clan, this means an inevitable “reset” of privileges: The clan’s putative successor, Kadyrov’s relative State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov, his brothers, the paramilitary units, and the entire family vertical become redundant and vulnerable.
Hence, the attempts to push Kadyrov’s son look less like a strategy than an instinct of self-defense. If Daudov becomes head of the republic, a redistribution will begin – and old humiliations, debts, and accumulated grievances against the Kadyrov clan will be recalled.
Here the darkest scenario emerges. A leadership change in Chechnya may come at the most difficult moment for the Kremlin – and become an instrument of a larger game. Moscow could extinguish the conflict, or it could cynically use it as a smoke screen. If the situation on the Ukrainian front deteriorates, or if “heir selection” is initiated at the Federal level, an old but effective temptation may be resurrected: a managed escalation in Chechnya, then “restoration of order,” and the appearance of a new “hero” who saves Russia with an iron hand.
If Kadyrov goes, Putin loses a trophy, a counterweight, and a “personal guard” all at once.
This is not an assertion of a ready-made plan; it is a hypothesis about how a system survives when it has nothing left to cover its defeats. The method is familiar: a quarter century ago, fear and war in Chechnya helped Putin become a “savior.”
Thus, the black swans strike not only at Putin’s foreign policy but also at his internal symbols and pillars. If Kadyrov goes, Putin loses a trophy, a counterweight, and a “personal guard” all at once.
In a system held together by personal knots, mutual fear, and a fragile balance of groups, such a loss almost inevitably triggers a fight for control – and that is no longer an “internal adjustment” but a direct risk for Putin himself.
After more than 25 years in power, he finds himself in a bleak position: His authority is eroding both outside Russia and at home; even his inviolability within the Russian state apparatus no longer looks absolute; and the system of checks, counterweights, and rival camps he has built around himself is beginning to crumble. This is zugzwang: Any move worsens the position, but inaction worsens it faster.
And the more complex the system, the smaller the shock needed for cracks to spread. An authoritarian structure locked onto a single person is, paradoxically, not stronger but more fragile: too many nodes depend on personal bargains, fears, and mutual guarantees.
That is why a “small” black swan – something like Kadyrov’s death – can become not merely an issue of cadre selection but a trigger that sets off a chain reaction: clan warfare, redistribution of resources, collapse of the accustomed balance, and – over time – the beginning of the disintegration of Putin’s system itself.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.