The American approach to Russia and the geopolitical chessboard is evolving rapidly, especially thanks to Trump’s disruptive tactics. But is there a strategy behind those tactics?
Kyiv Post spoke to Filip Styczyński, founder of PATRIOT Alliance, a conservative platform for Poland-Taiwan-US cooperation against authoritarian disinformation, psyops and narrative control, and correspondent-at-large and former director of operations at the Center for Intermarium Studies at the Institute of World Politics (IWP).
Michał Kujawski: A year has passed since Donald Trump’s inauguration – a period full of twists, emotions, and controversies: the suspension of USAID programs, the closure of organizations like IRI (International Republican Institute), the symbolic renaming of the Department of Defense to the Department of War, a war in Iran, the abduction of Maduro, threats to Greenland, and aggressive trade policies. Has Trump broken with decades of bipartisan US foreign policy, replacing soft power with hard power projection?
Filip Styczyński: It’s a departure from a policy that was perceived not as bipartisan, but rather as hostile to Trump. This was evident, among other things, in the cultivation of a negative image of the current US president abroad.
But we’re talking about the continuity of the state’s policy, not just one faction. Conservative or neutral organizations supportive of Trump were also targeted.
These were neither conservative nor neutral organizations. They were labeled as part of the “deep state,” and their so-called right-wing veneer was dominated by RINO (Republican In Name Only) factions, closer to Democrats than conservatives. Today, various right-wing factions still exist, but all operate within Trump’s camp. Allegations of large-scale corruption and unchecked US budget spending were also significant.
For years, the US built global influence through aid programs and scholarships, gaining real insight into emerging political movements and social processes. Closing them is like throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
Those programs were largely ineffective. You cannot build influence in other cultures by imposing your own model and cultural code, disconnected from local realities. Understanding local conditions is key. Trump is moving away from the Wilsonian vision of exporting democracy, which never had strong support among Americans anyway. As Rubio recently noted, the US is reclaiming control over its soft power, now directly overseen by the State Department.
So hard power at the expense of soft power?
What has soft power achieved in Iran over decades? Nothing. Diplomacy matters, but effective statecraft requires the full toolkit.
In the former Eastern Bloc, the US long enjoyed a strong image of freedom, prosperity, and democracy. Today, due in part to political shifts and Trump’s statements, anti-American sentiment is rising. The US is less often seen as a stable, reliable ally – even in traditionally pro-American Poland. Similar moods appear in Ukraine after the Oval Office incident with Zelensky, Trump, and Vance, and in Europe regarding Greenland.
Stoking anti-American sentiment serves those who have always been hostile – Russia and the radical left. Trump’s foreign policy is not dictated by how it’s perceived abroad; that’s not a priority. Far more interesting is the broader US strategy toward the world.
Is US policy toward Venezuela and Greenland about securing its own strategic buffer?
Yes, but it’s not only about the immediate periphery. Europe is focused on the war in Ukraine and its own problems, so we often miss the bigger picture. Meanwhile, the US is essentially in a Cold War with China – the main strategic challenge, involving aggressive economic competition, espionage, and pressure on US allies like Japan and the Philippines. Washington is concentrating on these threats.
After a year of Trump’s presidency, the concept of a “multipolar world” is effectively collapsing. The Russian-Chinese vision of dividing the world into spheres of influence is weakening: Russia has nearly lost its ability to project power in the Middle East, Assad’s regime has fallen, Iran and its proxies – including Hezbollah – have been weakened, and US action in Venezuela sent a global signal. All these areas share a common factor: strong political, financial, and military influence from Russia and China. Trump is also targeting Russia’s “shadow fleet.” NATO expansion – regardless of who gets credit – further undermines the logic of a multipolar world.
This is also reflected in the BRICS and Global South response. Russia, a key architect of the anti-Western order, went silent after events in Venezuela, with low-level protests.
Putin stayed silent out of fear. Xi, meanwhile, talks about violations of international law.
Does the US “clearing its backyard” in Venezuela risk encouraging Xi to act on Taiwan? Trump said it depends on China, but the Chinese leader would be “very unhappy” if that happened.
The US and Taiwan signed record-breaking arms deals worth $11 trillion – that speaks for itself. Japan has also declared its commitment to Taiwan’s defense. Regarding Venezuela, Washington sent a clear message to rivals, including [US Secretary of Defense Pete] Hegseth’s blunt “fuck around, find out.” Any aggression against Taiwan would not go unanswered by the US.
And where does Ukraine, Russia, and NATO’s eastern flank fit in all this?
This region is currently a low priority for the US. The administration talks about Russia more in terms of cooperation than confrontation.
Trump’s offer to Putin was generous, yet rejected. It seems Washington does not understand the Kremlin, which appears “irrational” in US terms. Meanwhile, the US pressured Ukraine to accept a very bad deal, barely better than Russia’s proposed capitulation. Add to that the chaos of contradictory signals – from cutting aid to increasing intelligence support and greenlighting strikes deep in Russia. What is Washington trying to achieve?
The US priority is peace in Europe, but without the “support to the end” narrative familiar from Biden’s era – that’s no longer on the table. Whether any US administration ever genuinely sought Ukraine’s victory and Russia’s defeat remains open.
War requires the will of one side; peace requires two. Nothing suggests Russia wants peace.
These swings and contradictions are not part of any grand strategy. It’s hard to predict the future, but what’s clear is that Trump has realized Putin ignores him and consistently rejects his proposals and conditions.
So the problem remains US misunderstanding of the Kremlin – Trump thinks in economic terms, Putin does not. Americans assume even a generous offer must be attractive to Russia.
This is something Americans are still learning. They don’t understand that the other side operates under a different set of values and logic – a broader problem for the West. Russia doesn’t want peace, prosperity, or a better future for its people in a Western sense.
Russia has a different definition of rationality.
Exactly, and that’s the key problem. Some in the US administration understand this, notably Marco Rubio, whose role is growing, especially after Venezuela. Pete Hegseth also grasped this, recently mocking Russia’s missile shield in Venezuela. Trump will lose patience and target Russia’s proxies, trying to weaken Moscow and enforce peace on US terms – not Europe’s or Ukraine’s. Expect new sanctions, further intelligence support for Ukraine, and pressure via the oil market. Russia is entering crisis mode, and the multipolar world is effectively unraveling – the US acts freely in others’ spheres of influence with little pushback.
Since the Cold War, Russia has been coded in American pop culture as the main enemy – a character speaking English with a heavy accent immediately evokes the KGB.
That still resonates, but it doesn’t reflect the realities of modern Russia.
So Russia matters mainly because of its nuclear arsenal? Otherwise, it would be more like a criminal organization pretending to be a state?
Russia is seen as a permanent political entity – it was, is, and will be. The US will always collide with it. Yet it evokes a sense of pity: Americans see how Russia operates versus themselves. Just compare US operations, like in Venezuela, with Russia’s.