Shortly before the Davos conference, one year passed since Donald Trump was sworn in as president of the United States. It was a year full of twists, anxiety, and unpredictability. At the same time, across Europe, particularly in Germany and France, political forces skeptical of supporting Ukraine and weakening continental unity have been gaining strength. As a result, calls for building a “coalition within the alliance” are becoming increasingly frequent.
This is reflected in the intensified diplomatic activity since 2022 among countries on NATO’s Eastern Flank and in the Baltic Sea region, as well as in a growing number of bilateral agreements, including those focused on security.
As early as March, Poland will host a large delegation from Sweden, including members of the royal family and ministers from key portfolios. This coming Sunday, ceremonies marking the anniversary of the January Uprising will take place in Vilnius.
At the invitation of President Gitanas Nausėda, Lithuania will be visited by, among others, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Polish President Karol Nawrocki. These meetings will certainly go beyond symbolic commemorations of a shared history, important as those are, and as we have previously written.
From Finland to the Bosphorus
In the context of “coalitions within the alliance,” President Zelensky’s call for the creation of a joint 300,000-strong army resonated widely. For now, it remains a political proposal aimed at mobilizing more proactive policies. Nevertheless, many countries share these concerns, bound together by specific security interests. While the European Union’s rhetoric remains unequivocally pro-Ukrainian, in practice it lacks the political will for decisive, systemic actions-such as making use of frozen Russian assets or effectively combating Russia’s shadow fleet. These shortcomings were highlighted in Davos by President Nawrocki and also pointed out by the US administration.
Despite this, much of the criticism fell primarily on the Ukrainian president. This is hardly surprising: Ukraine’s situation is extremely difficult, and slow, polite diplomacy coupled with gracious thank-yous would not produce tangible results. Zelensky’s arguments closely resemble those repeatedly voiced by the Polish president; the difference is that Nawrocki represents an EU member state that does not require such urgent assistance. Notably, the sharpest criticism of the EU comes mainly from countries bordering Russia – and this is no coincidence.
The fact remains that not all European countries are ready to take radical steps, such as fully severing trade with Russia. Russian oil is still being purchased. Whether this will change remains unclear, although on Thursday, French President Emmanuel Macron triumphantly announced a French boarding of a Russian tanker subject to sanctions. It is also worth remembering that Europe bears the main financial burden of supporting Ukraine. Shortly before Zelensky’s speech in Davos, a €90 million loan for Ukraine was approved, underscoring just how complex and ambiguous the current situation is. Against this backdrop, Zelensky’s sharp words may be forgiven over time and may ultimately fit into a broader common front among Eastern Flank states.
Looking strictly at security policy, increased activity on NATO’s Eastern Flank has been a reality for some time. It is visible in troop deployments, security investments, joint exercises, and close cooperation despite ideological differences. This process stretches from Finland to the Bosphorus. Turkey, often viewed as an unreliable partner, nevertheless has its own interests in the Black Sea, remains a NATO member, and competes with Russia on multiple levels.
So where does Trump fit into all this?
Allied fears regarding Trump’s policy are largely emotional – rooted in concerns over unpredictability and behavior that falls outside established norms. In practice, few of his most controversial ideas have translated into reality: Canada has not become another US state; there has been no reset with Russia despite generous offers; and although financial aid to Ukraine was suspended, intelligence cooperation has continued – according to some sources, it has even intensified, alongside a green light for strikes on targets deep inside Russia.
US policy remains ambiguous and not always aligned with the interests of Ukraine or NATO’s Eastern Flank, but historically, this should not come as a surprise. In 1991, President George Bush delivered the infamous “Chicken Kyiv” speech, and in 2005, in Donetsk, Barack Obama – then a senator – personally oversaw the dismantling of Ukraine’s conventional weapons. It is also worth considering the future: what if Trump is followed by an even stronger isolationist, or by a leader who redirects US engagement entirely from Europe to the Pacific?
Even so, maintaining good relations with the United States remains essential – if only because of access to unrivaled weaponry and support for initiatives such as the Three Seas Initiative, which Republicans have championed. US-Russia relations are also far from friendly. At the same time, the strongest guarantee of security is a country’s own robust military – and this argument is valid. Yet this does not mean that the European Union should be written off. Despite criticism, it remains a strong actor and carries a significant share of the security burden.
Further integration of Ukraine and its path toward alliance structures is therefore both justified and necessary. It is also not a given that forces currently seen as radical or pro-Russian will not move toward the political center once in power – the example of Giorgia Meloni in Italy shows that such a “Melonization” is possible. Similarly, relations with the United States must be nurtured, as it remains a close partner and itself needs Europe, particularly in the context of competition with China.
At the same time, thinking “out of the box” and developing regional alliances is essential. From Ukraine’s perspective, these alliances proved crucial in the first days of the war in 2022. Countries neighboring Ukraine and Russia – led by Poland and the Baltic states – supplied military equipment without hesitation, took in refugees, and launched a diplomatic offensive on Kyiv’s behalf. Such support was also evident during the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.