The French public largely endorses increased military spending. Polls show over 70% of the French public expresses concern that the conflict with Russia could spread.
Kyiv Post talks to Aurélien Duchêne, a lecturer at ILERI, defense consultant for LCI news channel and contributor to Le Monde, as well as author of “La Russie de Poutine contre l’Occident.”
Wojciech Albert Łobodziński: How can France effectively bridge the gap between President Macron’s ambitious “war economy” rhetoric and the country’s actual industrial output, especially given the significant lag in drone production and ammunition compared to the immediate needs of a high-intensity conflict?
Aurélien Duchêne: Securing the budget remains the primary hurdle, as National Assembly delays persist. However, President Macron recently announced a €7.5 billion ($8.8 billion) increase in defense spending, a 13% jump, prioritizing three core areas to bridge the gap between rhetoric and readiness.
First, France is ramping up ammunition production. Notably, after having halted production for 15 years, France is resuming domestic production of SCALP missiles this year.
Second, the strategy focuses on high-end drone technology. Rather than matching Russia’s mass production, France aims to lead in AI-powered niches. Recent partnerships with companies like Alta Ares or Harmattan AI exemplify this shift toward advanced drone and anti-drone warfare systems already being utilized in Ukraine.
Finally, France is addressing its armored capability gap. With only 200 Leclerc tanks and production long halted, there is growing skepticism regarding the Franco-German MGCS project. Given the 20-year timeline and bilateral tensions, a “Plan B” is gaining traction: developing an intermediary tank within 5 years.
This shift signals a pivot toward arming faster and stronger, ensuring that French military capabilities can finally sustain its ambitious political declarations.
Following the January 2026 declaration of intent to deploy up to 6,000 French troops for “peace monitoring” in Ukraine, what are the primary logistical and political risks of such a mission, and can it remain viable without a formal UN mandate or direct US military involvement?
France’s logistical capacity to sustain a long-term deployment in Ukraine rests on two pillars: extensive experience and European proximity. Having managed 5,000 personnel during peak counter-terrorism operations in complex environments, military leadership asserts that a European mission would be logistically more straightforward. We are currently exploring brigade rotations with the British to ensure a continuous presence.
While the logistical feasibility is clear, the legal and political mandates remain complex. Two main options are under debate. The first is an EU-led mission, potentially extending existing training frameworks. However, should Russia or China block a UN mandate, or if EU consensus proves elusive, France must consider a “coalition of the willing.” In this scenario, France and its allies would deploy as a coordinated group without a formal international mandate.
While France has the independent capacity to manage its own logistics, and even support partners, we would not act in political isolation.
The critical, unresolved issue remains the rules of engagement. How do you respond if Russian forces attack our troops?
Exactly. A unilateral deployment represents a massive political commitment. While some might advocate for a bold stance, it is unlikely the French presidency could justify such a risk alone. Public opinion would almost certainly reject a scenario where France is the sole nation risking a direct military confrontation with Russia. Therefore, while we can lead logistically, we must act within a strategic collective.
How does the French government justify increasing defense spending to 3% of GDP and expanding aid to Ukraine while simultaneously cutting Official Development Assistance (ODA) and social programs to manage a public debt crisis and a deficit exceeding 6% of GDP?
French public opinion largely endorses increased military spending, a consensus built over a decade of heightened security awareness following the 2015 terrorist attacks. Today, this sentiment is bolstered by the perception of Russia as a direct threat; recent polls show over 70% of the French public expresses concern that the conflict could spread, while half see a “high risk” of direct war. Furthermore, there is a strategic belief that to avoid being sidelined by Germany, France must invest heavily in its military to maintain its influential role in Europe.
However, while rearmament is popular, the methods of funding it are not.
What do you mean by that?
Military leadership warns that the nation must prepare for sacrifice, yet the public remains deeply divided over social spending cuts. While a majority agrees on the general need to reduce the deficit, which exceeded 6% in 2025, support vanishes when specific measures are proposed. Debates are polarized: some call for taxing the wealthy, others target immigration costs, while many fiercely oppose cuts to pensions or healthcare.
This tension will likely define the 2027 presidential election. The Macronist party advocates for fiscal responsibility and “war budget” efforts, while the National Rally promises to find funds by cutting EU contributions and immigration spending without touching social protections. Ultimately, while the French are ready to spend more on defense, the government faces a massive challenge in finding the necessary billions without triggering social unrest. The consensus on the “end” (a stronger military) does not yet extend to the “means” (unpopular reforms).
To what extent does Macron’s proposal to Europeanize the French nuclear deterrent serve as a realistic security guarantee, and how is this perceived in Paris given the current situation in Greenland?
Regarding the nuclear deterrent, despite claims from the National Rally that Macron intends to hand over our arsenal to the EU, the consensus among experts is different. We recognize that our deterrent cannot stop at our borders; Russia is not going to invade Marseille tomorrow. There is a growing opinion that France should explicitly state that its nuclear umbrella covers the vital interests of our European allies.
I do not expect formal nuclear sharing, such as placing French warheads in Poland. However, we are moving toward deeper cooperation. We recently conducted the “Poker” exercise, training our strategic bombers, with the British. In the future, we could conduct similar drills with Polish, Swedish, or Romanian forces. The deterrent remains French, but the operational cooperation becomes Europeanized.
As for Greenland, the mood in Paris is a mix of strategic validation and opportunity. The tensions there are considered definitive proof that the US security guarantee is wavering. In France, there is a certain sense of “we told you so.” It is an opportunity for France to lead.
While our physical contribution is modest, we are sending 15 personnel, the fact that Europe is acting at all is significant. We were particularly surprised by Germany’s willingness to deploy troops, as we didn’t expect them to take such a leap. In France, we don’t seriously believe Trump will invade Greenland, but we view the crisis as a catalyst for European defense autonomy. Ultimately, it serves to prove that France’s long-standing warnings about relying on the US were correct.