Ukraine more than held its own this week but the diplomatic and “outside Ukraine” news was just bothersome with Trump being a blowhard, Putin being mendacious, Rubio talking out both sides of his mouth, Macron being superficial, and even Herr Chef-Alleswichtigdirektor und Leiter Strategische Großartigkeit Friedrich Mertz telling reporters “there is no way” Ukraine could join the EU, even in 2027.
So, before I get going on this week’s news, here’s a link to a moderately upbeat story about Ukrainian trains.
Ukrainian locomotive travels in snow and ice conditions. (Photo by Ukrzaliznytsia)
When blowing up people counts as a ceasefire, a humanitarian gesture, and a “great deal”
Many of you will have seen the Thursday reports that Trump announced he had agreed with his “good friend” Vladimir Putin that the Russian military would not attack Ukraine’s power grid for a week, if the Ukrainians reciprocated. Because, you know, it’s cold in both countries and Putin is a merciful, humanistic guy.
Zelensky acknowledged the Americans had made the claim and said that if the Russians keep to the terms, so will Ukraine. The Kremlin eventually acknowledged it as well and said the window would last “until Feb. 1.” The Russian is very clear, as of midnight Feb. 1-2, the “power grid ceasefire” is off.
So, first thing, we all have calendars, we all know how to read them, it’s not a week like Trump said, because the Kremlin is saying about two and a half days. In reality, it is more like 60 hours, from an unclear point in time on Jan. 29 to the end of Feb. 2.
The record should reflect that, as of Friday morning, it seems like neither side went after power grid infrastructure, at least at a distance from the fighting line. We’ll see what the Ukrainians do and don’t do, hitting Russia – report on that next time.
There are more than a few good reasons why the Kremlin decided to throw their good friend (his words) Donald J. Trump that particular bone. One is that if a person’s understanding of Ukraine and war is immature and superficial, it looks like Russia is taking the high road.
But in the world of facts and adult thinking, it’s worth looking at what Russian forces invading Ukraine actually did in the 12-18 hours following the US president’s announcement that his brilliant “deal-making skills” had convinced the Russians to lay off Ukraine.
Me, it wasn’t what I would call “peaceful.” A better way to describe things would be, the Russians didn’t stop doing very much of anything at all. They just told the Americans they would.
The easiest way to demonstrate that is just to repeat compiled reports from overnight Jan. 29-30, right after Russia said the hold fire was in effect.
To be clear, all of this took place AFTER Trump said he had just made a really great deal with Putin to protect the Ukrainians:
- Russia launched one ballistic missile, 111 drones (about half strike and half decoy) at targets in 15 Ukrainian regions in overnight attacks
- Kryvyi Rih, private home hit by Russian drone, one woman killed, four injured, building destroyed by blast and fire.
- Kharkiv, vic. Rogan village, Russian missile strike, private business hit by ballistic missile (Philip Morris cigarette factory), major fire, 20 (!) fire response vehicles called to the scene
Yes, I know it’s a war but the caption can only be: Philip Morris factory in Kharkiv, Ukraine goes up in smoke following Russian bomb strike and Donald J. Trump announcement he had cut a “deal” with Vladimir Putin to limit Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian targets. (Photo by Ukraine’s Emergency Response Ministry Jan. 30)
Excellent image by Ukraine emergency response ministry photograph of a fireman at work in Kharkiv. (Photo Jan. 30 by Ukraine’s emergency response ministry, Kharkiv division).
- Donetsk region, more than two dozen Russian attacks vs. civilian homes and businesses registered, Pokrovsk area nine shell or mortar strikes, Kramatorsk area 17 shell or mortar strikes; 243 civilians evacuated, including 24 children
- Kherson city, Russian shells fired from across the river hit a bus, one person dead, five injured.
One person died and five were injured following a Russian artillery strike hitting a bus in Kherson city, Jan. 30, about 12 hours after Donald Trump announced he had gotten his good friend Vladimir Putin to agree to a temporary ceasefire in Ukraine. (Image published on Jan. 30 by Kherson regional defense administration)
- Daylight air attacks on the 30th: Russian drones penetrate airspace in Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Chernihiv, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Sumy, Kirovohrad, Chernihiv, and Mykolaiv regions.
- Daylight glide bomb strike against the Zaporizhzhia region.
- Daylight glide bomb strikes against Donetsk region. Video shows explosion and major fire in an 8-story apartment building in the center of Konstyantinivka city.
- Daylight glide bomb strikes against Kharkiv region.
- Drone strikes hit civilian automobile traffic on the Pavlohrad-Pokrovsk highway.
- Drone strikes hit civilian automobile traffic on Boguslav-Petropavlivka highway, reportedly Shahed drones operating on Starlink.
Fuel truck burns following Russian drone strike on the Boguslav-Petropavlivka highway, near the village of Sinelnikivshchine, Dnipropetrovsk region (Screen grab from video published by Airborne Division on Jan. 30)
- Drones flying across Dnipro River attack 20 times in Mykolaiv region.
- Frontline fighting, past 24 hours, Ukraine army reports 279 combat clashes (about 50% higher than usual) and 41 Russian air strikes dropping 123 glide bombs. Also recorded were 5,583 First Person View (FPV) drone strikes and 3,802 shell or mortar strikes on Ukrainian positions or civilian property (albeit 20% of those bombardments hit Russian property in Russia’s Kursk region).
- In that day of fighting, the Ukrainian military claimed 1,310 killed (that’s heavy losses, maybe 20% above typical for this time of the year) or severely wounded Russian soldiers and four armored vehicles, 19 artillery or rocket artillery systems, and 129 light vehicles destroyed by Ukrainian forces.
Some ceasefire, huh?
Odesa apartment building following Russian missile strike. (Image by Unian Jan. 27)
Power and heat
Kyiv remains the place struggling the most with fallout from the last round of Russian strikes. Repair is in progress and by Friday about 650 buildings of an original 3,500+ appear to be still without heat. Power deliveries are more reliable, but still there are unpredictable cuts for almost everyone. In the center of the city and the middle class or better districts, it seems like there are generators everywhere. I can’t say conclusively, but I get the impression that Kyivites with moderate or better resources are weathering things reasonably well. The metro is running normally, as is most public transport.
Ukrainian national railroad workers make emergency repairs to heating pipes in Kyiv’s Troieshchyna district. (Image published on Jan. 30 by Ukrzaliznytsia)
That being said, it was only on Thursday, after five days of not even trying, that the city power company published a blackout schedule, which is pretty critical for semi-normal life because blackouts are much easier to live with if you know when it’s coming and how long it will last. That schedule went by the wayside in a matter of hours.
On a meter-by-meter basis, the most notable impact of the Russian strikes at the moment is the very icy sidewalks. Authorities are basically leaving that to property owners, so walking around some parts of the city, especially where there’s a lot of pedestrian traffic and relatively few retail businesses, you are walking on a skating rink. But main roads and even secondary roads are clear and getting salted.
The worst-off Kyivites are the poor and/or elderly without access to outside support, particularly in the Troieshchyna district. On Thursday reports were that about 500,000 people, or 25% or so of greater Kyiv, still don’t have heating.
This review started being written on electricity delivered by the grid, but at the moment, it’s being written with the support of a power bank. The first blackout of the day was more or less per the power company schedule and fairly short, the second one came with no warning.
Other major Ukrainian cities in the same boat as Kyiv, but overall, not as badly off: Odesa, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Chernihiv and Sumy. Kharkiv is I would say at least as badly off.
Count the missiles
I am becoming more convinced that Russian missile production is limited enough that it is a critical factor in Ukraine’s ability to withstand the Putin power grid bombardment. I see evidence of economizing and limited stocks. The quantity of ballistic missiles Russia has to shoot at Ukraine is of strategic importance because if the Ukrainians can’t stop them reliably, then the Russian bombardment succeeds, and cities become unlivable. Enough Russian ballistic missiles = destroyed Ukrainian power grid.
The qualification here is that the following assumes the Russians are NOT manufacturing oodles and scads of missiles and saving them up to blast Ukraine at some later date, or maybe just to go to war with someplace like Mongolia or Kazakhstan.
OK, CYA out of the way, here’s a standard list of ballistic missiles launched by Russia since early December when Putin kicked off his latest campaign to bombard the Ukrainians into surrendering by crushing the Ukrainian power grid.
- Dec. 5-6: 14 Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles – Odesa, Kyiv, Lviv
- Dec. 12-13: five Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles – Odesa
- Dec. 22-23: three Kinzhal “hypersonic” i.e. aeroballistic missile – west Ukraine.
- Dec. 26-27, 2025: 10-12 Iskander-M ballistic missiles – greater Kyiv
- Jan. 8-9, 2026: one Oreshnik IRBM, 13 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic missiles – Kyiv and Lviv
- Jan. 19-20: eight ballistic missiles mixed Iskander-M plus S-300/S-400 anti-aircraft
- Jan. 27-28: one Iskander-M – Kyiv
- Jan. 29-30, 2026: one Iskander-M – Kyiv
In other words, for whatever the reason, it’s been ten days since the Russians launched a salvo of ballistic missiles. A little strange decision considering that if you want to flatten a country’s power grid, you keep the pressure on, Ukrainian repair crews can achieve amazing results in a couple of days, and here, Putin has given them a week and a half.
Also, starting in January, the Russians started adding to their Iskander salvoes S-300 and S-400 anti-aircraft missiles, which are really inaccurate when fired at a ground target, and of course, a Russian anti-aircraft missile used to hit a Ukrainian city is an anti-aircraft missile that won’t intercept a Ukrainian strike drone heading the opposite way. In the past, when the Russians ran low in proper ballistic missiles, back in 2022-23, we saw them use S-300s by the dozen. Maybe the same thing is happening now?
There are basically two ways to interpret it. One is that Russia is running out of ballistic missiles to shoot at the Ukrainians, and that means the Ukrainian repair crews are going to gain on damage caused even more. Which is not what you want if your objective is to cause irreparable damage.
The other theory, now being widely discussed on the Ukrainian internet, is that Putin is saving up missiles for a big strike to hit right after the “energy ceasefire runs out, to wit at 12:01 A.M. on Feb. 2.
Attached is a weather map for that day. Note the predicted temperatures. The government is concerned enough that they actually issued a national cold weather warning for the weekend – in a peacetime country, this is what governments do, almost always with an excess of caution. Ukraine is at war, and it takes a lot of predicted bad weather to get their attention.
The weather prediction for Tuesday, when Russia’s supposed “ceasefire” on the energy grid runs out. (Map image published Ukraine National Meteorological Center, 30 Jan.)
No, I don’t have a logical explanation for the Russians’ wasting a rare ballistic missile on a cigarette factory. Donald Trump seems to think it was because the manufacturer on paper is a US company. He’s entitled to an opinion, of course.
Pokrovsk
It’s now four months since it was all over the news that Russia had captured Pokrovsk.
Reports that I am reading say the intensity of fighting has fallen off somewhat, and that effectively, territory is not changing hands. The combat is duels over pieces of the gray zone by infantry squads backed by drones, or drones hunting the infantry. The Armed Forces of Ukraine’s (AFU’s) hold of the area is strong and well-organized; it’s very clear that the 7th Rapid Reaction Corps is running the show. For all intents and purposes, this is the air assault brigades plus the parachute brigade.
The Russians have control over most of Myrnohrad but not all – as has been the case for months. Russian forces control the south of Pokrovsk, Ukrainian forces control the north of Pokrovsk, the rail line cutting through the city east-west, for practical purposes, is the dividing line between areas of control. This picture is stable.
The weather is a factor; it’s cold, and about two-thirds of the time it’s been clear. This makes it difficult to hide from drones.
There are reports that the Russians are building up force in Myrnohrad preparatory to another push, and they may well be, but it is very clear that right now the battle is stalled here, neither side is exercising initiative, and the evidence is very strong the static situation is because the Russians have run out of useful groups of men to push into the fight.
In an interview with BBC, the 7th Corps commander Gen. Yevhen Lasiychuk, said: “Currently, the demarcation line runs along the railway. We control it, and the enemy almost never manages to cross it. And where there are his small “islands, which he tries to occupy, he is destroyed there, he does not live there for long.”
To the north of Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad, maybe 5 or 6 kilometers, there is a corps dividing line, and 7th Corps real estate ends, and 1st National Guard Corps Azov ownership begins. This is another strong formation with, as I’ve pointed out several times over the years, the most experienced command group of any major ground formation in the entire AFU. Sources tell me the Russians seem not very interested in attacking in the 1st Corps sector, and that corps leadership views the situation as relatively calm and suitable for rotating some personnel off the line for rest and recuperation.
In one sense, this is evidence of Ukrainian defensive success of greater scale than the smaller battles of Dobropillya (August-September) or 1st Pokrovsk (July). The evidence is very clear: At some point, AFU leadership decided to respond to the Russian decision to make capturing Pokrovsk the top priority of its entire fall and winter offensives by concentrating its best units opposite those attacks, and that defense has definitively held.
This is not to say that the Ukrainian personnel shortages have disappeared or the Russians won’t attack again, but, if looked at intelligently, there’s really no other way to interpret the last six months of fighting in this sector except that we have seen the AFU take the initiative away from the Russian army, on the operational level. The strategy was to run the Russian attack force out of personnel, and it’s pretty clear that the strategy in that sector succeeded.
If you reach the part at the bottom about Ukrainian cards, that’s worth bearing in mind. From the Ukrainian perspective, the attrition strategy against Russia is succeeding; it’s difficult to read the fighting around Pokrovsk any other way.
Scout/reconnaissance operator, 25th Airborne Brigade, in training area near the Pokrovsk sector (Image published 25.01.2026 by Ukraine General Staff)
Shadow tanker war: It’s hard to communicate how funny this all seems in Ukraine
The first part of this is basically a rewritten wire report. Fourteen European countries on Wednesday announced that they are closing the Baltic Sea to Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, according to a joint statement released by the UK government.
The countries warned that tankers concealing their origin, by changing flags, switching off transponders, or operating without proper documentation, will be treated as vessels without nationality. Such ships may be detained without legal risk.
Russia was also accused of deliberately interfering with satellite navigation systems, posing a serious threat to maritime safety and complicating rescue operations in the event of accidents.
The statement was signed by Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
In a development either directly connected with that, or having absolutely nothing to do with it, on Friday Russia’s Foreign Ministry announced Russia would not take any action regarding last week’s detention by French forces of the tanker Grinch on the high seas (Jan. 29), because, spokeswoman Maria Zakharova told Moscow reporters with a straight face, Russia had absolutely nothing to do with that ship or its owners.
There are people out there arguing that detaining Russia’s shadow fleet elements will provoke Moscow. Madame Zakharova seems to indicate the opposite: When push comes to shove, the Kremlin will abandon its shadow tankers rather than seek confrontation with the West.
I won’t make any comment one way or another, but, on the 30th, so one day after the Grinch was detained, French President Emmanuel Macron called up Zelensky and told him France shall unfortunately be obliged to release the detained tanker – which both he and Zelensky agree is a “shadow fleet” element – due to the requirements of French law.
Unsurprisingly, this turn of events wasn’t made public in Paris, but rather by Zelensky in a meeting with journalists in Kyiv.
Four years of war, Europe and Ukraine, and even the US agree that the way to get leverage over Russia is by inhibiting Russian oil exports, and a shadow fleet tanker by definition does not have a major nation navy defending it. The US detains Russian tankers. The Ukrainians attack Russian tankers. From the Ukrainian perspective, it looks like France isn’t serious about deterring Russia.
The Marinera oil tanker being escorted into the Moray Firth by a US Coastguard ship. Credit: Northpix (Image published by Scottish Sun on Jan. 13, 2026)
No cards: Then why is Ukraine waiting for the US to sign a security treaty?
The hack pack/pro journos covering the war already are getting ready for Feb. 24 and the four-year anniversary of the war, but there is an even more fun one coming up as well: Feb. 28th, the one-year anniversary of the infamous meeting between the US leadership and Zelensky in the White House, when J.D. Vance kept demanding Zelensky declare his gratitude to the United States for sending American weapons to Ukraine, and President Trump waved his finger and told Zelensky Ukraine better sign a peace treaty with Russia on Russian terms pretty durn quick, because “You have no cards.”
The threat was do what the Americans say or the Americans will pull the plug on arms transfers to Ukraine paid by US taxpayers, and Russia would destroy Ukraine and dictate terms. One thing, give the Trump team credit, they made good on the threat.
But fast-forward less than a year, and how’s that Ukrainian collapse going?
- The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the prominent Washington-based think tank, has published a big analytical paper and reports Russian forces suffered nearly 1.2 million total casualties since February 2022, and since 2024 advances have been Battle of the Somme slow; 15-70 meters (49-230 feet) per day.
- The Kremlin didn’t even send diplomats to the latest round of “peace talks” in Abu Dhabi, it was just army officers and FSB operators.
- Following the public relations disaster last month in which Russia claimed it captured the city of Kupyansk on national TV only to have President Zelensky show up in the city the next day to denounce the claim as a lie, the Russian General Staff this week, again, claimed Kupyansk – a key industrial rail junction – had fallen under Russian control. It took less than 24 hours for video to surface of AFU troops from inside Kupyansk saying “Uh…we’re here, not the Russians.”
- From independent sources, here is the breakdown of terrain gained by Russia for the past four months, estimating generously in favor of Russia: October 2025: 230 square kilometers (89 square miles), November 2025: about 700 sq km (270 sq mi), December: about 244 sq km (94 sq mi), January: about 265 sq km (102 sq mi). That’s about 120,000-140,000 men killed and wounded, in four months, to take territory roughly equivalent to the size of Oklahoma City.
- I checked, basically there is no artillery ammunition shortage anymore, although of course there’s never enough for everything. But the US warning that Ukraine would run out of weaponry and ammo without American support – “cards,” if you will – doesn’t exactly hold water.
On Jan. 25, in comments to Ukrainska Pravda, Zelensky, you know, the guy the Americans said had no cards, said this about the ongoing Russo-US-Ukrainian “peace” talks:
“The Americans are trying to find a compromise. But for a compromise to be possible, all sides must be ready to compromise – including the American side as well.”
And here is Zelensky talking about the peace process, on Jan. 30. This is a direct quote from the man commanding Europe’s biggest and most combat-experienced army. The issue is Ukraine’s Donetsk region: the Trump administration wants Ukraine to hand it over to Russia.
“So far, we cannot find a compromise on the territorial issue, namely on part of eastern Ukraine. We are talking about the Donetsk region of Ukraine. Unconditional demands on Ukraine are definitely not a compromise. The Americans are offering a ‘compromise solution‘ called a ‘free economic zone.’ The issue of control over a particular territory, even a free economic zone, should also be fair. Namely: control by Ukraine of those territories that we control.”
That is the Ukrainian position. The Americans can try and make the Ukrainians change it, and they keep saying over and over that they will. But the Ukrainians have four years of conventional war experience, they have 900,000 men under arms, and by almost any measure, they have the Russian army stopped cold (just about), and Germany and Poland are racing each other to re-arm themselves against Russia, and back Ukraine in the process.
Some might say Zelensky actually has a lot of cards; it’s just that Trump and Vance are too dim to see them.
Be that as it may, one thing is for sure: Zelensky seems to be one of the very few national leaders in the world flatly refusing to do what the White House tells him and laying down red lines to the Americans.
Also: Breaking news, once again, the Russian parliament (Duma) has started legislation that would give permission to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine. Russia never rattles nuclear sabers unless the Kremlin thinks it’s in trouble.
Russian businessman Aras Agalarov, left, Miss Universe Gabriela Isler and pageant owner Donald Trump at the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in 2013. It was there that Trump – then the pageant’s owner – spent several days hobnobbing with Russia’s elite. At this point, Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine was less than a year away. (AP image shot by Irina Bujor published by NPR on July 17, 2017).
The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.