A world that measures peace by loud declarations rather than concrete actions, and resolves conflicts at the cost of sovereignty, lives, and human destinies, is sliding into dangerous illusion. Political statements about “mutual concessions” and the artificial equation of aggressor and victim distort reality and contradict intelligence assessments: the aggressor interprets such compromises as weakness, receiving a green light for escalation, while the global threat only grows.
In the context of the agenda of recent global summits, particularly the World Economic Forum in Davos, leaders were forced, alongside economic issues, to focus on the priority issue of security and express positions on Ukraine and European stability.
The strongest impression and food for further reflection came from the speech of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, who openly stated: “The old rules no longer apply. Middle powers must unite around shared values to protect sovereignty and security.” He also emphasized: “The global system is experiencing the end of a pleasant fairy tale and the beginning of harsh reality, where global risks have become a permanent part of international politics, and the rules-based order is undergoing not a gradual transition but a radical rupture.”
No less convincing was the speech of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who stressed the importance of partner unity and sustained support for Kyiv, noting: “Any fatigue among partners will cost dearly.”
These words underscore that Ukraine is not merely defending itself today – it serves as a shield of stability for all of Europe.
A detailed perspective and assessments were provided by Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine Kyrylo Budanov (former head of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence – HUR), who explained that the war in Ukraine is not a temporary conflict but part of a global confrontation. In his words, Kyiv’s task is not only to repel aggression but also to preserve the unity of the international coalition and consistently demonstrate strength and endurance.
These speeches set the tone for further discussion and serve as the context for this article, based on assessments from leading intelligence services and analytical centers published during 2025–2026.
War as the new security norm: Intelligence assessments
In early 2025, Danish intelligence FE noted that “Russia is preparing for a prolonged confrontation with the West, in which the war against Ukraine is the central element.”
British Defence Intelligence emphasized that Russian leadership increasingly views the war as an existential confrontation, not a limited operation. US analysts from the CIA (Director William Burns and Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines) warned that “Putin sees no acceptable scenario for ending the war without strategic concessions from Ukraine or the West,” and that Russia is exhausting itself with enormous losses (approximately 1.2 million according to CIA estimates as of 2025) but continues the aggression, believing time is on its side.
The new chief of MI6, Blaise Metreweli, in her first public speech on Dec. 15, 2025, directly called Russia an “aggressive, expansionist, and revisionist” state that seeks to subjugate Ukraine and intimidate NATO, stressing that Putin “is stringing us along” in negotiations, having no genuine desire for peace without Kyiv’s capitulation.
According to ISW assessments, “Russian troops continue to suffer high losses for minimal territorial gains, indicating the protracted nature of the conflict.” CSIS data confirm: according to the most pessimistic CSIS estimates, combined Russian and Ukrainian losses by the end of 2025 reached nearly 1.8 million people, of which approximately 1.2 million were Russian (including 275,000-325,000 killed), and this figure could reach 2 million by spring 2026. As of early February 2026, accounting for current rates, total losses are approaching 1.81–1.94 million, confirming CSIS’s forecast of steady growth in the threat.
These assessments of losses and conflict duration are complemented by another alarming trend: Russia is actively expanding hybrid pressure across the entire West without crossing the threshold of full-scale war with NATO.
Hybrid threats and information pressure
Throughout the year, intelligence services of leading countries recorded intensified Moscow hybrid operations: cyberattacks, sabotage, and information pressure on Europe.
Danish FE in the October 2025 report “Assessment of the Hybrid Threat Against Denmark,” stated that Russia is already waging hybrid war against NATO and the West, seeing itself in conflict with them, and keeping hybrid means below the threshold of armed conflict. This means that in the coming years, Russia will almost certainly apply “hybrid” methods against NATO countries even more actively: cyberattacks, explosions, cable damage, arson, provocations in the air and at sea, disinformation, etc.
Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) also states that the Russian Federation combines military, information, and psychological operations, emphasizing the complexity of hybrid war. Budanov stressed: “Russia has not abandoned its maximalist goals regarding Ukraine; only the tools and pace are changing.” He added that strategic exhaustion is becoming the decisive factor: “What matters is not a one-time success, but the ability to systematically hold the defense and inflict losses on the enemy.”
HUR representative Vadym Skibitsky noted: “Russia plans the war in waves, combining military actions with information and psychological operations. Any reduction in combat intensity should not be perceived as readiness for peace – it is an element of preparation for the next phase.”
Analytical centers such as GLOBSEC warned that with depleting reserves, Moscow in 2026 will double hybrid operations in Europe: sabotage, disinformation, gray-zone actions.
Activities of pro-Russian forces in Europe
Particular attention is drawn to the activities of pro-Russian political forces in Europe, which amplify fear and discontent through emotional voter reactions.
For example, Alice Weidel (AfD, Germany) stated: “We will demand compensation. Ukrainians and Zelensky must pay for blowing up our pipeline. We invested over €70 billion in Ukraine, supplied them with so much weapons. We will demand the return of these billions, as well as funds for Nord Stream repairs.”
In Czechia, after ANO’s victory led by Andrej Babiš in the October 2025 parliamentary elections (34.5% votes, 80 seats) and the formation of a coalition with Euroskeptic SPD (Tomio Okamura) and Motoristé sobě, the new authorities appeal to “Czechia first” and public fatigue, which is already affecting Czechia’s position on new large EU/Ukraine aid packages for 2026-2027. The Czech ammunition initiative continues, but without Czech state funds – only with partner financing.
Similar sentiments in France (far-right and parts of the left), Slovakia, Italy (Matteo Salvini), Hungary (Viktor Orbán blocks EU decisions), and Croatia (Zoran Milanović retransmits Russian narratives) show how populism becomes a tool to weaken European solidarity with Ukraine and EU unity overall.
With the intensification of hybrid threats, BND assessments come to the fore: head Bruno Kahl in 2025 emphasized that “Russia may test NATO unity and check the effectiveness of Article 5,” including through the appearance of so-called “little green men” in the Baltics. He warned: “In Moscow, there are people who no longer believe Article 5 works. And they would like to test it.” According to BND, Russian forces could be ready for an attack on NATO as early as 2030.
Assessment of actions
This line is confirmed by MI6 assessments. The new chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, Blaise Metreweli, in her first public speech on Dec. 15, 2025, directly called Russia an “aggressive, expansionist, and revisionist” state that seeks to “subjugate Ukraine and intimidate NATO members.” She emphasized: “We all continue to face the threat of an aggressive, expansionist, and revisionist Russia that is trying to subjugate Ukraine and pressure NATO.”
Metreweli accused Putin of “stringing negotiations along” and “shifting the costs of war onto his own population,” having no genuine desire for peace without Kyiv’s capitulation. She noted that “hundreds of thousands have died, and the number of victims grows daily due to Putin’s historical distortions and his warped desire for respect.”
Metreweli described the current era as a “space between peace and war,” where power is becoming “more dispersed and unpredictable.” Russia, she said, is actively testing the West in the “gray zone” – actions “directly below the threshold of war”: cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, drones over airports and military bases, aggressive activity at sea (above and underwater), state-sponsored arson and sabotage, propaganda and information operations that divide societies.
She stressed: “Exporting chaos is not a mistake, but a feature of the Russian approach to international relations.” “The front line is now everywhere,” and Russia’s attempts to “intimidate, instill fear, and manipulate affect all of us.”
The updated British government profile of GRU operations (Dec. 4, 2025) details how Russia’s Main Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) conducts persistent cyber and hybrid operations against Britain and allies, causing real damage and supporting the illegal war in Ukraine. In December 2025, Britain imposed new sanctions on GRU units (29155, 26165, 74455) and dozens of individuals for cyber and information operations. On Dec. 9, 2025, Britain announced new measures against foreign information warfare, sanctioning Rybar LLC, Mikhail Zvinchuk, and other structures for spreading disinformation.
China’s role as enabler of Russian aggression
The war in Ukraine has long acquired a global character thanks to China. Beijing does not supply lethal weapons directly to avoid secondary sanctions, but provides the technological capability for the Russian Federation to wage high-intensity war.
In economic and financial dimensions, China makes sanctions pressure manageable. Russia-China trade in 2025 totaled $234 billion, despite a 6.5% decline due to falling oil prices. At the same time, over 95-99% of mutual settlements are conducted in rubles and yuan. The yuan has become the main currency of Russian foreign trade, allowing the Kremlin to bypass the dollar-based financial system, maintain energy exports, and finance the war. China remains the largest buyer of Russian oil, stabilizing Russia’s budget even under Western restrictions.
According to the Pentagon (2025 report) and Atlantic Council, Beijing supplies semiconductors, radars, sensors, fiber-optic cables, electric motors over 750 watts, ESC speed controllers, cameras, video transmitters, and lithium-ion batteries. In August 2025, China exported a record 328,000 miles of fiber-optic cables to Russia. Analysts estimate that about 80% of electronics in Russian First Person View (FPV) drones are of Chinese origin, enabling Russia to increase production from 15,000 units in 2024 to over 30,000 in 2025.
These processes are documented in detail in studies by the Kyiv Center for Defense Reforms, particularly the 2025 reports “Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Production of Combat FPV Drones” and “Chinese Contribution to Russia’s Jet UAV Program.”
FPV drones now account for up to 90% of all unmanned aerial vehicles used by Russia, with production rates up to 4,000 units per day. Critical dependence on Chinese suppliers persists: of nearly 60 identified companies, only four are under sanctions.
The jet segment poses a particular threat. Small turbojet engines Telefly JT80, Swiwin SW800Pro, JT 1000, and TJ 1050 are imported from China, with volumes rising from 80 units in 2023 to 299 in 2024, worth over $6.3 million. They are used in Geran-3 drones and the Banderol cruise missile. Chinese suppliers hold certification under PRC military standard GJB 9001C 2017. Scientific-technical cooperation is recorded, including between TsAGI and NORINCO Corporation in UAV aerodynamics in 2022–2024.
Ukrainian military intelligence in October 2025 provided evidence of high-level cooperation in satellite reconnaissance, including China’s transfer of data used by Russia for precise missile strikes on Ukrainian territory. President Zelensky, in December 2025, publicly warned of intensifying military-industrial cooperation between Russia and China, stressing that Moscow is increasingly dependent on Chinese investments, technologies, and political priorities.
Diplomatically, China provides Russia with international cover. Beijing abstains from voting on UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russian aggression (including February 2025) or blocks tough measures in the Security Council. This posture creates an illusion of Russia’s international integration for Global South countries and undermines the unity of the pressure coalition.
In effect, Ukraine has become a testing ground for China, where – without direct risk – Beijing tests its technologies against NATO-standard systems and obtains unique combat data worth billions of dollars. The asymmetry of benefits is obvious. Russia pays with blood, resources, and strategic dependence, while China gains a weakened West, a controlled Moscow, and practical modern-warfare experience. Under these conditions, containing Russia without applying pressure on Chinese supply chains, financial mechanisms, and diplomatic cover is a strategic illusion.
Western complacency and accumulation of systemic risks
By late 2025, Western assessments converged on the fact that the war in Ukraine has become the central element of global confrontation. Danish and British intelligence stressed that “the risk of indirect or direct clash with NATO grows if support for Ukraine weakens,” and that Russia is testing the limits of the permissible, from air provocations to crises in critical infrastructure.
Authoritative expert assessments, such as Stimson Center’s Top Ten Global Risks 2026, highlight risks associated with “Russia’s buildup of long-range systems and potential expansion of conflict scenarios” if Russia maintains the pace of arms production and maneuvers. In early 2026, intelligence data agree that “the RF will maintain readiness for escalation if the West shows fatigue or reduces aid to Ukraine.”
American experts add that “containing Russia without visible success for Ukraine is unsustainable, and any alternative scenarios merely postpone a clash at higher cost.” US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines noted that “Russian nuclear rhetoric and hybrid operations are significantly increasing and testing NATO deterrence.”
Former MI6 chief Richard Dearlove indicated that “hybrid escalation in 2026 may be a desperate Kremlin step,” while former CIA Director John Brennan warned that “Putin uses nuclear threats to pressure the West.”
This is precisely why President Zelensky’s words – “Any fatigue among partners will cost dearly” – sound not as rhetoric, but as a strategic warning.
Why this matters
Taken together, all these assessments – from intelligence services to leading analytical centers – point to one thing: Russia’s war against Ukraine has long transcended a regional conflict and become a long-term systemic challenge to the entire architecture of European security. This is not a crisis that will disappear on its own, but a multi-year confrontation that requires consistent and strategic support for Ukraine.
Particularly dangerous are talks about lifting or easing sanctions against the Russian Federation without achieving a strategic result in the war.
Historical chronicle of unlearned lessons
History demonstrates that attempts at “reset” between the White House and the Kremlin did not deter aggression but instead gave the Russian regime a “second wind,” thus saving it from catastrophe. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has systematically interfered in the affairs of post-Soviet republics. It uses both direct military interventions and elements of hybrid war.
In Nagorno-Karabakh since the 1990s, Russia supported war and active armed confrontation, supplied weapons, and acted as “mediator” in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Kremlin controlled the balance of power and influence in the region, using the conflict to strengthen its political and military leverage. After the 2020 war, Moscow deployed about 2,000 “peacekeepers,” effectively cementing its role in controlling the region and shaping subsequent dynamics. But when the Kremlin threw all resources into the war against Ukraine in 2023, Azerbaijan – after nearly 30 years – restored control over its territorial integrity, and today Armenia and Azerbaijan are building civilized and peaceful relations.
In Chechnya, the Kremlin applied direct military intervention. After the First Chechen War (1994-1996), the Khasavyurt Accords of Aug. 30-31, 1996, were signed, providing for the withdrawal of federal troops and cessation of hostilities, with the republic’s status deferred to Dec. 31, 2001. This was interpreted as de facto recognition of the independence of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. The Moscow Peace Treaty of May 12, 1997, between the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, signed by Yeltsin and Maskhadov, confirmed the intention to build relations on the basis of international law. Yet in 1999, Russia launched the Second Chechen War, ignoring these agreements.
In 1990-1992 in Moldova, Russia’s 14th Army directly intervened in the conflict: supplied weapons, provided officers and “volunteers,” conducted artillery support, enabling separatists to retain control over the left bank of the Dniester. This led to the creation of the separatist entity – the “Transnistrian Moldovan Republic.”
Similarly, in 1991-1993, the Kremlin actively fomented and supported separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian military and “volunteers” from the North Caucasus, arms supplies, and provocations led to ethnic conflicts and loss of territory for Tbilisi.
In 2008, Russia carried out a direct military invasion with regular troops, launching a full-scale ground, air, and naval operation against Georgia, and officially recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
After Georgia, Moscow received new impetus for aggression, leading to the next wave against Ukraine in 2014: from the seizure and annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by Russian troops under cover of “little green men,” to the imitation of “civil war” and creation of “DNR” and “LNR” by Russian special services (GRU, FSB), “volunteers” like Igor Girkin-Strelkov, and regular troops under disguise. Attempts to appease the Kremlin in the Minsk Group and Normandy formats ultimately enabled the launch of full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022.
Elements of hybrid war also manifested in the 2007 cyberattack on Estonia, one of the first large-scale cases of Russian hybrid aggression in the post-Soviet space.
Hybrid operation in 2021 on the Belarus-NATO border (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia): with the participation of the Lukashenko regime and direct coordination from the Kremlin, a migrant crisis was provoked: thousands of migrants from the Middle East and Africa were brought to Minsk, from where they were directed to mass attempts to cross EU borders.
Russia used this wave to create chaos, provocations, and pressure on the Alliance, including false promises of easy entry to Europe, forcing NATO to mobilize forces for border protection and expend resources on humanitarian and security crises.
This operation did not involve direct military invasion but effectively tested Western reaction, created division, and demonstrated how neighbors can be destabilized without open war. Every such precedent, met with relatively restrained and “moderate” Western response, only encouraged Moscow toward ever-larger actions, with the cost of containment rising exponentially.
The Kremlin no longer hides its intentions and crimes, openly pursuing a strategy of physical extermination of Ukrainian civilians.
This strategy runs through the entire war: from mass shootings and torture in Bucha, Izium, Olenivka, to the complete destruction of Mariupol, from daily terror in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to systematic destruction of energy infrastructure in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnipro, Lviv, and dozens of other cities.
Thousands of civilian deaths, millions deprived of home, light, heat, and safety – these are not accidental “collateral damage,” but a deliberate, consistent policy of the regime aimed at the physical extermination of the Ukrainian people and destruction of the foundations of its statehood. The scale of these crimes is so enormous that it requires not one publication, but constant international documentation, trial, and punishment.
Existential war against the sovereignty of states and free peoples
Russian propaganda and officials already openly threaten European countries, directly stating the need to restore Moscow’s control over all states that were part of the Soviet Union, as well as returning former Warsaw Pact countries to Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence, with de facto deprivation of their real sovereignty and independence in foreign and security policy.
Kremlin ideologists and high officials regularly promote narratives about the “historical injustice” of the USSR’s collapse and the “treacherous” NATO expansion, justifying revanchist ambitions and hybrid aggression against neighbors. These theses serve as the ideological foundation for current Russian Federation policy, where any independence of post-Soviet or post-socialist states is perceived as a threat to be “corrected” by force.
Therefore, containing Russia is impossible without Ukraine’s success. Investments in defense, cybersecurity, protection of critical infrastructure, and resilience of democratic institutions are a requirement of the time, without which the risk of EU division and weakening – or even “nullification” – of NATO grows. Ukraine remains the key element of containment, and it is precisely the consistency of Western decisions in 2026 that will determine whether this war becomes a point of stabilization or a prologue to a much broader crisis in Europe and beyond.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.