On Jan. 25 in Vilnius, the first-ever bilateral meeting between President Volodymyr Zelensky and Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya took place.
The talks were held on the margins of the commemorations marking the 163rd anniversary of the January Uprising, attended by the presidents of Poland and Lithuania as well. This meeting had been a long time coming – nearly four years after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and almost six years after the falsified presidential election in Belarus. The delay stemmed from the complex relationship between Ukraine, the Belarusian democratic opposition, and the regime in Minsk.
In Vilnius, Zelensky referred to Belarus, for which – at least in its independent, historical dimension – the January Uprising also constitutes an important legacy.
“Back then [2020], support for Belarusians was simply not enough,” the Ukrainian president said, directing criticism at Western partners. He added that today the dog of Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko has more rights than Belarusian citizens.
Tsikhanouskaya also announced that Zelensky intends to appoint a special envoy for democratic Belarus. This is significant given that Ukraine recalled its ambassador to Minsk, Ihor Kyzym, only in 2023, despite Belarus being widely regarded as a co-aggressor in the war against Ukraine.
Relations with the regime: calculation instead of rupture
The question of why the Ukrainian ambassador left Minsk only in 2023 remains valid. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was launched from Belarusian territory, and Lukashenko’s regime continues to provide the Russian army with infrastructure support as well as production and maintenance facilities. Minsk has also been accused of complicity in Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children from occupied territories.
At the same time, certain nuances should not be overlooked. Belarusian troops did not take direct part in the invasion. This was not due to Lukashenko’s pacifism, but rather to cold calculation and fear. The Belarusian dictator is acutely aware of his position – Belarus would be a buffer zone, or a crushing ground, in the event of an open conflict with the West, and its real independence is largely illusory.
It is also worth recalling that the first talks between Ukraine and Russia in 2022 took place in Belarus and Turkey. Among the participants was Roman Abramovich, and the Ukrainian delegation arrived in Minsk under the escort of Polish GROM special forces.
The rapprochement between Zelensky and Tsikhanouskaya nonetheless signals that Lukashenko is becoming increasingly irrelevant to Ukraine.
Ukraine and Belarusian democratic forces
In December 2025, most of the 123 political prisoners released by Lukashenko left Belarus, crossing into Ukraine. This occurred as part of an arrangement between Minsk and Washington.
The Donald Trump administration began a process of thawing relations with the regime, which enabled the prisoners’ release, but in return the United States lifted some sanctions – among them those on potash fertilizers, a key sector for the Belarusian economy. In practice, however, the regime currently has no real ability to export them due to EU sanctions.
Lukashenko also declared his willingness to participate in the so-called Trump Peace Council and, as can be assumed, would like to have a role in peace talks – even if they lead nowhere. For the Belarusian dictator, a “Minsk-3” format would be a diplomatic success in itself.
From the very beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Belarusian opposition has unequivocally supported Ukraine. Nevertheless, some of its representatives have been criticized for ambiguous or controversial statements regarding Crimea, or even for visits to the peninsula shortly after its illegal annexation – as in the case of Sergei Tikhanovsky.
Today, the Belarusian opposition, led by Tsikhanouskaya, is focused primarily on the many Belarusians living in exile and on diplomatic cooperation with Western partners. This includes administrative issues such as providing identity documents to citizens whose passports are expiring. The regime has stopped providing consular services, and many participants in the 2020 protests are unable to return to the country.
Ukraine also remains an important area of engagement, as many Belarusians live there – and fight there – among others in the International Legion and the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment. They often encounter administrative problems stemming from the fact that they are formally citizens of an aggressor state.
Since 2022, Ukraine has largely ignored Belarusian democratic forces and has not fully trusted them – a stance that is difficult to dismiss as unfounded, given earlier positions on occupied Crimea, even if the enemy was shared. This approach was also influenced by the maintenance of open diplomatic channels with the regime during the initial phase of the invasion.
The mental dimension is also significant: Ukraine’s Euromaidan, which began in 2013, succeeded, while Belarusian protests after the falsified 2020 election did not. The rapprochement between Zelensky and Tsikhanouskaya nonetheless signals that Lukashenko is becoming increasingly irrelevant to Ukraine. A Minsk that is a satellite to Moscow has less and less to offer with each passing day.