Many observers have welcomed the recent negotiations in Abu Dhabi as a rare note of progress in efforts to end Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. The talks produced the first prisoner exchange in five months, prompted cautiously optimistic statements from officials on all sides, and led US President Donald Trump to claim that a peace agreement is closer than ever.
But from the perspective of an international negotiator, the Abu Dhabi talks also exposed serious structural problems in how the US is conducting its role as a mediator. These problems are not merely cosmetic or temporary. Left unaddressed, they risk embedding the kind of weaknesses that Russia has repeatedly exploited in past negotiations. Correcting them will require a conscious recalibration by the White House and sustained vigilance from President Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration.
This is not a wholesale critique of the US’s broader commitment to supporting a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. The Trump administration has clearly dedicated significant resources and attention to advancing negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. The US government continues to provide aid and other forms of support to Ukraine amid Russia’s ongoing military campaign, and its stated willingness to accept long-term defense commitments in support of Ukraine is, in principle, commendable.
Nevertheless, the recent round of negotiations in Abu Dhabi highlighted persistent flaws with how the US is currently conducting its mediation efforts. These can be broken down into four broad issues.
Too much in the portfolio
The first is the overburdening of the US negotiating team. Steve Witkoff initially entered the administration as a special envoy focused on peace efforts related to the Israel-Hamas war. US President Donald Trump then expanded his portfolio to include the Russia-Ukraine peace process. Witkoff’s portfolio was subsequently expanded again to include US interests in Greenland and nuclear negotiations with Iran.
This overextension was evident during the Abu Dhabi talks. Originally scheduled for Feb. 1, the negotiations were delayed until Feb. 4, with no official explanation. President Zelensky later indicated that the delay was for reasons “unrelated to Ukraine,” and a glance at Witkoff’s schedule offers the likeliest explanation. He was in Gaza earlier that week, then penciled in just two days in Abu Dhabi for Ukraine peace talks before immediately moving on to negotiations with Iran’s foreign minister.
A credible mediator must focus on one conflict at a time, not only to ensure that the process receives adequate attention, but also to ensure that the mediator does not become a bottleneck or an obstacle to progress.
Competing issues
The second major problem is the introduction of competing issues into the negotiations with Russia. On the sidelines of the Abu Dhabi talks, Witkoff was also reportedly discussing New START arms control parameters with the Russian delegation. Even if Washington insists that these issues are not formally linked to the Ukraine peace process, holding them in the same environment, with the same officials, makes linkage inevitable and undermines the ability to secure a just and lasting peace for Ukraine.
When the US engages Russia on matters related to the war against Ukraine, its focus must remain singular: achieving a durable and implementable peace agreement. Diluting that focus weakens the negotiating process and complicates outcomes.
Creating space for bad faith behavior
While it was commendable for Trump to appeal to Russian President Putin to adhere to an energy ceasefire to create more favorable conditions for this most recent round of negotiations in Abu Dhabi, there were two issues that became evident. The first was touting an energy ceasefire agreement without any specificity. Trump said that the ceasefire would last a week, while Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov suggested that the White House had only requested until Feb. 1.
Zelensky was clear that Ukraine would honor the energy ceasefire for as long as the Russians. The Russians held back for only a few days before resuming their targeting of energy infrastructure. This sort of non-specific agreement is exactly what the Kremlin will seek in a broader peace agreement as it creates space for bad faith behavior.
The second issue was the US government’s unwillingness to impose sanctions. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent mentioned that there was an additional sanctions package targeting Russia’s “shadow fleet” that could be imposed depending on progress in the peace talks, but it should have been used immediately after Russia abandoned the energy ceasefire.
If one cannot address bad faith behavior in the negotiation phase, it will be impossible to address in the implementation phase.
Conflicts of interest
Finally, the most troubling of the issues highlighted in this latest round of negotiations is the introduction of competing interests. It was already unusual when US officials conducted bilateral discussions with Russian counterparts on economic matters shortly before the second round of talks on security guarantees. What was merely odd at first became deeply concerning when reports suggested that Russian financier and investor Kirill Dmitriev used that preceding bilateral meeting to present proposals for a major economic package that would deliver significant financial benefits to the US. If true, that would be a substantial conflict of interest in the peace process.
When a government acting as a mediator introduces separate interests – particularly economic ones – into peace negotiations, it ceases to function as a facilitator and instead becomes an independent negotiating party. If nothing else, this creates a new set of parameters for reaching an agreement, but worse, it can turn a mediator into a lever for the other side.
What we are now seeing is that the Kremlin has added a new element to its negotiating strategy. The three core pillars of its negotiating strategy thus far have been: (1) cling to maximalist demands; (2) increase the costs on Ukrainians to wear down their resolve; and (3) wait for Ukraine’s partners to lose interest and turn off support. Now, the fourth is to entice the White House with economic deals so the US government pressures Kyiv to concede more.
At this point, it is imperative that the issues be highlighted to the White House. This means from US government officials working on the peace process and, importantly, from Republican members of the US congress who support Ukraine and have Trump’s ear. At the same time, the Zelensky administration must try to stay ahead of the Kremlin’s efforts to leverage Witkoff and his negotiating team in bilateral negotiations. Ukrainian lead negotiator Rustem Umerov must also proactively engage Witkoff in demanding issue separation, enforceable commitments, and full transparency around any parallel US-Russia negotiations that could affect Ukraine’s position.
Peace processes fail not only when one party negotiates in bad faith, but when mediators allow competing priorities, issues, and interests to distort the terms of engagement. The Abu Dhabi talks suggest that this risk is no longer theoretical. An overextended negotiating team, blurred issue boundaries, vague commitments, and the introduction of parallel economic interests all weaken the foundations of any future settlement.
If these patterns persist, the result will not be peace but a fragile, unenforceable agreement that shifts pressure onto Ukraine rather than constraining Russia. Avoiding that outcome will require the US to reassert discipline in its mediation role and Ukraine to insist on clarity, separation of issues, and transparency in all parallel negotiations. Left uncorrected, these problems can erode both the sacrifices already made and the foundation of any durable peace.
The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.