The year since JD Vance’s Munich Security Conference reading of the riot act to Europe has seen relations between the US and Europe lurch from one crisis to another.
First came Volodymyr Zelensky’s ambush in the Oval Office when it became clear to Europe that Trump’s agenda on Ukraine appeared closer to that of Vladimir Putin than their own. Ever since, Trump’s negotiating team has seemed intent on using the stick against Ukraine and the carrot on Russia to secure a deal, any deal, to secure the end to the war in Ukraine, never mind the consequences for Ukraine and Europe.
Then in April, we saw Europe shocked by Liberation Day tariffs where Trump seemed intent on penalizing allies in Europe, much more so than rivals and enemies such as Russia.
Europe eventually backed down with the Turnberry Agreement, seemingly conceding a highly advantageous and asymmetric tariff deal for the US, not Europe, but on the assumption that this was the price of ensuring the continuation of the US security backstop for Europe. The Turnberry Agreement then appeared to be nothing more than money for old rope as Trump seemed intent on running a horse and cart (or sleigh and dogs) through existing agreements with Denmark over Greenland, and also all hopes that the Transatlantic alliance could survive the Trump presidency.
In the interim, the Trump administration and MAGA crew have lambasted and threatened Europe over its democratic credentials and media freedoms, et al., while being quite open to intervening in domestic politics in Europe, backing far-right parties (AfD, Reform, et al) against incumbents.
Now Trump whisperer Rutte might have secured something of a reprieve on Greenland – albeit it is unclear if a more sustainable deal has been reached between the US and Denmark, or is even possible – and Europe was relieved at the more diplomatic language used by US Secretary of State, Rubio at this year’s MSC, but surely the writing is on the wall for the US-EU/European relationship.
The Trump administration wants to kill the EU, which is the clarion for the past rules-based order, in favor of Trump’s preference for a transactional, almost no-holes-barred, kind of negotiating style where might is right, and great powers have spheres of influence, and smaller states have to concede ground, even territory.
Trump’s interest seems to be for the European center to be weakened, and Europe to go back to nation-states, which presumably can be picked off one by one by the US, in its own interests.
Trump and MAGA also appear to be pushing a socially illiberal agenda on Europe, which is in stark contrast to the more Woke, liberal, and inclusive agenda of the EU, and actually Trump’s own personal life and standards.
Supporters of this illiberal agenda cross against traditional divisions in Europe – allying the US with the likes of Reform, the FN, ADF, and Viktor Orban in Hungary, Babis in the Czech Republic, Fico in Slovakia, Vucic in Serbia, Dodik in RS, Ivanishvili in Georgia, Erdogan in Türkiye, and even Putin in Russia, and Lukashenko in Belarus. For the likes of Orban, Putin, Vucic, and Lukashenko, they operate managed democracies where leaders, once elected, don’t give up power; they game the political system to their own advantage.
The media, big business, are typically controlled, opposition leaders proscribed, or even jailed, and electoral rules changed to the incumbent’s advantage and to ensure their continued stay in office. Likely, this is what Trump aspires to – autocrats rarely want to leave office, as they typically fear jail for their sins of office. Trump wants the ultimate get out of jail for free card, which is membership in the elite club of autocrats and his tech bros.
What we are seeing is not a crisis of the transatlantic relationship, with European security at risk, but the very model of post-war European development, based on a liberal market democracy, rules-based order, under threat and challenge by Trump. Trump prefers illiberalism, kleptocracy/autocracy, and autarky in markets.
The next test, or stress point, in the Trump administration’s battle with liberal Europe is likely to come in looming elections in Hungary due on April 12, where the illiberal Trump-supporting sixteen-year incumbent, Orban, is facing off against a liberal pro-European rival, Peter Magyar.
Opinion polls give Magyar, and his Tisza party, a sustained ten-point lead over Orban.
A number of factors appear to be working in Magyar’s favor:
First, there is a palpable desire for change after 16 long years of rule by Orban, and five terms and 20 years total in power since the fall of Communism in 1989. In office, Orban has centralized power, dominating the media, big business, closing off rival sources of power, even to NGOs and independent universities.
Second, corruption is rampant in Hungary, and as reflected in the country ranking at the bottom of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index rankings of the EU, to a lowly ranking of 84 worldwide. The widespread perception is of Orban and his cronies profiting while the rest of the country suffers. The opposition, meanwhile, has run a savvy social media campaign to identify high-level perceived graft.
Third, the economy is struggling as the entire Hungarian business model, post the fall of communism, is now questioned.
That model was based on FDI into the auto sector, integration with the German economy, and partly fueled by cheap Russian energy, and huge structural fund flows from the EU.
The Russian gas and oil taps are now being gradually turned off due to EU sanctions on Russia because it is invading Ukraine.
The European auto industry is being waylaid by tighter regulations linked to policies aimed at alleviating climate change, and therein, cheap EV imports from China.
Meanwhile, Orban’s tortured relations with the EU have seen the bulk of the €23 billion in EU structural fund flows earmarked for Hungary in the latest EU budget cycle stalled.
The business environment, meanwhile, in Hungary is considered poor as Orban has micro-managed margins in many sectors of the economy to keep prices low and voters on side.
For the first time, Orban is going into an election with the economy weak and the economic outlook appearing dire. Orban might have been relatively successful in attracting FDI into the economy from friends in China and elsewhere, but typically, these are into low-value-added industries, creating few well-paid jobs.
Fourth, the anti-woke agenda might appeal to older voters, but opinion polls suggest that the young are fleeing to Magyar, perhaps irritated by a socially repressive and intrusive agenda as reflected in the unpopular ban on the recent Gay Pride events in Budapest and elsewhere.
Fifth, while the Orban team has tried to push a family values agenda, his own Fidesz party has been embroiled in sex scandals, including sex trafficking, and appears to be applying double standards when contrasted with Orban’s family values pitch.
Sixth, for the first time in years, the opposition appears much more united, around the anti-Orban agenda, and having in Magyar a young and vibrant opponent. Magyar is a good public speaker and has toured the country, reaching out to the key non-metropolitan vote.
And yet, despite his poll lead, Magyar still faces a real challenge to win this election.
First, Orban used his two thirds constitutional majority to change electoral rules to a UK based first past the post system. Constituencies in rural areas, which are Orban’s strongholds, are now disproportionately represented in Parliament. So much so that election pundits suggest that Magyar will have to win the popular vote by 5% or more to secure a majority. And through his constitutional majority, Orban can still change electoral rules before the vote, to his advantage.
Second, Orban is a strong campaigner and a good public speaker. He will likely play the nationalist card and on people’s fears and prejudices to get over the line – this means castigating minorities, the EU, and Ukraine – the latter for taking EU resources from Hungary, and on fears over the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine. There will be no holes barred for Orban.
Third, the power of patronage of the state in Hungary is significant, with Orban controlling state media, and fiscal policy will likely be deployed in considerable measure to try to buy votes.
Fourth, Orban will rely on the intervention of foreign powers in the election to his advantage. We saw that this week with the visit of Rubio to Budapest, and there is talk of a Trump visit. Putin will likely launch a far-reaching social media campaign to ensure his ally, Orban’s victory.
Fifth, dirty tricks will be deployed in full – and we saw some of this this week with the report of a sex video set to be released on Magyar.
Yet despite all this, Magyar and his Tisza party still seem to be maintaining a strong lead in the polls – perhaps all the dirty tricks by Orban are backfiring, and the country just wants a change at this stage. The pollsters, though, are noncommittal with most suggesting still that the election is too close to call.
I worry here, though, in a close election that neither side will accept defeat. Imagine a rerun of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004-05, when the opposition knows it won the election, but by foul play on election day, the vote is stolen.
Would Hungarians take to the streets as Ukrainians did in 2004-05, and how would Orban, the EU, the US, and Russia react in this scenario? Presumably, Trump and Putin would spur Orban to take whatever action is required to secure his election, including clearing the streets with the use of force. How would the EU react then, knowing that taking action against Orban would run against the wishes of Trump, and likely risk whatever is still left of the strategic partnership with the US?
Recently there – in Georgia and Serbia – we have seen the EU back off from more forthright support for pro-democracy street protests than had been the case with the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. And a report this week in the FT suggested that the EU had decided to back off from adopting a more controversial approach to Orban in the run-up to elections in Hungary. Therein, the fear might be of antagonizing Trump and gifting Orban some kind of PR win, as he has used the angle of an overly interventionist EU as a campaign slogan/pitch in the campaign. But is the EU stepping back, and Trump stepping in in support of Orban, a green light for the election?
For the future of Europe, I think this election could well be a turning point.
After recent victories in Romania and Moldova for pro-European candidates, it could mark a real turning point against the far right, MAGA-like wave in Europe.
More specifically, Orban’s exit would improve unity within the EU around Ukraine and Russia policy. It would leave more Putin-friendly leaders, like Fico in Hungary, isolated.
But if Orban wins, I think Trump would be energized in its future support for the likes of RN, the AfD, and Reform, sowing yet more disunity and division in Europe, and weakening the push back against Putin and then support for Ukraine.
But imagine also if the vote is so obviously stolen by Orban in Hungary, and the streets are cleared of demonstrators, and the EU is paralyzed to act, what would this say about the EU, and its future ability to champion the democratic cause? And if Orban gets away with the steal, would that not also be a green light to Trump to do something very similar in the US midterms?
So this election could well have resonance beyond Europe. But the risk here is that US - European relations are just further strained because of possible outcomes in elections in Hungary.
Reprinted from the author’s @tashecon blog! See the original article here.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.