In Iran, specifically during the peak of civil unrest in January 2026, authorities managed to significantly disrupt the operation of individual satellite terminals, most notably Starlink. This was achieved through Electronic Warfare (EW) tactics – a so-called “electronic shield” that complicates the connection between terminals and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites. This has become a wake-up call for Ukraine and the rest of the world.
Has a technology once synonymous with freedom finally come under threat?
From Kyiv to Caracas: The satellite as a political actor
To understand the scale of the threat, one must look back in history. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine from February 2022 became the first conflict in which Satellite Communications (SatCom) ceased to be a mere logistical support element and instead became the “central nervous system” of the battlefield. The reduction of the artillery kill chain from tens of minutes to mere seconds, the operation of maritime drones, and real-time situational awareness, were all made possible by LEO networks.
As information superiority dictates the tempo of combat operations, the Ukrainian experience has proven that the struggle for signal stability is now as critical as the fight for territory.
Consequently, we are now discussing infrastructure that fundamentally shifts the balance of power – infrastructure that authoritarian regimes are desperate to neutralize, just as they would any other element of an information advantage.
Starlink as a symbol of resistance
In the civilian sphere, satellite internet has become no less significant – serving as a vital tool for information access in regions where the state weaponizes connectivity as a means of control.
When the regime of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro launched Operation Tun Tun (Operation Knock-Knock) in July 2024, utilizing digital apps for mass denunciations and the arrest of dissidents, satellite internet became the only breach in the digital Iron Curtain. In response to the regime’s attempts to isolate the country, Starlink technology emerged as a tool to shatter the information blockade.
It was a classic example of asymmetric advantage: a decentralized network pitted against a hierarchical machine of repression. The Venezuelan case solidified the status of satellite internet as a geopolitical instrument, capable of influencing the domestic policies of sovereign states by bypassing their governments entirely.
The Iranian lesson: How to “shut down” the sky
However, beliefs in Starlink’s technological invulnerability quickly faded. The events in Iran during January 2026 disrupted this optimism, as Tehran demonstrated amid mass unrest, that Russian EW systems could drastically reduce satellite traffic, achieving up to 80% degradation even in dense urban areas.
How was this possible? The Iranian blockade succeeded due to two key factors: geography and technological borrowing. Unlike the sprawling front lines in Ukraine, protests in Iran happened in high-density urban areas. This helped government forces place powerful EW complexes on high-rise buildings and television towers. As a result, they created a dense “jamming dome.” In cities, the line of sight to a satellite is already blocked by “concrete canyons.” Intense jamming of the Ku-band, along with signal reflection off walls, produced a “radio frequency storm” effect.
Experts indicate a high probability that Iran utilized Russian EW systems, such as the Tirada-2 and Zhitel, or their local adaptations. This is a troubling signal: suppression technologies honed during the war in Ukraine are now being exported as turnkey solutions for crushing dissent.
The “friendly fire” paradox: Why connectivity in Ukraine still holds
A logical and somewhat chilling question arises: if Iran managed to effectively jam Starlink using (presumably) Russian technology, why hasn’t Russia itself done the same in Ukraine over four years of full-scale war? Are we threatened by a repetition of the “Iranian scenario?”
The answer lies in a unique paradox of this war, which can be termed the “friendly fire factor.” Unlike the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which relied on its own separate and secure communication channels and could afford to “scorch” the civilian airwaves, the Russian army has fallen into a technological dependency on Starlink itself.
The massive use of “grey market” Starlink terminals by Russian forces in occupied territories has created a stalemate for their own EW units. Modern electronic warfare assets often operate indiscriminately. If a Russian Tobol or Tirada EW system is cranked up to full power to take down Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) communications in a specific sector of the front, it will, with equal efficiency, “blind” Russia’s own assault groups, their own artillery, and their own drones, which are increasingly being equipped with Starlink modules.
It is this mutual reliance on a shared infrastructure that, paradoxically, protects the Ukrainian airwaves from a total blackout. We are witnessing a situation where the enemy is technically capable of delivering a blow, but strategically hesitates, fearing the destruction of its own Command and Control (C2) system.
At the same time, the decision by Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense to implement a “whitelist” of terminals has the full potential to shift the balance of power in this domain.
The technological arms race: From passive defense to “smart” antennas
However, banking on the enemy being perpetually hamstrung by its own problems is not a strategy. The war in Ukraine has ignited a global arms race within the invisible spectrum. While the world analyses the political fallout, Ukrainian engineers have already spent years developing technical countermeasures. We are witnessing a rapid evolution of hardware – equipment modification is in full swing, transforming civilian technologies into hardened military tools.
The lessons from the January peak of repression in Tehran and four years of Ukrainian resistance are universal. The electromagnetic spectrum is no longer a neutral environment – it is a battlefield.
The world is entering an era where access to low orbit defines the difference between truth and propaganda, between command of the troops and chaos, and ultimately, between life and death. The race for control of the airwaves is just beginning, and for now, Ukraine holds the pole position. Our mission is to ensure we do not surrender this lead.
Anton Sadykov is CEO of Adaptis – a tech company specializing in resilient communication solutions. Adaptis adapts and modifies Starlink terminals for tactical use on mobile platforms in demanding field environments.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily of Kyiv Post.