While expectations were already low for the Geneva round of trilateral negotiations between Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, they ended unceremoniously with Russian lead negotiator Vladimir Medinsky walking out less than two hours into the second day of talks. Although no party has yet clarified what prompted the abrupt end of discussions, the most likely reason was Russian recalcitrance towards Ukraine’s unwillingness to agree to territorial concessions in the Donbas region. This has been chief among all of Russia’s maximalist demands thus far.
The Russian behavior demonstrated in Geneva reflected the Kremlin’s fundamental negotiating strategy that it has been employing since the resumption of ceasefire talks last year. In short, the approach is as follows: cling to maximalist demands; increase costs on Ukrainians to erode resolve; wait for Ukraine’s partners to lose interest and turn off support; and entice the White House with economic deals so it pressures Kyiv to concede more.
But with a clear understanding of this strategy, Ukraine and its partners are able to counter it if they take clear and conscious steps. These steps are different for each player.
For the United States
The White House chose to insert itself into the negotiating process as a mediator, and thus it shares in the responsibility for securing a just and lasting peace. It has leverage to be able to compel such an outcome, but it simply has not elected to use it thus far.
If the US wishes to disrupt the Kremlin’s maximalist negotiating strategy, it begins with surging military aid to Ukraine and implementing new sanctions on Russia. Up to this point, the White House has opted to draw down direct US aid in favor of indirect options such as the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative, which uses European money to purchase US materiel for delivery to Ukraine. The White House can simply tell the Kremlin that Russia’s unwillingness to find compromise means that the US will resume direct military contributions, including weapon systems like Tomahawk missiles.
The US government should actively be petitioning for an armistice rather than a political level peace agreement.
At the same time, the White House must endorse the sanctions measures that are ready to deploy. Republican lawmakers have presented a bill which would impose additional economic sanctions on Russia that has been held up pending President Donald Trump’s endorsement. The Geneva round of talks should be a clear indicator that now is the time for implementation of such a bill.
Meanwhile, the Kremlin has sought to incentivize US support for its positions through the “economic track” discussions between White House Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Kremlin Special Envoy Kirill Dmitriev. In negotiator parlance, the US delegation must shift these economic talks from “creating value” to “claiming value” – that is, instead of talking about how much money there is to be gained, it is time for these talks to focus singularly on how much money the Kremlin and its supporting oligarchs stand to lose.
Finally, the US government should actively be petitioning for an armistice rather than a political level peace agreement. If the Kremlin is unwilling to budge on its political demands such as recognition of occupied areas of Ukraine as sovereign Russian territory, then the US must state unequivocally that an armistice agreement that achieves a cessation of military hostilities is the only path. While the Kremlin is likely to reject this option, it disrupts their maximalist negotiating strategy and reframes talks on different outcomes.
For other partners
For Ukraine’s European and global partners, the goal is to counter the Kremlin’s strategies related to its imposition of costs on the Ukrainian people and its efforts to wait out international support. This means two things.
First, these countries increase their immediate relief support. Poland demonstrated how this is done with the “Warmth from Poland” campaign following Russia’s massive attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. Each of Ukraine’s partners must meet a Russian onslaught with a corresponding aid delivery. Further, they must be more conspicuous in doing so to ensure that they cannot be ignored inside the Kremlin. While there are initiatives such as the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism in place, the type and amount of support to Ukraine must be clearly articulated in defiance of Russia’s efforts to impose costs on Ukraine.
Second, Ukraine’s partners must conclude and begin implementation on long-term aid and reconstruction agreements with Ukraine. After the war is over is not the time to begin work; rather, the Kremlin must be made to understand that dragging the war on longer will not suddenly result in the loss of issue attention and support for Ukraine.
Ukrainian negotiators must not deliver concessions on their indispensable interests.
For Ukraine
Ukrainian negotiators like Rustem Umerov and David Arakhamia well understand the Kremlin’s approach. After all, they have been a part of the ceasefire negotiations since the first series of talks began in early 2022. This is why in many ways, Ukraine is already doing its part to disrupt the Kremlin’s negotiating strategy.
Ukraine’s necessary effort begins with holding the line, both figuratively and literally. Ukrainian negotiators must not deliver concessions on their indispensable interests (e.g., Ukrainian territory and control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant). As they do so in the negotiations, it will also necessitate holding the line against additional Russian attacks on civilian centers and in battles between military forces.
As they do this, Ukraine must continue focusing on targeted gains both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table. They have done well so far towards these ends in recent weeks, regaining territory at a faster rate than they have enjoyed in months while also making progress in the negotiations on ceasefire monitoring mechanisms. These gains should continue to be focused, understanding that there may not be as much progress in other areas as they pursue these individual objectives; however, it is the targeted gains that will register more with the Kremlin than incremental gains spread across wider areas.
Finally, Ukraine must increase its engagement with Republican members of the US Congress. In making direct appeals to the White House, Ukraine will be competing with ongoing problems related to the release of the Epstein files, crackdowns on domestic immigration, Venezuela, Iran, Gaza, tariff negotiations, and a wide range of other issues. Instead, prioritizing engagement with influential Republican members of Congress will allow Ukraine to enlist the aid of allies within Washington, DC to help disrupt the Kremlin’s maximalist negotiating strategy.
Ultimately, countering the Kremlin’s negotiating strategy requires sustained coordination, clarity of purpose, and unwavering resolve across all levels of engagement.
For the US, this means leveraging both military and economic tools to signal that concessions will not be won cheaply. For Ukraine’s partners, it demands visible, immediate support alongside long-term commitments that demonstrate that Ukraine will not become isolated if Russia drags the war out longer. And for Ukraine itself, it requires steadfast defense of its core interests, targeted gains on the battlefield and the negotiating table, and leveraging key allies in Washington, DC.
If each actor understands its role and acts in concert with the others, the Kremlin’s playbook can be disrupted. When this happens, a just and lasting peace for Ukraine may be within reach.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.