Roderich Kiesewetter, one of the German parliament’s most outspoken supporters of robust military aid to Ukraine, says Europe has run out of room for hesitation – and must be prepared to carry Ukraine’s defense even if Washington tries to broker what he calls a “sham peace,” driven by resources and deals.
In an interview at the Munich Security Conference, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) lawmaker argued that diplomacy will only work again if Europe backs it with strength – including long-range capabilities for Ukraine, tougher sanctions, and a firmer stance against Moscow’s “shadow fleet.” Otherwise, he warned, Russia will exploit Europe’s caution and the United States’ shifting priorities to impose a settlement that trades sovereignty for expediency.
“The decisive point is: spectator or actor,” Kiesewetter said. “The transatlantic relationship was always shaped by trust, by reliability. This is no longer there.”
A leading pro-Taurus voice among Germany’s conservatives
Kiesewetter serves as the CDU/CSU parliamentary group’s representative on the Bundestag’s Foreign Affairs Committee. Within Germany’s conservatives, he is widely associated with the security-policy wing that has pushed to move faster and further on military support for Kyiv.
The core principle, he said, is that Ukraine should not be pressured into formal territorial concessions – because concessions, in his view, would mean abandoning people to Russian rule.
“We must not force Ukraine to cede territories,” he said. “Because with the ceding of territory, the ceding of people is connected. Human destinies would be handed over into Russian repression.”
Kiesewetter acknowledged that Germany’s conservative camp is not fully unified on how far to go, describing internal frictions and urging Chancellor Friedrich Merz to provide clearer direction.
“I hope that my party gives up its indeterminacy in certain questions,” he said, listing steps he wants Berlin to take – beginning Taurus training and deliveries, tightening action against the shadow fleet, and limiting the operating space of Russian state structures in Germany.
On air defense, he went further, arguing that European systems deployed over western Ukraine could allow Kyiv to shift scarce Ukrainian assets eastward – toward frontline positions and major cities under sustained attack.
Pressed on whether such steps depend on government backing, Kiesewetter acknowledged the limits of his role as a lawmaker.
“I cannot change that as a member of parliament,” he said. “That has to be decided by the government.” He added that Chancellor Merz had signaled he wanted to act differently, but “he will have to be measured by his actions.”
Merz and the end of old assumptions
Merz used his Munich speech to argue that the postwar international order – rooted in rights and rules – is being dismantled, and that great-power politics has returned in a form that is “fast, hard and often unpredictable.” He urged Europeans to accept the “new reality” without surrendering to it, insisting Europe can still shape outcomes if it acts decisively, together and with confidence.
Picking up on that assessment, Kiesewetter said Merz was right to acknowledge the strategic rupture – but argued that Europe must draw sharper conclusions from it, starting with the recognition that Washington’s view of Europe has fundamentally changed.
He described a US strategic hierarchy that places the American homeland first, the Indo-Pacific second, and Europe far down the list.
“Only at priority four comes Europe,” he said. “That means America is no longer concentrating its scarce resources on Europe.”
Kiesewetter said Rubio’s Munich appearance projected a friendlier tone than Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech a year earlier – but he said Rubio’s omissions carried their own message.
“It’s only about nation-states,” Kiesewetter said. “It’s not about organizations like the European Union – he didn’t even mention Ukraine. And that is a warning sign for us Europeans.”
Strength, economics, and tech sovereignty
Kiesewetter broadened his argument beyond battlefield aid: Europe must also protect its economic and technological sovereignty, especially as US policy shifts toward deregulation and political pressure.
He linked security to investment and regulation, warning that American tech interests do not want a strong regulatory Europe and prefer fragmented national states.
“We will preserve peace, freedom, self-determination only if we have a strong economy,” he said, calling for reduced bureaucracy and more attractive investment conditions in Europe.
He also criticized foreign involvement in European domestic politics, saying Europe should push back against efforts by US-aligned actors to support parties that undermine Ukraine and European unity.
“Stay away from our turf”
Kiesewetter argued that the war is increasingly viewed in Washington through a transactional lens.
“The war Russia is waging against Ukraine interests the Americans only regarding the minerals in Ukraine and the business with Russia,” he said, warning that if Europe fails to act independently it will become a “plaything” of influence-zone politics.
Asked how Europe should deal with the Trump administration while still depending on US capabilities, Kiesewetter called for a firmer European line: negotiations over Ukraine must not be handed to private dealmakers – and Europe must insist that Ukraine’s fate is not a commercial transaction.
“We don’t want Ukraine to be handled by businessmen who have no idea of classical diplomacy,” he said, naming Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff as examples. “Germany must tell the US: ‘That’s our turf – stay away from us.’”
He warned that a settlement arranged to satisfy Washington’s need for a “deal” would not end Russia’s appetite – and could set the stage for new confrontations.
“If the Americans already say conventional defense is Europe’s task, then they must not make this conventional defense harder by negotiating a sham peace with Russia,” he said, arguing that Moscow would later turn pressure on Moldova, the Baltic states or other EU and NATO members “to show we are not united.”
Munich 1938, updated for the digital age
Kiesewetter’s most pointed historical analogy landed in the city’s own shadow.
“In Munich, 87 years ago, Europe’s fate was sealed,” he said, referring to the 1938 agreement that forced Czechoslovakia to cede territory. He noted that the areas handed over at the time included the country’s key defensive positions – and suggested the lesson applies to Ukraine’s fortified lines in the Donbas.
“That is the same if the Donbas is given up,” he said. “There Ukraine has its fortifications.”
“History doesn’t repeat itself,” he added. “But the US and Russia are trying to copy Munich 1938 like a digital twin into the high-tech age – and thereby ruin Europe.”
For Kiesewetter, the implication is that diplomacy without leverage invites coercion – and that Europe’s repeated habit of publicly outlining its red lines and self-imposed limits has signaled hesitation rather than resolve.
“Putin understands diplomacy and strength,” he said. “But our soft diplomatic approach without hardness he uses as our weakness.”
The risk of collapse: Power outages and ungovernability
Kiesewetter warned that Europe’s slow pace carries a risk beyond territorial loss: a breakdown of governance.
“The situation is even worse,” he said. “The power outages in Ukraine can lead to government action no longer taking place and then this country becomes ungovernable.”
He argued that Russia, unable to advance decisively on the battlefield, is trying to make Ukraine dysfunctional – pushing civilians to leave and putting European societies under strain through additional displacement.
“That is exactly Putin’s strategy,” he said, adding that Europe has relied too heavily on expensive air-defense interceptions while denying Ukraine the long-range means to strike Russian production and logistics.
His argument echoed a theme he has voiced publicly: Russia escalates attacks to induce European de-escalation – and uses Western caution as time.
When unanimity becomes a liability
Kiesewetter argued that Europe’s institutional habits are mismatched to the current strategic environment – particularly when unanimity can be blocked by a small number of states.
“Unanimity in the EU – you can forget it,” he said.
On the shadow fleet, he outlined a practical route that avoids paralysis: build action around legal standards that can be enforced by a coalition of willing states, including environmental and insurance requirements. He pointed to Poland’s role and urged Germany to support it.
Germany, he said, had long been reluctant out of fear of escalation – but escalation has arrived regardless.
His remarks echoed criticism voiced by President Volodymyr Zelensky a few weeks earlier, when the Ukrainian leader made clear his frustration with Europe’s endless internal arguments and hesitation over long-range weapons.
“Too often in Europe, something else is always more urgent than justice,” Zelensky said at the time, warning that while Europeans debate what not to say – including whether to mention Tomahawks or Taurus – Russian missiles continue to strike.
Kiesewetter agreed with that assessment.
“Zelensky was absolutely right to hold up a mirror to us in Davos,” he said. “But nobody likes plain language. In Ukraine, however, it is about existence.”
He added that it ultimately comes down to mindset and political will, arguing that Europe must move from declaratory unity to operational action if it wants Russia to change its calculus.
No land for peace: A message from Munich’s streets
Kiesewetter’s stance was not confined to closed conference rooms. On the sidelines of the Munich forum, he also spoke at a pro-Ukraine demonstration, where he argued Germany has a historic responsibility to support Ukraine and warned against allowing land grabs to become normalized in Europe.
“We must not allow Russia to commit genocide in Ukraine, carry out land theft and bomb Ukraine into cold and destruction,” he said at the rally. He reiterated his call for Germany to deliver Taurus, saying it would help disable Russian drone and missile factories and logistics.
A grim alternative: “A modern North Korea”
Pressed on what happens if Ukraine cannot sustain the war until a ceasefire framework materializes, Kiesewetter laid out what he called a worst-case trajectory: a Ukraine that survives, but in a destabilized form – hardened, impoverished, and pushed toward underground resistance.
“Ukraine will never give up,” he said. “There will always be a Ukraine.”
But he said the question is whether it remains integrated into European security or becomes vulnerable to destabilizing forces.
“Ukraine could risk becoming a modern North Korea – isolated, heavily militarized and potentially driven toward extreme forms of deterrence, even going underground,” he said. In that scenario, he warned, the country could become an arena for mafias and organized crime – a security problem for Europe rather than a security partner.
“Never again” must also mean “Never again defenseless”
Kiesewetter closed with a blunt reframing of Germany’s postwar identity.
“Germany’s lesson after 1945 was ‘never again’ – war, never again National Socialism,” he said. “But the lesson of our neighbors – France, Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine – was ‘never again defenseless.’”
“If we Germans never want war again, we must understand that we must never again be defenseless,” he said – “neither toward the Americans nor toward Russia and China.”
For Kiesewetter, Munich’s central question is no longer whether Europe supports Ukraine in words. It is whether Europe is prepared to act as a strategic power – fast enough, unified enough and forceful enough – to deny Moscow a victory, and to keep Ukraine from being reduced to a bargaining chip in a deal-driven era.
Kiesewetter stressed that Europe can no longer wait for Washington to set the terms of debate. It must decide whether it will remain a spectator – or finally become an actor.