Europe’s uneven rearmament drive risks weakening its own security as national defense strategies diverge and coordination falters across the continent.
As Washington signals a reduced appetite for transatlantic preeminence and Russia expands military production beyond the needs of its war in Ukraine, European governments are increasing defense spending. Yet instead of converging around unified procurement and strategic planning, EU member states are pursuing largely national approaches.
In a commentary published by Euractiv, this fragmentation creates a widening gap between political rhetoric about unity and the operational reality within Europe.
Spending rises, coordination lags
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly urged Europe to strengthen its defense posture. Speaking in Davos, he said: “Europe needs to know how to defend itself.” He also criticized EU governments for failing to prioritize defense spending before pressure mounted from US President Donald Trump, saying they “were not even trying” to spend 5% of GDP on security.
The problem, however, is not merely the scale of spending. It is the lack of coherence.
While the Trump administration has urged European allies to “take the lead” on regional security threats, rearmament has become a test of collective defense credibility. Yet planning remains uneven, and procurement strategies differ sharply among member states.
France, Germany and Italy – home to Europe’s largest defense manufacturers – have resisted deeper procurement coordination, preferring bilateral arrangements that preserve national industrial control. Such approaches, the article contends, undermine efforts to implement the European Defence Roadmap and dilute strategic coherence.
Flagship projects stall
The European Drone Wall, presented as a flagship EU initiative to counter Russian hybrid threats, illustrates these divisions. Disputes over technology and governance have stalled the project, leaving it effectively frozen despite its political prominence.
This mismatch between political messaging and military coordination risks generating ambiguity at a time of heightened geopolitical tension.
European leaders have already sent contrasting signals. French President Emmanuel Macron recently cautioned that “we have to remain very cautious and avoid any escalation.” In contrast, Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže argued that a more “proactive response is needed.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin has publicly acknowledged Europe’s military buildup. At the Valdai conference last October, he said Moscow was “closely monitoring the growing militarisation of Europe” and asked: “Is it just rhetoric, or is it time for us to respond?”
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has insisted EU measures are strictly defensive. Yet inconsistent messaging may complicate those assurances in an environment of mutual suspicion.
Diverging procurement strategies
Public support for higher defense spending has increased across Europe, prompting ambitious national timelines. Germany has pledged to become “war capable” by 2029, while NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has warned that the alliance must be prepared for possible conflict within five years.
At the same time, procurement policies remain fragmented. Germany has proposed “Buy European” legislation, France emphasizes domestic production, Poland continues purchasing American fighter jets and tanks, and the Pentagon promotes US arms exports under its “America First” policy.
The result is a patchwork of national decisions that limits Europe’s ability to achieve strategic – let alone operational – coherence despite rising budgets.
Preparing for the wrong threat?
The analysis further suggests Europe may be prioritizing conventional military hardware while underestimating hybrid threats. Any Russian action against NATO territory would likely target critical infrastructure, cyber networks, disinformation ecosystems and economic vulnerabilities rather than large-scale armored offensives.
Despite this, defense investments remain heavily concentrated on traditional weaponry. The mismatch between threat perception and procurement priorities deepens what the piece describes as Europe’s rhetoric-reality gap.
Meanwhile, Baltic and Eastern flank states are reinforcing borders, constructing fortifications and preparing infrastructure for potential conflict. Analysts describe this as a “two-speed alliance,” with frontline states moving toward quasi-war footing while Western Europe debates procurement frameworks.
A December poll found that more than two-thirds of Europeans believe their country would be unable to defend itself militarily against Russia.
Calls for institutional reform
To address these weaknesses, the Euractiv article proposes binding joint procurement mechanisms enforced through budget conditionality, as well as the creation of a permanent EU Defense Industrial Coordination Body with decision-making authority.
It also calls for transparent burden-sharing formulas to replace ad hoc negotiations that have hampered projects such as the Drone Wall.
Without such structural reforms, Europe’s rearmament risks producing fragmentation rather than credible deterrence.