Four years after launching his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin remains firmly in control at home. As the war enters its fourth year, the Kremlin’s focus is not only on the battlefield but on regime durability.
In February 2026, Vladimir Putin signed a decree restructuring the Russian National Guard, Rosgvardiya. The reform transformed Rosgvardiya’s internal command into a force with its own dedicated parallel “General Staff,” assigning it autonomous responsibility for operational planning, intelligence coordination, and the assessment of military threats.
The new structure reports directly to the Security Council, which Putin chairs. Viktor Zolotov, a longtime associate who previously served as Putin’s personal security during his first two presidential terms and his tenure as prime minister from 2010 to 2013, was appointed to oversee the reorganized command while remaining the head of Rosgvardiya.
This restructuring constitutes a structural shift in the Putin regime’s internal security architecture. It reflects a recalibration of the distribution of coercive power within the Russian state as the Kremlin prepares for potential domestic instability. Originally established in 2016 for riot control, Rosgvardiya has evolved into a heavily armed parallel formation. What began as a consolidation of internal security forces has gradually transformed into the construction of a vertically loyal force designed to operate beyond traditional police functions. The February 2026 reform formalizes this evolution, embedding Rosgvardiya more firmly within the presidential command chain and reinforcing its role as a guarantor of regime continuity rather than merely public order.
Structurally, Rosgvardiya increasingly resembles Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), designed not only for internal stabilization but for regime protection.
Rosgvardiya’s evolution accelerated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Its units entered Ukraine alongside regular forces, reflecting Moscow’s expectation of rapid territorial control and the need for an occupation force capable of suppressing resistance.
The Kremlin intensified the militarization of Rosgvardiya following the Wagner mutiny in June 2023. In August 2023, Putin signed legislation formally allowing Rosgvardiya to receive heavy weaponry, including artillery systems and other advanced equipment. The decision reflected an institutional response to internal security vulnerabilities exposed during the mutiny and marked a further elevation of Rosgvardiya within the Putin regime’s coercive hierarchy.
Following legislative changes in 2023 and subsequent force expansion, Zolotov confirmed in September 2025 that the service had integrated tanks, anti-tank artillery, self-propelled systems, and multiple launch rocket systems into its arsenal. It has approximately 370,000 personnel, with further expansion planned.
The force is now capable of operating both inside Russia and in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Structurally, its trajectory increasingly resembles that of a parallel security institution comparable to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), designed not only for internal stabilization but for regime protection.
Like the IRGC, Rosgvardiya now operates as a hybrid structure, combining domestic suppression capabilities with the capacity to function in high-intensity conflict environments abroad. In both cases, the force is institutionally insulated from the regular armed forces and directly subordinated to the supreme political authority to ensure regime durability.
Iran’s recent developments demonstrate how such parallel formations function during domestic revolt. During major waves of protests and social unrest, the IRGC has acted not merely as a riot-suppression force, but also as a guarantor of elite cohesion and regime survival. While regular army units were tasked with guarding strategic infrastructure and maintaining territorial defense postures, the IRGC assumed primary responsibility for stabilizing the domestic situation, invoking the pretext of defending the state against externally orchestrated destabilization. In that sense, Rosgvardiya’s institutional strengthening reflects a similar anticipation of internal volatility and a deliberate preference for insulated coercive authority.
Prioritizing regime insulation over operational consolidation suggests a clear emphasis on coup-proofing.
By reinforcing this parallel chain of command, Putin has established a counterweight within the coercive apparatus that can operate independently of, and, if necessary, constrain, other military institutions. Prioritizing regime insulation over operational consolidation suggests a clear emphasis on coup-proofing. In a future crisis, the Kremlin is likely to rely on a politically loyal force whose command structure remains embedded within the presidential vertical and operates through a command structure directly subordinated to the Russian president.
Rosgvardiya’s expanded mandate is also visible in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Since 2022, Moscow has relied on Rosgvardiya units to conduct counter-partisan and anti-resistance activities, filtration measures, and pseudo-elections. Ukrainian estimates indicate that more than 35,000 Rosgvardiya personnel were deployed across occupied regions as of early 2024, organized into brigade-level formations and tactical groups equipped with armored vehicles and artillery systems. Moreover, the Kremlin continues to ramp up its presence in occupied territories. For instance, in February 2026, the Kremlin deployed additional Rosgvardiya units near administrative facilities and along key routes to bolster security and the region’s infrastructure in occupied parts of the Zaporizhzhia region.
The increase in the influence of Rosgvardiya should therefore be understood as Putin’s aim to insulate his regime from potential dissent at home and in the occupied territories of Ukraine. By institutionalizing a parallel command structure, expanding its military capabilities, and embedding the force directly within the presidential chain of authority, the Kremlin is reinforcing insulation within its coercive system amid prolonged war.
Rosgvardiya’s transformation signals not only the Putin regime’s anticipation of potential domestic instability, but also its recognition that prolonged war increases the structural risks within its own coercive system. For the West, Putin’s restructuring of Rosgvardiya could minimize the likelihood of sudden elite fracture and indicates that the Kremlin is actively insulating its regime against domestic instability. Rather than signaling Putin’s weakness, it demonstrates his determination to reinforce anticipatory mechanisms to suppress any form of domestic dissent.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.