In the early days of Russia’s full-scale “special military operation” in Ukraine, I was asked what I would prioritize in Ukraine’s defensive war against the Kremlin’s invasion force. My answer was ground-based air defenses – not F-16s or other fighters, not bombers or attack aircraft, not artillery or tanks. But surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA).
Some thought I would say – or even wanted me to say – that Ukraine should get F-16s or some other Western aircraft. A few – including those without experience in the cockpit – suggested that the Ukrainian Air Force would benefit from getting the A-10 – an aircraft the US was putting in proverbial “mothballs,” or more accurately out to pasture in Davis-Monthan’s “bone yard” desert storage facility. But, despite the self-deluding hype, this attack aircraft was not really a tank killer that would survive in a threat environment of even 1980s Soviet air defenses.
Yes, I loved flying the F-16, but it is not stealthy at a 5th generation level like the F-22 and F-35, and thus also vulnerable to Russian SAMs. Plus, I knew the timeline that would be involved in getting Ukrainian pilots “up to speed” in the Viper, having personally trained Polish Air Force pilots coming out of the post-Soviet military aviation culture.
Priority: air defense
My answer to the question centered on national priorities: protecting the civilian population centers, the energy infrastructure, Ukrainian frontline defenders, and logistical supply lines to the front, from airborne threats.
An advantage Ukrainian defenders have in the ground war is they are fighting with supply lines on their own territory that reach back to Kyiv, Odesa, Lviv and beyond, to the allies supplying food, firepower, medical treatment, evacuation opportunities, and even water, all without having to resort to carrying in supplies behind them, whether equine or human.
Against Russia’s attrition strategy, these supply lines must be protected – and Ukraine is doing that in a newly evolved battlespace volume I call the drone zone.
After World War I, the first war to be fought not on a battlefield but in a battlespace, there was a school of thought among the fledgling proponents of air power that centered around strategic bombing, chiefly espoused by an Italian general, Giulio Douhet. Douhet believed the future of air war would be attacking “vital centers,” including what we now correctly consider war crimes – bombing civilians in cities and civilian industry – to get the enemy to capitulate by shattering their morale.
World War II generally falsified Douhet’s hypothesis. Londoners in the summer of 1940 showed that civilian populations more typically become steeled against the enemy aggressors, and frontline fighters are given a genuine cause to fight for that is more real than patriotic symbols or figureheads. I would argue Ukrainians are doing the same eight decades later.
Strategic bombing against military targets and economically important industries that fund an enemy’s war effort are worthwhile, effective, legitimate and legal under international laws of armed conflict. However, bombing, shelling or attacking civilian houses, hospitals, schools, kindergartens, shopping centers, heating plants, and pedestrians are not only atrocious and cynical, but wasteful, ineffective, inefficient and illegal under international law.
Nevertheless, not all political, diplomatic or military leaders are students of real history or international law, while some cherry-pick the part they want to believe and extol, including Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Out of necessity since February 2022, Ukrainian air defenses have evolved with new challenges and innovations each year, shifting from a desperate survival mode using Soviet-era systems, to a highly sophisticated, multi-layered Westernized network, with very significant advances that are thoroughly Ukrainian in origin.
Mutual denial of air superiority
In March 2022, I was living in Irpin as Russian Su-25 (NATO: Frogfoot) attack planes flew overhead in ridiculously close formation at about 50 meters on their way to bomb Ukrainian ground forces protecting Kyiv. Once, one flew directly over my house at about 07:00 local time: it went into about a 4-5 g hard turn and put out exactly one flare, hoping to decoy the Stinger I would have shot it down with had I had one. (Stingers have flare rejection, so if you expend a flare, that only sweetens up the shot.)
By about April, neither side would gain air superiority, creating a stalemate that persists even now for piloted/crewed warplanes.
While the S-300 (NATO: SA-20 “Gargoyle”) SAM system – used by both sides – is not a PAC-3 Patriot in its capability against cruise missiles and ballistic missiles; but a very formidable SAM against 4th generation, I.e., non-stealthy, fighters and bombers.
This has meant that both the Ukrainian Air Force and the Russian Aerospace Force are reluctant to fly their aircraft into the threat envelope of each other’s airspace. For Ukraine, this has meant it is not using traditional offensive piloted/crewed multi-aircraft strike package attacks against targets inside Russia, instead relying on long-range deep-interdiction drones and other tools or methods to engage strategic targets within Russia.
Meanwhile, Russian air superiority fighters have no work to do. Even if they supposedly have a handful of 5th generation fighters in the Su-57, these aircraft likely do not have the entry level requirement to be in the 5G club – stealth.
The Russian air force’s air-to-ground airplanes, therefore, stay inside the safety of Russian airspace, or the somewhat safe airspace over the Black Sea, or even as far away as the Caspian Sea for weapons release when delivering weapons destined for civilian targets. The Black Sea locations could well disappear as Ukraine is no doubt making unmanned surface drones with air defense weapons.
For the rest of this review of Ukrainian air defense evolution, we will concentrate on the surface-to-air components over the four-year timeline.
Survival and “Pop-up” Tactics
From February to September 2022, Ukraine was in survival mode, including its air defenses.
Despite Russia’s superior number of warplanes, Soviet-era S-300 and Buk systems forced Russian aircraft to fly low, making them vulnerable to man-portable systems like the Stinger. Kyiv essentially denied Kremlin pilots the air superiority that no manned aircraft would have over Ukraine until a true 5G warplane would enter Ukraine’s airspace
Early on, crucial intelligence sharing with the US enabled the successful dispersal of assets before the first missile salvos rained down on targets.
This phase ended when Tehran began supplying Moscow with Shahed drones in late autumn of 2022.
Integrated air defense: mixing Western systems with Ukrainian ingenuity
As allies in the US and Europe contributed air defense weapons, Ukrainians integrated their own system incorporating local eyes and ears to augment the electronic modern weaponry and early warning radars into its distinctly Ukrainian integrated air defense system (IADS).
Once Iran began supplying Russia with its Shahed-136 drones, Ukraine had to shift from relying solely on expensive SAM missiles to forming rapid-response mobile fire groups equipped with machine guns and spotlights.
Delivery of various air defense systems were promised by mid-summer of 2022, around the time when the US (then under President Joe Biden) and European countries decided that perhaps Ukraine was not going to lose quickly, and may at least be a thorn in Putin’s side. They were not seemingly concerned enough to give aid or permissions that would allow Ukraine to have a chance of winning.
The initial air defense systems began trickling in late in 2022 and accelerated through 2023, with NASAMS, IRIS-T, and Gepard anti-aircraft guns providing much-needed capabilities against cruise missiles and drones.
The National (formerly Norwegian) Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS) was first, with two units confirmed operational on Nov. 7, 2022, delivered by the Biden administration. The system uses the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) which is a “fire and forget” system due to its active radar design, meaning the missile doesn’t require external course updates.
As of early 2026 and Ukraine operates about six to eight NASAMS systems, with Norway and the US continuing to provide ammunition and infrastructure integration.
Patriots arrive
On Dec. 21, 2022, Biden officially promised the first Patriot battery as part of a $1.85 billion security assistance package, and in January 2023, Ukrainian troops begin training on the system at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.
A few months later, the first Patriot systems arrived in Ukraine through a joint effort by the US, Germany, and the Netherlands. In April 2023, Ukraine confirmed that two batteries were fully operational.
The deployment of Patriot batteries marked a massive shift, providing the capability to intercept high-speed ballistic missiles (Kinzhal/Iskander), which had not previously been available to Ukraine.
On May 4, 2023, the first shootdown of a Kinzhal (Kh-47) hypersonic missile occured over Kyiv, debunking Moscow’s claim that the weapon was invulnerable to Western defenses.
Then, on May 16, 2023, Ukraine repelled a massive Russian barrage targeting Kyiv, claiming to have intercepted six Kinzhals in a single night. One Patriot system was reportedly damaged but repaired shortly thereafter.
On Dec. 31, 2023, the Kyiv government reported a total of 15 Kinzhal missiles intercepted by Patriots throughout that year.
Scaling up to match Kremlin escalation and counter the US House
To save limited numbers of interceptor missiles, such as Patriots, Ukraine formed hundreds of mobile groups equipped with ZSU-23-4 and Gepard anti-aircraft guns, along with heavy machine guns specifically intended to hunt Shahed drones.
Why the effort to save missiles? Because all spending of money or the levying of taxes, i.e., all financial decisions for the US government, per the Constitution, must be voted on by the US Congress and must be initiated as bills in the House of Representatives.
How does it make it to a vote? The Speaker of the House, selected by a majority of its members, must bring each bill to the floor for a vote. If the Speaker doesn’t want a bill to be decided on, they simply don’t bring it to the floor.
So, despite not being the president at the time, Donald Trump was still the leader of the Republican political party, and he did not want Ukraine to get any military aid and certainly no weapons. He therefore told the Speaker, Mike Johnson, not to bring a bill sending weapons, including air defenses, to the floor lest they could end up in Ukraine. This halted weapons from the US for nearly a year.
With its FrankenSAM Initiative, Ukraine began modifying Soviet-era Buk launchers to fire Western missiles (e.g., Sea Sparrow or Sidewinder) creating hybrid systems to bridge the gap between systems available and the munitions supply.
And Ukraine began shifting to an offensive strategy, using long-range drones to destroy Russian aircraft and missile launchers on the ground before they could fire.
In the summer and autumn of 2024, F-16AMs arrived with additional upgrades along with new Viper pilots. These were recent graduates of the F-16 International Military Training, US Air Force (USAF) 162nd Wing, my last official USAF post at Morris ANGB (Air National Guard Base).
Of course my fellow Viper drivers have done extraordinary things, with at least one anti-cruise missile single-sortie ace announced publicly by the Ukrainian Air Force, but we will continue with the ground-based timeline.
Burgeoning domestic high-tech defense industry: laser cannons and autonomous anti-drone interceptors
The air defense future is now
In 2025, Ukraine formed a new military branch – the Unmanned Systems Forces. Among other weapons, it is employing AI-driven interceptor drones to ram and destroy enemy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), significantly increasing the protection coverage area, and upping not just the effectiveness, but also the efficiency, giving “more bang for the buck” – more drone kills, lower costs.
Ukraine has developed a prototype laser air defense system designed to counter Russian drones.
The system, known as Sunray, uses a portable laser weapon that fits into the trunk of a car and can be mounted on a pickup truck. After acquiring and tracking a target drone, the laser burns through a small drone in midair within seconds, causing it to fall.
According to the developers, the system was built in approximately two years at a cost of several million dollars and could be sold for several hundred thousand dollars per unit.
Strategic partnerships indicate Ukraine will be a major player in defense
At the 62nd Munich Security Conference (MSC), Ukrainian defense industry companies signed multiple agreements for joint ventures worth billions of euros, in addition to other recent cooperative defense industry arrangements with many related to ground-based air defenses.
Germany’s Rheinmetall is planning to build four factories in Ukraine that will produce anti-aircraft weapons, while Giehl Defence agreed in 2025 to triple its supply of IRS-T systems and establish long- local term local production.
State-owned manufacturer of weapons and military equipment JSC Ukrainian Defense Industry and Swedish aviation and defense company have Saab signed a cooperation memo to co-produce a next-generation air defense system and advanced military electronics on Ukrainian soil.
Perhaps this will be the Ukrainian homegrown Patriot rival I hear is in the works.