The US-Israel-Iran War will inevitably affect Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations. After all, the United States is supposed to be mediating an end to the war but is now headlong in an attack on one of the parties substantially contributing materiel to Russia’s war effort. Whether the different parties to the peace process like it or not, conditions have changed, and they will have to reconcile it in their respective negotiating strategies.
What has changed?
The ongoing conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran has diplomatic, economic, and military consequences across the globe. It is uncertain to what extent, and there are bound to be day-by-day changes in analysis of developments and estimates for potential outcomes. In the meantime, both the known and unknown effects will influence negotiating calculus just the same.
The unknowns are perhaps the most significant, as the world is unsure of how long this conflict may last, what disruptions it will have to the global economy, and what the resourcing demands will be to prevent expansion of the conflict further. Each of these factors will affect commitments to the Russia-Ukraine peace process, such as the Coalition of the Willing’s ability to dedicate forces or Ukraine’s partners’ capacity for immediate and postwar financial aid. This introduces uncertainty to the negotiating process where it was previously more assured.
But there are three known factors that will be influencing the negotiations going forward.
The first is that the United States and Israel have disrupted a source of war materiel for Russia. Since the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Iranians have provided missiles, drones, and ammunition to support the Russian war effort. With the current existential crisis, the Iranian government will be diverting these resources to its own military operations, in turn creating at least a temporary disruption in the delivery of weaponry and equipment.
Russia will likely seek to reconcile any lapses in delivery from Iran by looking eastward to its partner in North Korea. The North Koreans may be happy to oblige; however, this will still require a recalibration of production volumes and logistics operations to bring that equipment to the frontlines from the Far East. This is opportune timing for Ukrainian forces coming into the spring offensive. Ultimately, it introduces risk in the war effort for the Kremlin and opportunity for Kyiv.
The second known factor is that the US military struck one of Russia’s treaty security partners. While the January 2025 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty between Iran and Russia does not contain defense commitments (only provisions for nonaggression and consultation amid conflict), it introduces a new dynamic for the Kremlin which must consider how the US attack affects its tangible networks in the Middle East and perceptions of its reliability as a partner. Russia may decide to introduce additional interests into its bi- and tri-lateral negotiations involving the United States as a response to US actions in the Middle East.
The third factor is that the principal mediator for the Russia-Ukraine peace process is now embroiled in a separate conflict with Iran. Incidentally, the principal team for negotiations with Iran is the same for Russia-Ukraine negotiations; namely, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. That pair is also involved in the implementation of the Gaza peace plan, which, given Israel’s involvement in the conflict with Iran, will invariably be affected as well. The already stretched-thin peace envoy team is stretching even thinner with this conflict.
While that is a practical issue related directly to the negotiating process itself, there are bigger picture problems that can emerge from this conflict in terms of domestic political pressures and military resourcing. With regard to domestic pressures, there are midterm elections this November that will be heavily influential in the distribution of power within the US government, and the White House will seek to manage criticism of its foreign policy decisions. The conflict in Iran and the Trump administration’s performance in mediating the Russia-Ukraine peace process are two of the highest visibility issues.
Further, the United States is supposed to be the principal agent for ceasefire monitoring in the Russia-Ukraine postwar environment, but a prolonged conflict with Iran or its proxies will impact the US military’s resourcing for that mission. Even if the White House insists it can manage multiple problem sets, perceptions matter. If Kyiv or the Kremlin conclude that US attention and resourcing are diluted, they will adjust accordingly.
If the Trump administration is seeking resolution before the November midterms, it is more likely to squeeze Kyiv than to ratchet up tensions against Russia.
How negotiating strategies could be impacted
Negotiating strategies are built on a multitude of factors, including interests, constraints, tools for incentive or coercion, and alternatives. The aforementioned changes to conditions affect each of these elements in different ways for the three main parties to the current negotiations.
The most predictable adjustment will be from Russia. The Kremlin has many reasons to harden its negotiating approach. A distracted United States is a weaker partner for Ukraine, and if the Trump administration is seeking resolution before the November midterms, it is more likely to squeeze Kyiv than to ratchet up tensions against Russia to meet that artificial deadline. Also, if there is a significant disruption to Russia’s battlefield output based on reduced imports from Iran, the Kremlin will bluff so as not to reveal this potential weakness. Russia can execute this strategy at the negotiating table, or it can simply announce that it is walking away from talks altogether.
Ukraine’s adjustments may not come quickly. There is likely going to be disagreement within Volodymyr Zelensky’s cabinet about the right approach. Some will argue that Russia’s position is weakened after the blow to Iran, claiming that it is better to hold the line at the negotiating table and push the line forward on the battlefield. Others will claim that Ukraine’s window for reaching a somewhat favorable deal is closing. They will argue that holding out means potentially losing US support, which may outweigh the costs of territorial withdrawal. In such circumstances, maintaining the current strategy until clearer indicators emerge may be the most rational course.
The United States remains the wild card here. The best option for the White House is to use the recent conflict with Iran to signal its willingness to ratchet up pressure against the Kremlin. That has not been the modus operandi for the Trump administration up to this point, but Trump also campaigned on starting no new wars, so a change in approach is still possible. Nevertheless, given the domestic political conditions, the White House is more likely to increase pressure on Kyiv, citing the competing requirements while delivering a “take-it-or-leave-it” proposal.
The next round of negotiations will be the most important in this current series of talks. It will deliver a clear indication of the new trajectory for the peace process following the start of the conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran, illustrating whether the parties are negotiating based on yesterday’s assumptions or today’s realities. The conflict in the Middle East has altered the conditions in the negotiation, and the success or failure of the peace process will depend on which parties adapt the most effectively to the new strategic reality.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.