If Trump really is calling an end now to the war in Iran what are the key conclusions we can draw from events over the past ten days or so?
First, that Trump is an incredible risk taker. He is prepared to take risks that no other POTUS likely would have been prepared to tolerate. This war was a high-risk operation with unclear goals and no real, plausible end game which could be imagined.
You have to ask yourself why did Trump do it then? And my only conclusion is that Trump is willing to take extraordinary risks to change the news cycle, whether that is from Epstein or simply his poor roll ratings heading into midterms.
The obvious questions are why he is so sensitive about the Epstein issue - note therein that Democrats last week managed to get the DOJ to release fresh allegations relating to Trump over the Epstein affair.
This all then begs the question what other extreme risks is he willing to take going forward if the poll ratings don’t turn or Epstein remains in the headlines?
This is a POTUS who is willing to do the unthinkable. So, can we imagine him returning to the Greenland issue, lifting all sanctions on Russia and pulling support for Ukraine to force Ukraine to accept a peace deal with Russia, or messing with midterms?
Literally almost anything is possible but as we saw with the Iran war this POTUS is willing to do extreme things which can take global markets to the brink, and over the brink.
Second, I guess when it comes to markets, POTUS does seem to have limits. With crude oil prices close to free fall and the gas price at the pump approaching $4 Trump realized the need to do a TACO, to try and manage market sentiment to stem the falls.
It has worked to a degree thus far, but it is unclear whether this still means an end to the war with Iran. Keeping the war bubbling away but limiting the impact on the price at the pump to keep it below $4 a gallon might still be a risk worth paying for Trump if it keeps the news cycle away from Epstein et al.
But it’s not just about oil prices when it comes to the Gulf as we realized this week, the Gulf states are now so key to so many global supply chains in chemicals, logistics, fertilizer, et al. If the Straits of Hormuz are not lifted soon the impacts to the global economy of the on-going war will still be very significant and could well still be globally systemic.
Third, you cannot just decapitate the Islamic Republic and expect the regime to be toppled. Indeed, Trump and Israel thought they had killed forty odd top leaders in the first strike against Khamenei but it had little real impact.
Khamenei’s son has been named as leader and arguably is even more extremist than his father. Iran is not Venezuela, and the U.S. and Israel cannot just pick its leader.
Fourth, the opposition is weak in Iran, understandably perhaps after decades of brutal repression. And hopes that ethnic groups, like Kurds would rise up and do the U.S.’ dirty work for it have been dashed.
The regime still controls the tools of control and repression domestically and has a hardcore of 15-20% which are willing to do anything to ensure the regime’s survival.
Fifth, the regime has endurance, and if the U.S., and Israel want regime change then they will have to put large numbers of troops, or boots on the ground. Thus far they have been unwilling and without clearly defining the goals and mission, allies are unlikely to rally to the cause as they did with Gulf War I.
Sixth, as with Trump, the Islamic Republic also has few risk limits when it comes to a situation when the threat is seen as existential.
We saw that in demonstrations a few months back when the regime likely killed tens of thousands of its own citizens. And again, we saw that over the past ten days when the Islamic Republic did the unthinkable and hit out at neighboring Gulf states, oil assets and tried to close the Straits of Hormuz.
Seventh, the Gulf states and the global economy are the soft spot for Iranian retaliation. Actually, the Iranian nuclear program has proven a distraction and has proven ineffective in countering the risks of US/Israeli attack - actually the nuclear program encouraged that very attack. The nuclear program failed as a deterrence.
The proven deterrence for Iran has been its ballistic and more particularly its drone program and its ability to strike nearer to home, at Gulf states and its neighbors, giving it an ability to rock the global economy, and to bring Trump to the table last night suggesting an end to hostilities.
Herein it was Iran’s ability to attack and breach Gulf defenses which has proven so effective in hurting the Gulf states’ economies and global energy and broader markets.
And for the Gulf states, and Iran’s neighbors it is very hard to defend against a wounded Iran, willing to lash out and with access to low tech drones, as well as more advanced ballistic missile technology.
The US and Israel have made this war about getting rid of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile technology but how do they counter the threat from much lower tech and cheaper drone technology?
As the war in Ukraine has proven its is almost impossible to have a 100% defense against drones when that war is a war of technological iteration.
Likely the drone threat to the Gulf states’ economies from Iran will endure long after the current war ends. So how do you counter that threat if you are not prepared to put boots in the ground to ensure regime change?
Eighth, and related to seven, the Gulf states’ business model of diversification from oil and energy to tourism, logistics, et al has been based on assured security.
They relied on the US backstop - US bases - to deliver that but actually those very same bases made them targets. They also thought that an economic outreach to Iran would buy off the risk from an attack from Iran, but that also failed.
How can the Gulf states assure their security and retain their current business models to ensure their economic well-being? Is there ever a real defense against the newfound Iranian drone threat?
Is the future more regional defense cooperation, to include Türkiye, Europe, et al? Will they move to develop a Gulf Golden Dome? But can even that be secure?
Ninth, if the evidence is right then Russian helped Iran target US assets in the Gulf and strike them. Trump’s response was though not to sanction Russia, but actually to lift oil related sanctions on Russia. Russia was rewarded for its support for Iran - some might say bought off.
But again, Trump showed his unwillingness to hold Putin to account. Trump seems intent there on normalizing relations with Russia.
Notable also that as the focus turned to Trump’s failing war on Iran, we again saw resurrection of Russia - Ukraine peace talks. Note above - and fears that Trump will again try and sell out Ukraine.
Indeed, Trump’s war on Iran, helped Putin by driving oil prices higher, helping fund a longer war, and as noted above allowed Putin to negotiate an easing of sanctions.
If those sanctions remain lifted, irrespective of the longevity of the war in the Gulf, Putin will benefit from a softening in the sanction’s regime and more dollar inflows to fund his war on Ukraine. Trump’s war on Iran, hence, likely came at the price of extending the war in Ukraine.
Tenth, irrespective of the point above, because of its position as the number one drone killer, Ukraine has positioned itself as a key strategic ally for Gulf states, as a potential future supplier of drone defenses.
This will give Zelensky the cards, and cash, which Trump suggested he lacked just one year or so back in that infamous Oval Office meeting. Gulf states will be queuing up to contract Ukraine to run their drone defenses.
Eleventh, the war in the Gulf and the push higher in energy prices again underlined the weak position of Europe, given its reliance now on energy supplies form the Gulf, having tried to diversify away from Russia.
The war also just underlines still the weak security position of Europe - the U.K., et al struggling to muster a defense to help Gulf states, or even EU member states like Cyprus. Europe was not even able to defend its own energy security interests in the Gulf as it lacked defense capability.
Contrast this with Europe’s significant contribution to Gulf War I when it still had its Cold War defense capability.
Twelfth, notable that the Gulf states even broached the issue of freezing Iranian assets under their jurisdictions to hold them to account for their attacks on Gulf states.
Oh, the irony that these same Gulf states had been amongst the first to criticize the West for freezing Russian assets for Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Clearly a states assets are no longer safe in a foreign jurisdiction and if a state acts as an aggressor and breaks norms of international behavior then these assets can be subject to freezing and seizure. One can read into what this means for reserve asset status, or the price of gold.
Reprinted from the author’s @tashencon blog. See the original here.
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.