Drones are no longer just shaping the war in Ukraine – they are defining it. What began as an improvised response to a lack of manpower has evolved into a technological arms race, shaping not only how battles are fought but where they reach. Ukrainian forces, driven by innovation and necessity, have managed not only to hold the front line but to strike far beyond it – targeting military infrastructure, ammunition depots, drone production sites and even oil refineries deep inside Russian-held territory.
At the center of this transformation are specialized units like Typhoon, a special-purpose unmanned systems unit of Ukraine’s National Guard, established in 2024. Operating across key directions such as Kharkiv and Pokrovsk, the unit focuses exclusively on drone warfare and electronic systems, from reconnaissance and strike UAVs to electronic warfare and interception. Built largely by volunteers and veterans of special forces units, Typhoon combines technical expertise with battlefield experience, constantly adapting to a rapidly evolving war.
One of its key figures is “Yuri,” the call sign of a lieutenant colonel originally from Crimea. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, he was the CEO of a construction company in Ukraine. When it began in 2022, he volunteered and initially fought as an infantryman, including in battles around Irpin, Kharkiv and Donetsk region. Today, he serves as a group commander responsible for electronic warfare support within Typhoon.
Kyiv Post met Yuri in Kharkiv for an exclusive interview.
Kyiv Post: What is Typhoon’s role on the battlefield?
Yuri: Our main task is to protect our units from enemy UAVs while gathering intelligence on enemy positions. We scan enemy-held territory, map radio signals, intercept and decode communications, and pass that information on to our units.
Based on this, we identify targets and guide strike crews. We also support air defense units by tracking aerial targets and helping them adjust their engagement in real time – correcting direction and altitude so targets can be intercepted more efficiently.
We are responsible for jamming and protecting our own communications, ensuring that our crews can operate despite enemy interference. Alongside this, I oversee the organization of supply chains for these operations.
Overall, our role combines intelligence, coordination, and electronic protection to support both strikes and interceptions on the battlefield.
At what point do you know whether a mission is likely to work or fail? And how much of your work is affected by Russian jamming?
It’s a constant game in the radio spectrum. We are always searching for channels that are not jammed, while the enemy is trying to detect and block the frequencies we use. As soon as they do, we switch again. It’s a continuous, dynamic fight.
GPS is often unreliable or unavailable, so operations rely primarily on radio frequencies and the use of repeaters – including airborne repeaters – which allow us to extend our range deeper into enemy-held territory.
We also maintain detailed maps of jamming zones and frequencies, including estimates of how effective enemy interference is in different areas. Based on that, each crew plans its route – choosing altitude and direction to avoid what we call “jamming clouds” – areas of heavy interference.
Ultimately, the key is to find usable frequencies. It’s impossible for the enemy to jam the entire spectrum, so there are always gaps, but you have to identify them and adapt quickly.
And how often do you still lose control of drones because of jamming?
The goal now is not necessarily to reduce losses dramatically, but to keep the success rate at the same level while Russia increases the number of jamming systems on the front. They have more and more jammers. So, if we can maintain the same success rate under those conditions, that’s already a good result.
Yes, we still lose drones. But they lose far more, largely thanks to our jamming.
How did you end up in Typhoon? Was that your own decision, or did it just happen over time?
I started fighting along with the current commander of Typhoon. We served in the same unit and took part in assault missions together from the very beginning of the war. So we knew each other well and trusted each other.
After two years of war, when we realized that we were ready to create a new unit, we decided to do it. It was not just the two of us – there were several people involved – but there was already trust between us.
Why drones? What drew you into this kind of warfare?
At the very beginning, the decision was driven by necessity. We understood that we could not fight Russia symmetrically. We had fewer infantry, fewer resources and fewer people. So we needed to find a way to save lives. We had to become smarter, more technically advanced, more modern and more flexible in our approach.
At first, nobody really trusted this idea. It was more of a volunteer initiative. We bought drones with our own money and collected donations because many people thought they were just toys, not serious weapons.
In reality, all the officers and founders of Typhoon are skilled first-person view (FPV) and drone pilots. The commander and I, along with the others, all know how to operate them. So we understood from the inside how this direction could work.
Who are you supporting most directly – infantry on the ground, artillery, or both?
We have groups responsible for different depths of attack. I would divide it into three zones: the nearest zone, up to 20 kilometers; the second zone, from 20 to 50 kilometers; and the third zone, beyond 50 kilometers.
What we support depends on the target and on the mission assigned by the Second Corps of the National Guard. If we expect active enemy infantry movement in the nearest zone, we prepare drones suited for infantry targets. If the main target is artillery deeper behind the line, we use a different type of drone.
These zones all operate simultaneously, depending on the mission.
What kinds of drones do you rely on most right now?
In general, we use a combination of different drone types depending on the mission. Some are used for reconnaissance to gather intelligence and identify targets, while others are used for strike operations. Closer to the front line, we use smaller and more flexible systems adapted to specific tasks. For deeper targets, we rely on larger fixed-wing drones that can carry heavier payloads over longer distances.
In Typhoon, the majority of personnel are involved in strike missions.
What role do fiber-optic drones play compared to wireless systems?
We rely on both wireless and fiber-optic drones, each with its own advantages and limitations. Fiber-optic drones are very reliable in terms of connection because they are not affected by radio jamming. At the same time, they are larger and slower, since they have to carry a cable, which makes them easier to detect and shoot down.
One of their key advantages is that they can be used as traps. They can land, remain in a low-energy standby mode, and wait for a target – such as a vehicle or infantry – before restarting and attacking.
Currently, Russia holds a clear advantage in fiber-optic drones. Their logistics chain is shorter, and they are able to scale production faster. As a result, they have several times more of these systems than we do.
Why can’t wireless drones be used in the same way?
Because of what we call “radio shadow.” The lower a drone is to the ground, the weaker the signal becomes. If a radio-controlled drone is sitting on the ground far from the operator, the connection may not be strong enough to restart it reliably. That’s why wireless drones usually need to stay higher in the air and cannot be used as stationary traps in the same way.
And most of these systems Typhoon uses are Ukrainian made?
Yes, almost all of them are local. We also have German Vector drones, but only in very limited numbers because they are too expensive, so we use them rarely and only for special missions. I would say around 90 percent of our drones are Ukrainian made.
How quickly is Ukrainian drone technology evolving right now?
Very quickly. Sometimes we see changes every week, not just every month. We are very flexible now, and since the appointment of the new defense minister, we can feel the difference. It is much better.
Manufacturers are working 24/7 to improve the drones. And now, production is being increased for the manufacturers that actually prove effective. Before, both good and poor-quality producers could be multiplied. Sometimes we received relatively poor-quality drones. Now the quality is improving steadily.
What makes Typhoon effective compared to other units?
First, motivation. Around 90 percent of our people are volunteers – former civilians, engineers, IT specialists and people from technical backgrounds. They were not career soldiers. Their motivation is different.
Second, we are more flexible in decision-making. We do not carry the full burden of standard military bureaucracy, which allows us to act faster. We can do in one day what a standard procedure might take a week to do. If the front changes quickly, that speed matters.
We are also highly specialized. UAVs are our permanent focus. We follow all the updates and all the successful methods, whether on our side or the enemy’s side. If the enemy has something effective, we study it and adapt it for our own use.
Are you supported by the private sector as well?
Yes. We work closely with volunteers and charitable funds who invest in drone production. I would say around 70 percent comes through centralized supply, and around 30 percent comes from the private sector. But those 30 percent provide often the most modern, up-to-date, and unique systems.
For some targets, we need very specific ammunition for drones. If we ask the Ministry of Defense for this, it may take weeks. Through private contacts and volunteers, we can sometimes get it in two days.
In any case, we never have enough drones. So, we use both sources all the time.
Do you work directly with engineers and manufacturers to improve your systems?
Yes. We even have our own small laboratory. We buy spare parts, modify drones, and upgrade equipment ourselves. If we receive drones that are not fully modern, we can improve them with smaller modifications.
How much of your work is planned, and how much is improvised?
Everything is planned. Improvisation happens only in rare cases, when a commander on the ground has to make a decision quickly because the situation changes too fast and there is no time to ask higher command. But normally everything is planned in advance.
From your perspective, is the situation at the front improving for Ukraine, or is it more of a stalemate?
I can feel improvement now. I think it was the right decision over the last year to hold the line rather than launch large offensives before we were ready. The aim was to hold positions and reduce the number of Russian troops.
Now we can see that they also have a shortage of infantry. So, when we identify gaps in some areas, we can attack with small numbers of people and avoid large losses. I think that approach was clever.
I believe it was a mistake to launch the 2023 offensive under pressure. We were not ready. We did not receive everything we had asked for in terms of weapons, and we started too late, exactly where they were waiting for us.
As Typhoon is operating in the Kharkiv region, let’s talk about Kupyansk. From your perspective, is it fully under Ukrainian control?
I would say about 85 percent is under our control, and perhaps 10 to 15 percent is under theirs, mainly on the outskirts. There is a private residential sector with small houses connected to the city, and in some of those areas, in my personal opinion, enemy infantry may be hiding.
So where does Russia still have the advantage?
Russia’s advantage is in the quantity of infantry. They still have many more people than we do – sometimes 5 or 10 times more. But they do not seem to care about them at all. We are still shocked by that. Nothing has changed in three years. They just keep sending soldiers forward to die.
It is difficult for us to understand how those soldiers think. They can see bodies already lying in the trenches, and still they stand there and hope they will survive. I do not know whether they are more afraid of being killed by their own commanders than by Ukrainians, but that is how it seems sometimes.
And where does Ukraine have the advantage now?
Technology – especially drones – is where we have the advantage. We have many more types of drones than Russia. If they have 10 types of strike drones, we have 100. Our systems are more diverse and therefore more flexible.
Our tactics have also improved. We care more about infantry, and our losses are lower now than in previous years during similar operations. Communication between reconnaissance, commanders, and infantry is much better. Commanders now know much more clearly what is happening in real time and can control troops more effectively, which helps avoid unnecessary losses.
Has the change in the defense leadership also mattered?
Yes, very much. It changed the supply chain and the philosophy of supply, which is extremely important. I am pretty sure the new system will reduce the chances of receiving garbage – bad-quality drones and equipment, which sometimes happened before.
Do you think this new kind of tech war changes the way human life is perceived?
Yes. It becomes easier to make the decision. The most notable mission for me happened years ago, when I was still infantry. The emotions were much sharper then. It’s different now. When you kill the enemy while watching through a screen, it’s a completely different feeling from shooting him with your own rifle.
I think post-combat trauma for drone operators is generally not as severe as it is for infantry. We have drone pilots who have killed hundreds of enemies, but they still feel like IT specialists, not like warriors.
What keeps you going mentally in this kind of war?
We still do not have the results we need. We have lost too many friends, too many citizens of our country, relatives, and so on. We do not really have a choice. We have to fight until the end.
I strongly believe we will not get tired before the Russians do.
Is that because you know what you are fighting for, while they do not?
Yes. They understand less and less why they are fighting. Many of them [the enemy] probably do not even remember how or why it began for them.
Do you get used to this?
We never get used to it. We just become more experienced, and because of that experience, we avoid mistakes more successfully. But that experience was not free. We paid a lot for it, and now we have a duty to use it.
We are responsible, first of all, before the memory of the men who are already dead.
How long do you realistically think the war will continue?
It is a political question. My personal view was that Russia would ask for a ceasefire around November 2026. But if oil prices rise dramatically, as they are doing now, then Russia may gain another year – perhaps until the end of 2027. And for many generals and high-ranking officers on their side, this war is a gift – a chance to gain posts, money, influence, and to strengthen their corruption networks.
In your view, do they care more about money than about their own people?
One hundred percent. That is one of the biggest differences between them and us.
If this war ended, many Ukrainian commanders – generals, colonels, and others – would simply leave service and go back to civilian life, to their families, to rebuilding the country’s economy. They never planned to be military men forever. I am one example of that.
If you could change one thing right now – on the battlefield or politically – what would it be?
I would change the system of motivation and mobilization. I do not think mobilization is happening in the right way.
If politicians and parliament gave a real example to the people – showed them how to behave, how to sacrifice, how to lead – then the nation would be more ready to fight. Then you would not have to catch people in the streets and push them into service.
They need to lead by example. They need to show what they themselves are sacrificing.
People in the army want to see punishment. They want to know that if someone commits a crime, especially during wartime, that person will be held responsible.
Too often now we see someone simply lose his post, and that’s all. But that’s not enough. Not during a war, when the country is fighting and losing people every day. If someone steals money and then simply retires, that is not justice. He should be in prison.
Does that demotivate both soldiers and civilians who might otherwise be willing to serve.
You cannot push people to do something if you are not doing it yourself. That is the point.
What kind of country do you think Ukraine will be after the war?
I hope it will be a different country from the one we had before 2022. First of all, everyone now understands and agrees that Ukraine as a nation truly exists. Before, we were less united. Now, regardless of what politicians say or what struggles there may be between parties, I believe we as a nation will remain united.
Our self-confidence has increased dramatically. At the beginning of the war, many people hoped we would survive, but very few truly believed we could win, resist, and defeat Russian aggression. Russia was too big, too powerful, too well prepared. Many people were waiting for a miracle.
But after the first one or two months, everything changed. We understood that we could resist, that we could be successful, and that we could win.