Erik Melander, one of Scandinavia’s leading experts on armed conflict – combining rigorous quantitative research methods with extensive fieldwork across multiple conflict zones – answered five questions from Kyiv Post.
What’s your view about the Gripen fighter jet and its possible use by Ukraine’s armed forces?
“Gripen in many ways is an ideal aircraft for Ukraine’s air force…but it has to be paid for.”
Melander said Sweden’s Saab JAS 39 Gripen is an excellent fit for the Ukrainian Air Force’s needs because it was designed to fight Russia in a way Ukraine is fighting Russia: from remote airstrips where the aircraft is refueled and re-armed by mobile ground crew.
Technically, the plane is a good deal more advanced than any aircraft operated by Ukraine right now. Although for some countries Gripen’s relatively short range might be a liability, for Ukraine and its need to defend domestic airspace, the plane is fully capable.
One problem could be that the Gripen has a US-made engine, and so a Ukraine-operated Gripen could be subject to political pressure from Washington. Ukraine “might” produce such an engine, but it would take many years of development. The key factor is financing: For Saab to produce Gripens for Ukraine, money has to be found to pay for it.
What has Sweden learned from Ukraine in its war with Russia?
“Ukraine has shown how important rapid innovation and acceptance of new developments are…in Sweden, we need to learn to do this faster.”
Melander said that Ukraine has shown that national security in modern war depends on a country’s adapting quickly to changes in military technologies, and that in the West, there is still a good deal of resistance to accepting change. Ukraine has adapted to war by allowing innovation and development to take place in its military at the level of operating units and individual developers. The Ukrainian approach allows for wide experimentation and quick identification of real solutions, a little like the Maoist “Let 1,000 Flowers Bloom” strategy.
In Sweden (like in many Western states), the approach is more conservative and top-down. There is reluctance to give authority for the development of new military technologies to operators and troops, because in the West, professional state institutes working with big corporations usually do that job.
Western exercises with Ukrainian troops using Ukraine-developed technologies help weaken biases against bottom-up development, because on the ground, Ukrainian solutions work. A good example is recent NATO training in Estonia, in which a small Ukrainian drone unit “destroyed” more than a dozen legacy tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in less than an hour. This came as “a wake-up call.”
How does Sweden perceive the Russian threat, and how does Ukraine fit into Sweden’s concept of national security?
“Russia will remain a threat to Sweden for decades…Ukraine and Sweden need to cooperate.”
Melander said from its own national security perspective, Sweden doesn’t fear a Russian invasion of Swedish territory, and that in the case of a ground war, Sweden’s assumption is that its ground forces would fight in Finland and the Baltic states. The main Swedish focus in deterring Russia from starting a ground war affecting Sweden is in developing its air force and navy, because those forces are more capable of quickly intervening outside Sweden where Russian aggression might take place. Currently, the main Russian national security threat to Sweden is covert operations and sabotage.
From the perspective of Swedish national security, Ukraine needs to be a strong bulwark against Russia for the long term; for Sweden to be safe, Ukraine must remain militarily capable and stable. This means that it is strongly in Sweden’s national interest to have a very close military relationship with Ukraine. Both countries have an existential national security interest in deterring Russian military aggression. In addition, thanks to the differences in their economies and national technological base, each country has advanced military technology that the other has much less of, so military tech exchange between Ukraine and Sweden is logical.
How seriously does Sweden take Russian hybrid war tactics, and how prepared is Sweden for that?
“I think at the level of the Swedish national leadership this threat is well understood and taken very seriously…at the level of the average citizen, the understanding is probably not as detailed…but Russia is widely seen as hostile.”
Melander said the Swedish national leadership is under no illusions about Russian hostile intentions towards Sweden and Russian willingness to use hybrid war tactics to undermine Swedish resilience and will to oppose Russian aggression. The average Swedish citizen probably doesn’t have as nuanced an understanding of specific Russian hybrid war tactics, but, that Russia wants to weaken Swedish confidence in state institutions and national defense is commonly known in Sweden. A popular Swedish joke about a minor problem like a computer glitch or a poorly functioning stop light is “I bet it was the Russians that did that.”
The view, however, that Russian propaganda and Russian fake news should not be suppressed is widely held in Sweden because such censorship as that would directly contradict Swedish values about free speech. The Swedish view is that malicious Russian messaging should be allowed into the Swedish information space, where debate and free exchange of ideas will necessarily expose the lies.
How ready is Sweden to confront and contain Russia?
“Sweden is determined to fight as a part of NATO (i.e., if Article 5 is triggered) and this view is widely shared across all major political parties and almost all the Swedish public…there is a feeling that Sweden has done a lot…But I think that there is willingness in Sweden to contribute more.”
Melander said that Sweden’s national commitment to preventing Russian aggression is wide-reaching and across society, and that Swedes have few illusions that it will require the commitment of resources and even more resources.
In Sweden, there is a general feeling that Sweden has already done a lot to contain Russia and help Ukraine, and it is well-known that, relative to population size, Swedes are sacrificing more, per capita, than larger European states like Germany and France. The Swedish military has said that in some weapons categories, it is no longer possible to send equipment to Ukraine because it would leave Swedish forces too poorly-armed.
That being said, Swedish willingness to sacrifice for national security and to help Ukraine is strong, and should there be a need, it’s probable Swedish taxpayers would be willing to meet that need.
Regarding field confrontations with Russia and Swedish forces – this primarily being along international airspace or sea space borders – the Swedish policy will probably stay the same: Ignore Russian provocative acts, but enforce the line.
Erik Melander, Professor of War Studies, Swedish Defence University (Image provided to Kyiv Post by Melader)