Key Takeaways from the ISW:
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations across the theater throughout the first day of the May 9 – 11 ceasefire.
- Russian forces used the ceasefire to conduct rotations, reinforcements, redeployments, and logistics throughout the theater, likely to support imminent future offensive operations.
- Russia and Ukraine have not yet conducted the reportedly agreed to prisoner-of-war (POW) swap of 1,000 prisoners each as of May 9.
- Ukrainian defense successes on the battlefield have prevented Russian forces from making significant advances across the theater, depriving Russian President Vladimir Putin of any significant operational successes to celebrate on Victory Day.
- Russia’s war in Ukraine forced Putin to hold his Victory Day parade on a much smaller scale than in previous years, as Putin cannot reliably defend deep rear areas, including the capital, from Ukrainian drones.
- Putin’s insistence on holding the Victory Day parade despite the threat of Ukrainian strikes reflects Putin’s refusal to accept the realities of the current battlespace.
- Putin used Victory Day to position the war in Ukraine as this generation of Russians’ equivalent to the Soviet Union’s role in World War II.
- Russian forces continue to suffer increasing casualty rates.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Borova direction.
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