Calls to oppose migrants from other countries are spreading rapidly across Ukrainian social media. These appeals are often filled with hatred and xenophobic rhetoric, often grouping together both legal (including employed) and illegal migrants.
Where are these messages coming from?
The first posts about the alleged threat from mass migration – particularly involving people from India and Bangladesh – began appearing on social media, notably Facebook, on May 9, when Russia celebrated its annual Victory Day.
At first, few people paid attention to these messages. What did stand out, however, was that most posts were openly manipulative and contained clear signs of ethnic hostility.
Some posts claimed that migrants in Ukraine received monthly salaries of Hr.35,000 ($800), compared to Ukrainians allegedly earning only Hr.12,000 ($273). Most of these messages have been created using AI and spread via Telegram.
The claims, of course, are generally false and intended to manipulate. Such salaries are sometimes offered to foreign workers with specialized skills. Ukrainians working in similar positions often demand twice as much.
On May 10, the number of posts about the so-called “migrant threat” increased significantly. The manipulation began to resemble an information and psychological operation. Some posts claimed that while Ukrainian men are dying in the war, migrants will take their place next to their women.
Almost immediately, theories emerged suggesting a Russian connection behind the campaign, aimed at destabilizing the country.
Suspicions deepened when organizers of the anti-migrant campaign began calling for street protests, including in Kharkiv, which is under daily bombardment by guided bombs and ballistic missiles.
Doubts about a Russian connection disappeared entirely after similar anti-migrant hysteria began spreading in neighboring Moldova. There, social media posts criticized the pro-European government of President Maia Sandu, which is attempting to pull Moldova out of Russia’s sphere of influence. The same message is retranslated – “Instead of returning our people from Europe, PAS [Sandu’s party] is moving hostiles into our country.”
When nearly identical messages appeared in another country and were amplified by anti-government and pro-Russian separatist groups – including media linked to the unrecognized pro-Russian Transnistrian Moldavian Republic, which has existed under Russian military protection in Moldova since the mid-1990s – the source of the campaign became obvious.
Is Ukraine really facing a migrant influx and are Ukrainians concerned?
The Russian origin of this information campaign does not change the fact that many Ukrainians have bought into the propaganda, expressing fears about migrants and supporting discriminatory and xenophobic rhetoric.
But are migrants really a problem for Ukraine?
The actual number of migrants in Ukraine remains extremely small. Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s population, according to census figures, was more than 40 million people, including 300,000 foreign nationals – many Europeans. According to Kyiv Post sources in government institutions, there has been a substantial exodus of foreign nationals from Ukraine since 2022.
At the same time, many foreigners arrived in Ukraine, particularly volunteers participating in the resistance against Russia.
As for labor migrants, there are currently just over 11,000 in Ukraine as of 2026, according to Vasyl Voskoboinyk, president of the All-Ukrainian Association of International Employment Companies.
Ukraine currently has approximately 200,000–250,000 foreign nationals, or about one in every 100 residents based on the population in government-controlled territory being around 25 million.
Among these, Ukraine is home to many foreigners who are culturally similar, including Russian citizens who oppose Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policies, some of whom fight alongside the Armed Forces of Ukraine against Moscow’s forces. There are also many Belarusians and Europeans involved in business projects.
Ukraine has in fact long been a place where diverse cultures interact. These include settled Slavic agricultural cultures in the north and nomadic Turkic-Mongol peoples in the southern steppes. Among the ancestors of modern Ukrainians were Semitic peoples, Turkic groups such as Tatars and Kipchaks, Iranian peoples such as the Scythians, as well as Baltic, Germanic, Scandinavian, and Greek populations. Historically, Ukraine has also been home to significant Jewish and Armenian communities.
In general, this coexistence has been peaceful. Today, large Caucasian, Afghan, Jewish, and Central Asian communities continue to live in Ukraine.
The number of labor migrants holding foreign passports remains small.
According to Voskoboinyk: “In 2024, 6,123 work permits were issued, but 4,083 were canceled. In 2025, 9,582 permits were issued, while 3,310 were canceled. In the first quarter of this year, 2,495 permits were issued, although the number of canceled permits is still unknown. Moreover, receiving a permit does not mean a person can actually enter Ukraine. They still have to cross the border, which is not always possible. Even those arriving on tourist visas must show proof of $7,500 in their bank account. The overwhelming majority of migrants cannot meet these strict conditions.”
Voskoboinyk made the point that most foreign workers in Ukraine are employees of major road construction companies that have been repairing and building roads in Ukraine over the past six years.
“Among these 11,000 labor migrants, the largest group is Turks – around 1,400. They are followed by citizens of Uzbekistan and India, with roughly 900 each. There are far fewer people from Bangladesh and Pakistan – around 100 each,” he said.
For now, migrants are not rushing to Ukraine.
“There are no lines of people waiting to come here. We are at war. Salaries here are nowhere near European levels, and Europe is very close. Also, migrants already have established language and cultural communities there,” Voskoboinyk explained.
Other factors behind demographic fears
Researchers believe that demographic panic among Ukrainians is driven less by reality and more by wartime trauma. Tens of thousands of Ukraine’s defenders have been killed. Hundreds of thousands more have been wounded. Millions living in the rear endure constant stress under ongoing attacks.
Russia openly admits that it is waging what many Ukrainians view as a genocidal war aimed at destroying or drastically reducing the Ukrainian nation. In occupied territories, cities that are not completely destroyed by Russian artillery and aviation often undergo ethnic cleansing. Local residents lose their homes and property, which are transferred or sold to settlers arriving from Russia.
This inevitably affects public consciousness.
“Ukrainian society is experiencing demographic panic. People understand that we are shrinking as a nation, and this creates a desire to isolate ourselves, to become an impregnable fortress and defend the purity of bloodlines. It is an irrational response that ultimately worsens demographic decline instead of solving it,” says psychologist Olha Dukhnich.
Another factor, she believes, is the psychological release from centuries of Russian imperial domination, during which Ukrainians were often treated as second-class people – especially if they refused to abandon their language and culture in favor of Russian identity.
“We lived under oppression and humiliation for too long. When such an identity finally gains freedom, it often asserts itself with excessive force. Former victims of humiliation sometimes reproduce the same logic toward others, becoming subjects of superiority themselves. During war, the desire to protect ourselves becomes so strong that we begin doing so by devaluing others,” Dukhnich adds.
The future of migration
At the same time, the idea that Ukraine will eventually face larger-scale migration after the war is likely a reality rather than a hypothesis.
Of Ukraine’s current population in government-controlled territory (approximately 25 million), a significant share consists of older adults and pensioners. The war triggered large-scale emigration among working-age citizens, children, and young people – up to six million in total. Another two million remain in occupied territories or in Russia.
In addition, Ukraine has suffered major military losses. Even before the war, the country’s death rate exceeded its birth rate, which was already among the lowest in Europe before 2022.
“Even without accounting for military losses, Ukraine’s population shrinks by 300,000 people every year. We have 6 births per 1,000 women, while maintaining demographic stability requires at least 22,” Voskoboinyk explains.
These figures suggest that even without the war, Ukraine’s population – already far smaller than in 1991, when it exceeded 50 million – could be cut in half over the next 50 years. By 2075, the country may have little more than 12 million residents. That would be clearly insufficient to sustain such an economically developed and resource-rich territory with fertile agricultural land, access to the sea, major ports and dense road and railway networks.
Is there a way out of the population crisis?
The issue of immigration in Ukraine is gradually shifting from theoretical debate to one which shapes policymaking, said Oleksii Pozniak, head of the migration department at the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Quality of Life Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, during an panel discussion.
The event was part of a series of public and expert discussions organized by the institute together with the All-Ukrainian Association of International Employment Companies and the NGO Office of Migration Policy, with support from the International Renaissance Foundation. The initiative is focused on preparing Ukraine’s State Migration Policy Strategy through to 2035.
Perhaps the launch of these discussions itself has become the trigger for Russian anti-migrant propaganda?
While migration policy remains unresolved, the government is trying to find labor resources within the country. This idea remains popular.
In particular, Prime-Minister Yulia Svyrydenko presented a labor market reintegration program targeting people aged 50 and older. This cohort had often been marginalized by employers preferring younger workers who generally accept lower salaries and make fewer demands.
Critics of the program point out that many participants will soon retire anyway, making retraining and employment only a temporary social measure. Others argue that older workers may struggle with physically demanding jobs.
Another direction involves developing urban infrastructure to help people with disabilities participate in the labor market. Many disabled Ukrainians living in older buildings cannot leave their homes without assistance.
Creating proper mobility conditions and development opportunities could potentially add several hundred thousand workers to the labor force.
However, there are limitations here as well, since such workers cannot always perform every type of job due to health restrictions.
Women represent another major labor resource. Ukrainian women are already replacing men in many sectors, from construction to truck driving and heavy machinery operation. Some are also serving in combat roles.
Even so, researchers believe this will still not be enough, as the labor market already lacks several million workers.
The problem is particularly severe in rural areas, where entire villages are either dying or shrinking rapidly due to both mortality and migration to cities.
The birth rate problem
Another major issue in Ukraine is the birth rate.
How can Ukraine compensate for population losses and demographic decline? Many support policies aimed at increasing birth rates. However, according to former Deputy Information Minister Artem Bidenko, international experience suggests such policies are not always effective.
“Often, the more a state invests in promoting higher birth rates, the weaker the results become. Over the last 15 years, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary has spent billions of euros on pro-natalist policies – mortgage holidays for large families, lifelong tax exemptions for mothers of four children, maternity capital programs, and an entire ideology centered around the ‘great Hungarian family.’ Yet in 2024, Hungary recorded its lowest birth rate of the past decade, with 1.38 children per woman.
South Korea spent $260 billion on family support over 16 years – more than any country in the world – and still has just 0.75 children per woman, effectively a global record of demographic failure despite record spending. This is important to remember when Ukraine’s public debate on demographics is dominated by simplistic solutions,” Bidenko said.
At the same time, many fear that large-scale migration could create problems similar to those seen in parts of Europe, including isolated communities, failed integration, and ethnic or social conflicts.
What do minorities say?
Akash Krishan is a Ukrainian of Indian descent. He was born in Ukraine, has lived in Kyiv his entire life, graduated from one of the country’s leading universities, and speaks Ukrainian fluently as a native language. He has visited India – the homeland of his ancestors – only a few times as a tourist.
Krishan says he has never experienced discrimination or humiliation in Ukrainian society because of his skin color or ethnic background. He currently holds a senior management position.
“Through my father, I know many mixed families where the father is Indian and the mother Ukrainian, or vice versa. They have children and live successfully in Ukraine. As for actual migrants from India, I have only met two in my entire life, and both left for India back in 2022,” Krishan says.
What should be done?
According to Bidenko, Ukraine needs a comprehensive approach.
“How do we create real incentives for people who left Ukraine to return? How do we increase labor productivity, since part of the demographic gap can be compensated through automation and robotics, as Japan has done? Which countries should Ukraine prioritize for labor migration partnerships – because, in reality, these are likely to be Belarusians, Moldovans, Georgians, Armenians, and yes, to some extent, people from Bangladesh or the Philippines?
“How do we build integration institutions before large migrant communities arrive, since integration fails without them? And how do we support Ukrainian families in a way that represents normal humanitarian policy rather than a magical solution to demographic decline?” he asks.
Bidenko adds that before answering these questions, Ukrainians must first honestly admit that the country’s population has already shrunk dramatically and make preventing further decline a national priority.