The interview with Prof. Grzegorz Motyka, historian and director of the Military Historical Bureau, was conducted during the Polish-Ukrainian Historical Congress, which took place in Baranów Sandomierski and was organized by the Juliusz Mieroszewski Centre and the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance.
Michał Kujawski: How do you assess the congress? Do such debates among historians actually influence reality, given the high level of social tension – and consequently political tension – surrounding the events of the Second World War between Poles and Ukrainians?
Prof. Grzegorz Motyka: It was the first major event in years during which historians from both countries were able to meet and discuss their research and historiographical achievements. They could also openly debate the issues on which they disagree. For the first time in a long while, there was also a serious discussion about the Volhynia massacre itself and the existing disagreements surrounding it, rather than only about how to prevent Volhynia from dividing us.
And this brings us to terminology. Ukrainians speak of the “Volhynia tragedy,” while Poles refer to a “massacre.”
That is one of the disputed points. The terminology itself shows how differently Poles and Ukrainians assess these events. Among Polish historians, regardless of their political views, there is a consensus that in 1943-45 an attempt was made to depolonize a vast area covering several provinces of pre-war Poland. Polish historiography speaks of mass crimes and approximately 100,000 Polish victims.
Were the crimes acts of indiscipline by individual units, or a planned operation?
Polish historians are convinced that this was an organized operation carried out by the OUN and UPA. Since the actions were conducted by a military formation, we can speak of genocide. The dispute concerns, at most, whether this should be described as a genocidal ethnic cleansing or simply genocide, or possibly – as nationalist circles argue – a particularly brutal genocide. The core thesis itself, however, is not in doubt.
On the Ukrainian side, the deaths of Polish civilians are not denied (although the number of victims is often minimized), but responsibility is frequently shifted onto individual units, their commanders, or the Ukrainian peasantry. However, no case has ever been confirmed in which peasants independently attacked a Polish village. In every case, the involvement of organized OUN or UPA structures can be demonstrated.
Emotions surrounding historical disputes obscure the actions of Russian intelligence services.
Speaking with Ukrainians, I get the impression that they fear Polish influence over Ukrainian historical memory. What do you think about that?
It works both ways. The same applies when someone in Ukraine equates the actions of the UPA with those of the AK (the Polish Home Army) or suggests that Volhynia should not be given so much importance. The subject is painful for Poles and troublesome for Ukrainians.
That does not change the fact that already in the 1990s, Polish policy adopted the principle of separating history from current politics. This is a sound assumption, which successive governments have followed to varying degrees. Thanks to that, today, when Ukraine is heroically defending itself against a barbaric Russian invasion, Poland is able to help it on a massive scale. I am proud of the role Poland and Poles are playing in supporting Ukraine. There is no contradiction between helping Ukraine and seeking truth for the Polish victims of Volhynia.
You speak about separating politics from history, but on the Ukrainian side there are voices claiming that Volhynia has become politicized. I myself believe the subject is politicized, but primarily because of the emotions and needs of Polish society. Only later, after several years of deadlock, did some political forces begin exploiting it. Why does Volhynia remain so important?
The Volhynia massacre occupies a special place in Polish memory because it was one of the bloodiest episodes of the Second World War. German or Soviet crimes – such as the massacres of Warsaw civilians during the Warsaw Uprising or the Katyn massacre – are well researched and no longer provoke political disputes today.
In the case of Volhynia, we have differing interpretations that fuel emotions, as well as a need for dignified commemoration of the victims. It would be naive to believe that these emotions can simply be artificially silenced. Attempts to suppress them end in political conflict. Had it not been for what I believe was a halt to the exhumations of Volhynia victims inspired by Russian special services, tensions would not be this high today.
Why do you believe Russian services were involved?
Several years ago, Ukrainian monuments in Poland and Polish monuments in Ukraine and Belarus were being vandalized. In my opinion, Russian special services were behind this. The goal was to create tensions and lead the Ukrainian side to ban further exhumations. That is exactly what happened, and for a long time the efforts of both states to break the deadlock ended in failure.
The very good agreement reached in 2019 between Presidents Andrzej Duda and Volodymyr Zelensky was sabotaged when a former soldier of one of the so-called Extermination Battalions [paramilitary units created during World War II to secure the Soviet rear and conduct scorched-earth policies] subordinate to the NKVD approached the Polish IPN (the Institute of National Remembrance) with his objections. The Polish IPN accepted them, which is incomprehensible to me.
It is also noteworthy that whenever the culture ministers of Poland and Ukraine announced talks on exhumations, materials related to the Volhynia massacre would appear on Russian intelligence websites. It is difficult to regard this as coincidence – especially during wartime. Fortunately, in this case the provocation failed, and both ministries reached an agreement that unlocked the exhumations.
That was when the ministers were Hanna Wróblewska and Mykola Tochytskyi.
Yes. Shortly after their meeting was announced, declassified documents concerning Volhynia were published on FSB websites.
Didn’t that raise any red flags?
Responsibility lies on both sides. I would like to make public opinion, officials, and politicians in both Poland and Ukraine more aware that emotions surrounding historical disputes obscure the actions of Russian intelligence services. They orchestrate various events in both countries. Effectively so – because the exhumation ban did come into force, and the issue negatively affected the willingness of part of Polish society to continue supporting Ukraine.
In 2025, there were also deepfakes – fabricated documents supposedly from the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture or false statements attributed to Professor Ossowski, who oversees the Polish exhumations. They suggested that the works had been halted, which turned out to be false. However, the authorities of both states reacted quickly.
Yes, these are not coincidences.
What role should history play in relations between states?
Polish expectations are actually quite modest – they concern cemeteries and respect for the memory of Polish victims. The maximalist demands of some politicians regarding changes to Ukrainian historical policy or its pantheon of heroes seem unrealistic and impossible for the Ukrainian side to fulfill.
It is also clear that the perpetrators of crimes against the Polish population will never be accepted in Poland. However, it is unhealthy when history begins influencing other areas of relations, including economic cooperation. Historical matters should proceed in parallel with the other aspects of cooperation. I also have the impression that history is sometimes used as a convenient explanation for current failures. It must be separated from the present day.
So what should the future of the past look like?
What has been happening over the past two years – the unblocking of exhumations and debates like the one during this congress – shows that both sides see the need for dialogue and action. Thanks to this, public opinion will feel that historical issues are being addressed and that the most important demands are being fulfilled.
It is worth emphasizing that all of this is taking place during wartime and in a very difficult situation for Ukraine, when some historians are serving in the military. I would like history to stop influencing politics so that politicians can focus on building the future.